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1.1
Thq size of the oiLshock.s compar,ed
The Community is now in the process of adjustment to a new incnease in
the price of oiL of such a magnitude that it can be expected to have a major
impact upon the pattern of demand from househotds and the chojce of techniques
ilof production in enterprjses. Given the considerabte infIuence of,this event,
both on short-term stabitisation poticy and on [onger-term economic prrospects,
it'is'important that poLicy decisions should take full account of the ifrpact of
the ojL price incr€ase on domestic prices, neaI incomes, baLance of payments etc.
so as to undertake adjustment poLicies on the reLevant basis. In order to bring
into reLief the effects of the oiL price increase, it is usefut to introduce a
distinction between these eff.ects and the norrnaI cycIicaL deveLopment of the
economies. With this purpose in view, this section presents the essentiaL
considered in isoLation.resuLts of estimates of
The foLLowing section,
the impact of the oil price,
in contrast to this somewhqt theoneticaL presentation,
1. The Conmunity ec,onomy uqder. the impact gf lhe oiI sho.cks
Siince 1973, economic poLicy has had to manage the super'imposjtion of major
externaL shocks - in the oiL price rjses of 1973 and 1979/80 - on top of the
traditionaL business cycLe fIuctuations. The second oiL shock Langety precip-
itated a turning point in the Community economy during the earLy months of 1980,
after two-and-a-haLf years of steady upswing. t,lhiLe the increase in oiL prices
in the two episodes has jn reaL terms (constant doLLars) been of simiIar order
of magnitude, severaI other cond'it,jons have been quite dif ferent. Capacity ]
utiLjsation was higher in 1973 than in'1979. Price increases for non-oiL com-
moditjes have been Iess than haLf as great in the second episode. Exchange-rate
appreciation of European currencies against the dotlan has atso diminished the
oiL price impact on this second occasion, aLthough thjs has also come with a
weakening in demand,.for Community production in home and externaI markets. A
more stabte internaL and external monetary poLicy has come with a more moderate
wage reaction to the second oiL shock. OveraL[, a [esser weakening in output
trends is expected in 1980 and 1981 compared !o 1974 and 1975, refLecting a
steadjer pattern of investment and consumption'behaviour and smaLIer swings in
sectoraL financiaL baLances. GDP growth in the Community as a whote is expected
to remain positjve in 1980 and 1981 (+113% and'+A.16'A). However, there is evidence
to suggest that the underLy'ing rate of growth of production potentiaL has decLined
substartia[y from about 4 1/2% up to 1973 to perhaps about 2 1/2% since then.
provides a broader picture of the actue! deve[opncnt of the Community economy
after the first oit shock and during the period immediateLy foLLowing the most
recent oiL price increases.
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: From December 1978 to thelmidd[e of 19d0, the,average doLLar price
of oil rose from just over S 13 pbr- ba,rreL to aLmost g 3J: In percentage
terms this represented an increase of about 150%, much Less than the 365%
increase which occurred in the 'finat months of 1973, but of course this
earLier increase was from a vefy tow base. Atmost 6 20 was added.to the
pricb of oi L in 1979-80 cornpared w'ith a rise of I7,3' ln 1973. Even
when account is taken of:the increase in prices generatLy which occurred
in the Community between the two shocks, the additionr_to the oiL'price in
1979-80 is sti[L somewhat Larger than that in 1973 $ 8,7' 'and I ?13,
respectlvety, at constant prices). i
The djrect cost of the oi[:price'rises to the Communityrs trade I
bata4ce, ignoring exchange-rate changesandany reduction in the voIume of
. 
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o1t1mporls,rsaLrno!tg7obiLLionfortlre197g-8or.ises.l,comparedwith
some 8 31 biLtion:in 1974, Expressed as a percentage of'Community imports '
of goods and serviceslih the years preceding the oit shocks, the costs to :
the trade'baLanee are of simiLar magnitude (1314'1, compared to :13% respectivety)
'" 
',(e)As a percentage of GDP,the doLlar increase in the oiL biIt"' was
3147, in the case of the recent price rise, as against 2r9% in thd earLier
ca:se (figures based on 1978 and:1973 GDP respective[y).
However, exchange-rate performance, here sumrnar.ised as thg ECUfs rate 
,
agajnst the dotlar, has been significantLy d'iffefent as between the two..
episodes. Aftqr the first ojt, shock the doLLar oiL price rise was amptified
f_or the Community by the depreciation of the. ECU (of 7r{A in 1974 as a
whoLe over September 1g?3>, whereas after the second oiL shock the doLtar,
Rricg rise was eased for the Community by an appreciation of the ECU
6f 5r4% in the f irst eight months of 1980 over Decenber 197E). h,h jLe
it 'is difficuLt to se[ect ths appropriate exchange-rates to be used in these
catcuLations, the above rates haye the eff,ect of changing the percentage
of GDP represented by the oiI price rise to 3,1% for the first oit shoct, and
3107, for the second (compared to the ?r97, and 3147. figures quoted above).
Thus, the oiL shocks are not"l of even cLoser size, with the exchange-rate
factor dim'inishing the dir:ect impact in. the case of the sccond oiL shock.
due to a dectine in the volirme of bi'|. i,rirports of around
increase in the Comnrunityrs oi t bJ t t between
1980 is expected to be about 815 bittion.
votume of imports unchanged. .
:+;(1) In fact,
l0%, the
1978 and
(2) l{ith the
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The theoretjcal impact on the price Level of the increased oiL
import biil., based on the above figures adjusted for exchange-rate changesris in
both periods in the first instance of a simiLir order of magnitude.'Thus the
theoreticaL, direct impact of the second oiL shock on the defLator for
totaL finaL demand was about 2 1/?%, and on consumer'prices about 3 1/?%.
) if theThese figures beqome substantiaLLy targer (atmost tujce as Large)
prices of aLL energy products rise to keep on a par with the price of imported
oiL, but data on the speed and ampLitude of this secondary energy price
movement wiLL onLy become fulLy avaiLabLe at a Later date. (The measure-
ment of energy price movements in practice is discussed in more detaiL in
the next chapter on prices and incomes)
Assessment of the impact of the oiL shock on demand and output
starts aLso with the reduction in purchasing power represented by the
increased oiL biLL of the European economy. The next mdjor factors to
be taken into account are offsetting in direction: on the one hand the
increased demand for exports to the oiL producing countries, and on the other
hand the tendency for the net shortfalL in demand to multipLy itself
through the workings of the cycLicaL process within the industriaLised
economies, to which shouLd aLso be added some depression of demand from
deveLoping countries. In the second year after the oiI price rises, a
substantial fraction of the increased oil producers'earnings ten$to be
spent in the industriaLised countries. It is pdssibLe that about haLf o'f
the Community's $ 70 biItion initia't tosi of purchasing power be
compensated by increased exports to oiI producers after two years (totaL
OPEC imports of goods and services fr-om aL L sources are fo.recast to
rise from g 1Oo bitLion in 1979.o?Y"lzO biLLion in 1981). 0n the other
hand the process of mu[tipLication of the demand depression within the
industriaLised countries.couLd more than doubLe the impact of the net
externaL shock on the leveL of activity after two years. Thus as a simpLe
ruLe of thumb, one might expect the impact on activity LeveLs to reach
a percentage of GDP somewhat greater than that of, the initiaL oit bitL
7
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incnease (uhich was 3d of GDP).(1);
If the whole grohtth profi[e. is, as a resutt of thg 9iL shock,
lowered for a period of years, then the Loss of, .demand and output cumutates.
to a very high tigure (the step toss in the levet, times the number of years).
However, such "demand-side" estimates become increasingty'inadeQuate as the
time horizon is extended beyond a short-run cycLicaL context'and if they
l
'ignore the suppLy constraints that werb impLied by the oiI shock in the first
ptace, For exampLe.a strong suppl:r side proposition could argue that the
uho[e mgdium-term profi[e of productive potentiaL had,been i.nstantly reduced
by the oiL price rfse with the growth:of reaI demand a[ong the previous
t.profite having become no Longer attainabte. The macroeconomic poLicy reaction
to thq oit ghock, either compensating the demand Loss or acceptjng it in
the short run r,rhi Le not accomnrodating a rise in inf fation, uriLL in practice
rqveaL,the judgement of poticy*makers on these questions - on which reLiabLe
mechanicaI quantification is extremeLy difficutt.
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(1) Estimates of the impact of 'the oiL shock on the growth of GDp hive b6n
made 
. 
yr i 19 -? T, r.t i -count ry mu it r p i r ".-i"a"i ;;-d; ;;'i'0"."r"..r"nloffi'are identified (8 community countries, canada, Japan, usn, oihl"r.,.P€i5'North, 
-other oEgq South, oeec, ."ntiri r;-;r;;;r;-;;;";;l3,"ano *rerest of the wortd). rhe initiar r.oss of ',:!"i rn.o;;-;;; 
"Jin-"i ii,i "tr-import ins count rv sroups Leads to-"-..0r;;;;" i;-i;p";lrtrr,i'.i' .."iti$-Hnen atLocatecl via a trade matrix, in a corresponding faLt in'eiport! Uitradins partners, and hence a further drop in-r".i i";;;;. ';";fi'.ia"'
::?:::":nt.round effects are simiLarty talen lnto account; rr,"-'eip*Ii*.,eff.ect of increased,OPEC imports and the incleased 
"rportr, .".["T;.;;; -''and hence.ipolJs thig gen;FiijS iil-tr,"-rupilyine countries ir'it,tilrt$'li*caIcutated in the same'bray;
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T,hus a host of furthgr factors are impqltant in trying to understand
the interaction between the oiL shocks.- as, jus.t summarised in isoLation
and in a highIy schematic fashion - and what has actuaLLy been happening
to the course of the economy, and what is LikeLy to happen over the
period ahead
The first oiI shock occurred at a time of higher capacity utiLisation
than in the second case. The rate of infLation of other commodjty prices
'h,asrargreatellnthettrstepisode'Thepsyc'hoLogicaLshockfactor'interms
of creating new uncertainties about the futurei.was aL'o of course tr.n,
greater in the first case. These factors wouLd tead one to expect a weaker
e of the second oiL shock -impact on the production cycLe in the cas
and aIso because the uncertainty factor was greater then.
Non-oiL commodity prices in fact rose about three times as fast in the
' two years to the end of 1973, compared to the two years to the end of
% and 45% respect'iveLy according to the Economis'trs dollar index) '
This, together with the exchange-rate factor aLready ment'ioned, accounts
, .i:. for the fact that the contribut{on of irnports to the rise in the overaLLil price Level has been probably onLy haLf as severe in 1980 than in 1974
(see TabLe 2.4 beLow)
More generatty, the evo[utjon of the terms of trade in the periods
19?4t75 and 1979t8A'is set out in Table 1.1 (where the data is constra'ined to
annuat average figuresr giving a someuhat different.picture to the less compLete
data avai l"abLe for more f ineLy sel.ected periods of time, as in the preceding
section). Here the dottar oiI price rises are seen to have been simiLar in
magnitude, as atso for other commod'ity prices (for which the main impact of the
price boom in the first episode had aIready been feLt in 1973>.'The differences
in exchange rate experience concern particuIarLy 1974 aga'inst 1979/80
t
I
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(in 1973 Commun'ity currencies reversed most of their Losses of 197e. The main
'further information cgnveyed by Tabte f.f is in ghowjng hor the prices of
exports and of non-bit commodities affected the totaL toss,in'the terms of
trade, rrhich uas nea-rly twice as sevqre in compari ng 1974 aLone (a toss of
9:62)with 1979 and 1980 taken togeiher (a toss ot 4.47); however, in 1975
one third of the loss experienced in 1974 was recuperated. The essentiaI
exptanatjon here is that 1974 sav a faster acceteration of costs in the Comnunity
with high reat wage increaaes obtained jn spiteof the termp of trade toss.
This in part'cause6 tne sUbstantiat recession i,n '1 975, uthich togeth,er: attowed
export prjces to regain ground over import.prices in tt"t year'] Uut onty
in h"ithl'y unsatisfactory eqonomic conditions. The more even profite tin lg?glSO,
despite the comparabte size of the oi t shocks, reftects a ,more moderatb,
- 
"clav-backrr of'the terms of trqde toss, but a Less sevpre recession ind tess
severe terms,of trade Loss..
'Thus import prices, unit tabour cost'sr.and-export prices have aLt been
growing nuch more stowty in 1g7,g/80 than in 1974. ionsumer prjces, however,
ut as fast in 1980:as in'1974,. reftepting pr.ice and tax poIicies
(described jn the next chapter) which, togeth;r uith the more. moderate Hage
bargaining; h.ave kept thl-l'tinanliaI position of the entei.prir. r.iao. ro."
-' shieLded.from the oiI prjce rise in this second epjsode.
-,- 
I These f aqtors are, a Lso important for the prospects fo'r the rea L l ,
economy through into 1981, compared to the experience of 1974-75. *
,TheCommiss.ion|sforecastsforthemaindemandcomponentsandGDP","i
given in TabLe 1.3. The overaLL weakening of GDP is expected to be
,s.ignificanttyLesS.in1980and1981than.in19?4and1975(thetota|-,9rowth
in the {wo pairs of years being respectiveLy 1o?A and Ar3%). ''
.
Ihere:are even greater differences in the pattern of behaviour of .,
'the main demand components taken individualty. This is not at first,s'ight ,'
'evjdent in the figuqes folr private consumpt'i,on, where the voiume growth 
,,.,
, ...,']
.tn1974.75and1980.81isaround1.1/27,perannUm:Thestrikingd.ifference
here Lies in the fact thatrwhiLe reaL wage increases rose very substantiaLLy
afterthefirsto'iLshock,thiswqsaccompaniedbysuchanintensific,ation
jnthec[imateofjnfLationand-uncerta.intythathouseho[dsavings
increased very sharpty; in 1980-81 it'is expected that'.ttre savings natio
wi||remainmLchmorestabLeatongs.idetheabsorptionbywage-earner.s
of the oil price nise. , '
The 1974-75 recessionoccurredprilcipaLty. !hrough a sharp faLL of
prjvate investment and run-down in stocks, which wa9 the consequence of
the cLimate of monetary instabiLjty, a.ut"Ly reduced profitabiLity in the
,;
t
.L
' 1.7I
ehterprise sector, and the sharp drop jn demand that occurred in the
course of 1974-75 (atthough this is smoothed over the annuaL average
f.igures in Tabte 1.2). By Eontrast a much miLder weakening in investment
and stockbuilding is anticipated for 1980-81, in part because of the
better fjnancjat position of enterprises (of course this descpi!s5 the
Community average, an9 there are eiceptions.- notabty in the case of the
I-
United Kingdom in 1980)
Government consumption is. a cont,r.ary inf Luence: 
'n..n" 
Sense
. that .it cont.inued to grow in.votume termi qUite strongty after the
f ir:st oiI shoc,k (2,2% in 19?4; 3,9% in 19?il, whereas it is expected
to grow more medestLy in 1980 (G.A7) and 1981 (r3Lr. This is a consistent
f the overaLL picture, in which budgetary and monetary poLicy is,Part o ] n] n o og
aftef the second oiL shock, bejng kept on a stricter and steadier course than
in the first episode (see also Chapters 4,5 and 6).
It is thnough examining the course of monetary policy that the fult
chain of interact'ions between price, demand and output effects of the oiL
shocks can be Ljnked up. The strict generaI stance of monetary poLicy has
in part accounted for the stronger and cerlainLy more. stabLe exchange-rate
'experience after the second.oiI shock,,a factor heLpfuL to investment-
0n the other hand, whiLe the appreciation of Community currencies has
diminished the ext.ernat price shock, it has aLso hafdened the conditions
t of competitjoo. for the Community in internationaI trade. As described in
Chapter 3, the adjustments to tr.ading periormance,since the second oiI shock
have been mone favourable in the cases of-the Unitqd States and especiaLLy
Japan than for the Communjty. The Communityrs current account deficit in
for over hatf of the totat. Demand for Community production in home and
overseas markets has been reeakening in a toss of market shares to other
producers of industriaI goods-
gne cannot yet concLuder. of course, on how the community e.conomy
wilL emerge from the second ojL shock. The objective, evidentLy, is to
benefit from experience since the first oiL shock, which in practice means
to secure- a.steadierand firmer adjustment to the energy crisis, wh'i Le
at the same time beginning to reverse 
-the 
fong-run acceIeration of infLation
and the weakening of growth performance and worLd-wide competitiveness-
poLicy is aimed at these severaL'for.midabLe object'ives, and there are some
s'igns that the private economy too is adjusting in the right direct'ion,
I for exampLe as regards wage infLation and a steadier pattern of,consumpt'ion
and investment. The Loss of autput in the present down-turn shouLd
turn out to be Less than ]n 1974-75, and the upturn expected in the course
ol 1981 shouLd avoid the unsustainabLe precipitation of 1976.
*
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Tracking the business cyc[e'in the Community
':
19E0, probabLy in lvlarch. There llas some decline in output in the second and
third quarters of the year, fottowing an upswing tasting ne'arty two-and-a-hatf
years during which the annuat average growth of GDP was 3r4% (see Tabte 1"3). i
The present down-turn is thus a continua,tion of'the mattern of marked ftuctuations
which are ptotted for the Comnunity as a whote and the foun iargest Member States'
in Graph 1.1'(the shaded areas indicate the periods from peak io tnough of the
community cycLe; thelreference rycte'i s sfrown alongside the indjcator of
business confidence reported by industriatists in surveys).
For the Comqrunity as a whole, three cycles may be recognised
past decade (see Table 1.3), spaced between four peaks,in JuLy 1969,
1973.just before the f irst oiL shock, i'n Nove*;he? 1976 after a short
period, and in March 1980 with the second oiL shock
The cyc[es have on average, from peak to peak, beeh about 3 1/z years
l-ong, with. dhe periods of upswing from trough ,to peak tending to be stightty
shortlr (21 months) trhan the period! of downswing:f.or p""t io trough ,1, ronan.r.
.
TabLe 1.3:indicates the average annuat,rates of growth exper1enced over
these phases of the cycte. The undertying rate of growth represented by the
fuLt cycle, fnom peak to peak, has sharply dimini'shed, fon exampLe, fron 4rT%(for GDP) in,the ['ast cycte before the 1973 oiI crisis, to about 2 1/ZT" since
.. 
' :',then. However, there are difficuLties invoLved in iudging how far the potentiat
^1)growt,hratehasdecLinedasaresu[toftheoiLshocksandotherfactoro
The business cycLe of the Community economy in the aggregqte is a fairly
weLL estabLished economic reaLity, reflecting the strong'interdependence of the
economie-s-of the fiember States. This is, reflected, moreoven, in the average
opiniqns of jndustriaLists in the Community, as reported in the business surVeys(pubLished in European Economy, Supptement B) which giv"l" consistent guide to
the developmgnt of econsmic conditions jn the commqntr, 
". " "hot".] ti-t, "i.,shown by the cycLicaI fLuctuations pLotted in Graph t.f to. the four Largest
Member states. But the cyc[es of the three lange continentat'ecoqomies have
been more cLose[y synchron'i,sed to the community aggregate than that of the
united Kingdom. The degree of synchronisation has atso varied over time: th.e
peaks around August 1973 were somewhat dispersedn white the troug'hs around
August '1975 and theipeaks around Novem.ber 1976 and again around March.1980'have 
-
been'more tightty synchrohiped. The most synchronised ttrrning po.ints haver thus,
not'always been those.,associated with common externaI shocks.
f';, '.
).-,,, ' :' i
1.8
over the
in August
re covery
*
1) sge a discussion.of these probLems in the conctudinij section of this chapter.
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''Q The s[ow-down in the underLvinq rate of qnowth
The large changes in the real pr:ice of energy have reduced in some
degree the opt'imaL productive capacity of the economy as a whole, at Least for
the time being. ALthor-rgh physicaLLy it is sti LL possibLe to produce just as
much output as beford, it is in part no Longer economic to do so/ as the most
economicaLIy efficient m'ixes of factors of pnoduction have changed. It takes
time, ner"l investment and new hOman ski LLs, and much reorganisat'ion to
return to a new optimum. In the meantime economic capacity has been Lost, with
capitaI equipment having become economicaLly obsoLete faster, and with a brorse
mismatch between the Labour force and empIoyment opportunities.
The difficult question is to quantify the Loss of capacity, or the
stow-down in the rate of growth which can be sustained without creating further
infLat'ionary tensions ih product or Labour markets. At the present time
no. sure answer can be given to this question.. However, the issue is of
such evident importance that it 'is worthwhile taking note of such information
that exists.
-.._..
One lrsdition.al shorrt-iut approach to these questions has been to study the
fate of growth experienced between'cyctlcaL peaks (the t,lharton schooL technique),
I
* thus identifying a growth'rate that cuts out cycl.ical fLuctuations, and where the
peaks represent ci rcumstances in whi ch capacity or infLation constraints are
supposedLy equivaLent, The cycL'icaL chronology set out above (in Table 1.3,
anci Graph 1.D suggested that the Communityrs aggregate rate of GDP growth
declined f rom 4 ;7% ,in the c/cte before the gi L crisis to 1.8% and 2.92,"tn the
trnro cycLes that have foLLowed. These figures are open to the criticism that
they refLect peaks of uneven height :'indeed, capacity utiLisation was sureLy
higher in Manch 19E0 than in November 1976. It may be more satjsfactony
. 
*i to caLcuLate the rate of growth between the two oi t crises , or, more prec'iseLy,
between the peaks of August 1973 and fiarch 1980 : th'is g'ives 2.47. tor GDP,
and 1-7X for industriaL productioh.
This stiLL does not entireLy dispose of the problem that the peaks
may represent different capacityuti Lisation LeveLs, s'ince the two indi cators
of industriaL capac'ity uti Lisation obtained fpom the business surveys
(see Graph 1.? and TabLe 1.4) suggest that the recent peak in March 19E0,
while higher than in November 1q762 was lower than in August 1g73.However,
the business survey data do pnovide,an opportunity for a cross-check, by
.,i
t,t i,
t.
making jt possibLe to Ca[cuLate the rates of growth experlenced 1n
sLightLy different'periods .for which capacity util.isation was reportedLy
equaI at beginning and 
"n6-poihts, These d.ata 
(see TabLe 1.5) provjde.
confirmation of the figunes aIready cited. For the seLested period
preceding the 1973 oiL shock the under[ying rate of GDP grot"rth thus
measured was 4r9%. Fol the se[ected periods endlng ln 19?9 or 1980
th-e comparabLe. rates o,f GDP growth were both ?tst'
*',t
,. l :
A supporting jndicator may be seen i3 the growth rate of 3.47, experienced
in the recent two-y,ear upswing, from the trough in 0ctober 197? to the peak'i:n
flfrch 1980. t'lh'iLe this rate of growth may Seem mo,{eralg by earLier
standards, it was accompanied by a substantiaL rise in capac-ity utilisation and
a,stabitisation of.the totaI unempLoyment Levet. However, maLe unemp[oyment
decIined over, this period, and increased tensions became cLearLy apparent
on tabour 'markets in key rggiong and skitI categories. . Thus .a 3.4'/,,growth rate
of GDP seems at the,moment to U" in excess o'f ,that of productive ' '
potentiaL for'the Community as a whoLe..'.
gveraLt, therefore, there is some convergence of indicators suggesting
that for GDP the underLying rate of growth.of produ-ctive potentiaL in the
'' betHeen 
- 
aDd- 
.
Community as a u*hoLe may have decLined fl6in74-'ltZz-'l-SZ before 1973, to
r. 
' 
I
about 21l?'/.in nrcre recent./€ors.' This of course does not Or"rrdn.tJ;, S
the rate of grory,th jn the medium-teim,future meiy be. :Thjs wiLL depend
cruciatly on the rate of investment and mofe generaLty on the rate of
structurat change and productivity groh,th that the Community economy sustains'
in the period ahead..
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t TabLe 1.3
Business cyctes in the EC economy as a uhole 1969-80
Economic performance during period
Dur at i on
in months GDP growth IndustriaL Capacity
% annua L produ ct i on ut i L i sat i on
average %annuat %change(1)
average
FulL iycLes: peak to peak
JuLy 69 to August 73
August 73 to November 76
November 76 to(rvlarch) 1980
,t
Average dunation; 43
.
Up5wings: t"r'og-q-h.s to pet
February 72 to August 73
August 75 to November 76
october 77 to (March) 1980
Average duration:
Down-swings: peak to trough
JuLy 69 to February 72
August 73 to August 75
November 76 to 0ctober 77
Average durat io0l 22
+
49
39
40
31
24
11
1rl
1rO
216
815
11 ,4
4rA
113
712
319
+ 5rA
+ 7r7
+ 5r3
- 613
-13,8
- 1r4
514
519
314
411
- O16
117
417
118
?,e
18
15
?9
?1
* 117
418
111
-[glg. Business cycLes are here'based on deviations from trend of a composite monthLyindex of output, consisting of monthly industrial production data and quarterIy GDP,
in which the guarterLy GDP LeveLs are attributed to each of the three constituent months.
The trend is estimated on the basis of 75 months moving averages (extended by 3? months
to cover end-po'ints). Turning-points are Located by iuccessiu" appLi cation of the
moving average procedures. Peaks are identified where output index reaches its
h'ighest point above the trend LeveL after an upswing phase, and troughs where the
output index reaches its Lowest point (beLow-trend growth incLuding both sLou grouth and
decL'ines in output beIow the trend Levet) after a down-swing phase. Peaks (or troughs)
are recognised on[y if they are separated by 15 or more monihs and by an intervening-
trough (or peak). The Bry-Boschem method of the National Bureau of Economic Research(New York) has been appLied to estabLish reference.cyctes of economic activity and
turning-points in cycIes.
(1) Source: business surveys, see TabLe I.4.
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(1) The figures are based on business survey results, and are adjusted for.comparabiLitv with those of the 0ther Memben staieJ";"-i;.;;';i']J"r"g" t"u"tand deviation
Q) Il:^:lJl!.q::tt:l data for capacity ut'iLisation are interpoLated vaLues of thesecondand,fourthquarters,owingtoLackofbasicdata._
(3)i SeasonaL ty adj usted
Source: European Community and nationaL business surveys
Nqte: J./.1 = Jangary/February IJlJ = June/Ju[y ) These are
, 0/N:0ctober/-lilovember ) : --- -'- the months in which the r.etevant survey-
. are conducted.
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TabLe 1.t
Rates of GDP
between point
voLume growth
t4\
s of equaL \ r/
in the Community
i ndust ri aL ut'i Li sat ion
Reference period,
year and quarter
Measure of capacity
uti Iisation observed
during the reference
per i od
% industriaL capac'ity
utiLisation
% annuaL average
rat€ of GDP
growt h
ru 1970
IU 1974
r 1977
r 1974
ITI 1973
ru 1976
r 1979
r1980
8p.8
80.6
81 .1
83 .8
86.4
80.2
81.8
83.3
4.9
3,?
?.5
?.5
% of enterprises with
production L im'ited by
Iack of'equipment
5.1
2.7
2.6
23
8
8
24
8
8
I
IV
II
1969
1974
1976
rr 1973
rr 1976
r 1979
Source ': Commission services, and European Community business surveys.
1) The capacity utiLisation rates measured durinE the seLected periods are,
if not equal, as close as the observed data aLtow,
f
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GRAPH 1.1
74 1975 1976 1978 1979
: EC business surveys 5nd nationaI statistical pubLications. For methodoLogy
see TabLe 1.1.
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2.1
2. StabiIisatiol and convergence
The substantjaL accel'eration of'consumer prices in 1980, and the renewed
d'ivergence of performance between {vlember Statesr'have at f irst sight been
about as serious as after the first oiL shock in 1973. However, there are
some, mi:tigating factors, The recent consumer price,rises, refLected in part
detiberate acts of poticy to IiberaLise price and rent control, pass oit
price rises rapidLy through to consumers, and change tax structuresl in aLL
cases aim'ing at improved resource aLLocation and fasterstructuraI adjust-
ment. Moreover, wage incomes have, unLike in 1974-75, more readity been
absorbing the oiL price rises, rather than avoid them through,more infta-
tionary wage bargaining,. Performance under the main measures of domestic
inflation .(GDP def.Iator, Labour costs) has deteriorated in .1980" Iess than
for consumer prices, and shouLd in 1981 show renewed improvement. However,
acute probLems of lnadequate profitabiIity in the enterprise sector, in
conjunction with high inftation, remain outstanding in some countries,
notabty in the United Kingdom and Ita[y.
T
Pri ces
The trend of cbnsumer prices in the Community, measured by the
'index of consumer prices (TabLe ?.1), worsened considerably during 1979
and the earLy months of 1980, aLthough there were sigpg of deceleration
in the rate of inftation in the second and third quarters of 1980
Thus for the Community as a whote the increase of 8'6% recorded in
1979 gave r.ray to a 13ft in the turelve months to Juty 1980: for 1980
as a whoLe an average of 12Y. is expected, and for 1981 a significant
deceLeration down to 9 r7'A is forecast.
However, the trend in the GDP price defLator, which refLects
domestic prices and costs to the excLusion of any djrect 
-impact from
imports, acceLerated Less. This is most evident in comparisons
with 1974 and 1975. The GDP defLator in 1980 is estimated to have lisen
17r1%, compar'ed to 1316% in1'975, whereas the consumer price rise i,n ?980
came much closer to the 1975 experience.
These trends are likewise evident in the data on standard deviations
g'iven in Tabte 2.'l: the d'ivergence in consumer price rises betbreen
I
Member States wasraccording to this measure, about the same in 19g0
as in 1975, whereas the GDP deflator showed a much Lesser divergence than
after the first oi L price shock
In the wi der {i vergence of perf ormance between ,lvlember Slates
in 1980, three groups of cguntries are apparent: those'in a reLativeLy
tow' jnftation group with consumer prices rising in 1980 between
5 112 to 7'/, (Germany, BeneIux countries), those in a middLe group-.
r
fr
t1
t
2.2
around 132 (Denmark and France), and those in a higher infLation group
in a range 18 l tZiA - }Oy. QreLand, Itaty and the United Kingdom)
TabLes 2.2r 2.3 and 2.4 seek to give a more disaggregated account
of recent price trends by commodity2 and by origin of the price'increases
(aLthough there are considerabIe shortcomings in the data for these.purposes)
Not surprisingLy the items fueI and Light show the greatest price rises
within the consumer price index over the past tweIve months, wjth an average
increase of some 24% in the Community as a who[e (Tab[e 2.D. The weighted
contribution of these energy products, as ih 1974, appears to have added
about 1y" directLy to the t'otaL consumer price LeveLs; however, this onLy
covers eLectr.icity and heating o'iL but not f ueL for private transport
which has contributed'importantLy to the rise in prices of the item "other
non-food goods". Moreover, the rising p1i9e of energy'inputs in aLI other
goods and services are of course refLected in aLI categories shown in
Table Z.Z and 2.3. In part i cular there wi L L have been a s'igni f i cant energy
component in the price rises for non-food goods and services, but Less so
for food and rent
The Largest contribution to the consumer price rise came from non-
food goocls, rising in themselves 14i( over the Last twelve months recorded'
tr ancj contributing about 5% to the rise jn the tota[ consumer price Levet.
This refLects a m'ix of factors beyond the energy component mentioned
incLucling the lifting of pr.ice controL in some countries (France, united
Kingdom), the increase in'indirect taxes aLso in a number of countries,
and a more gener.aL strengthening of manufacturerst prices- This Latter
factor has no doubt contributed to maintaining a better finartciaL position
in the enterprise sector than in the squeeze that fo[[owed the first ojL
shock (see further in Chapter 4) -
By comparjson food Prices have
generaL acceLerat,ion of consumer pri
agreecl under the Common AgricuLturaL
contributed reLativety titt Le to the
ces, ref Lect'ing the modest pri ce rises
PoLicy.
Rent inCreaSes, hOweVer,, llere more SeVere than in previous yearsr
refLecting measures taken in a number of countries (Italy, United
Kingdom); moreover, the rrent'component of the index covers in some
countries charges that have increased sharply (for exampLe mortgage
interest rates in the United Kingdom,
i
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-. Another way of tooking at the components of infLatibn'is given
in Tab Le 2.4, based on the contributions of the princ'ipaL inputs to the
price rise of totaL finaL expenditure. The contrjbution of imports to the
rise in totaL price LeveL was 3 r8:Z in 19E0, compared to 8,3% in 1974,
this much [ower figure combining three factors: the do[[ar oiL price rise
which was of simiLar size (as indicated in ehapte r 1), the much Lower
rise in other commodity prices in 1?80 than in 19?4, and tle greater
strength of the exchange rates of Community cunrencies against the doLLar
in 1980 compared to 1974. As expLained more fulLy below, unit Labour.costs
contributed significantty Less to the totaL price rise (Sr1% in 1980
against about 7% in 1974 and 1975). Indirect taxes are aLso shown to have
contributed sornewhat to the acceLeration of infLation; generaI increases
in the value-added tax were made in Germany and the United Kingdom in 1979 and in
Ita[y in 1980, and indirect tax increases have a[so been important, especiatty
for energy products, in IreLand, Denmark ancl France.
0veraLL the trend in the price leveL has been significantLy infLuenced
by government intervention. Indeecl government poticy directIy affecting
priceshasbeenmuchdifferentin1979and1980comparedtotheperiod
after the f i rst o'i L shock. Energy prf ce ri ses have been passed qujck Ly
through to consumers, and there have been more upward adjustments of energy t
consumptiontaxesonthisoccasion,comparedtothewidespneaderosionof
the rea[ vatue of such taxes after the first oiI shock. This fnore adjust-
ment-oriented.energy pricing poLicy has more or Less coincided with other
price and rent tiberaLisation measures and some changes in tax structure
easing direct taxes and accentuating indirect taxes, community poLicy,
for farm products, has worked more irr a price stabiLising direction, but
here as wel.I the intention of po['icy has been to seek a better suppLy/demand
batance.
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The acceLeration of wages and salaries which aLso began in 1979
continued in 1980, but the rate of increase is expected to remain substan-
tiaLLy below the high [eveLs of the wage explosion in 1974/75, and may
aLr.eady be sLowing down. However/ experience among Member States is by
no means uniform. In the third quarter: of the year, the increase in com-
pensation compared with tweLve months previousLy, sti LL varied from
4 1/2% in the NetherLands to over 23% in ltaly, The average increase of
13,1% expected in 1980is forecast to faLl back to 10,3% in 1981 (see Table
2.5). As a reflection of this, the standard deviation of wage and satary
increases'widened sharpty in 1980, but is expected to decLine again in 1931.
In view of the importance of the need to avoid'the second oiL
pyice shock generating a further, secondary acceLeration of infLation
through compensatory llage increases, congiderabLe attention has been paid
over the past year jn the Community to the wonking of mechanisms for the
indexatjon of wages on prices (see for exampLe the concLusions to the
19?9/80 AnnuaL Economic Report), A description of such mechanisms as
exist (or otherwise) and how they may have been changed in the necent
past, is given in the attached inset "wage indexation jn the Community".
The rote of automatic wage indexation in income formation differs
substantiaLLy from Member State to Member State. In Germany and the Unjted
Kingdom indexation is virtuaLLy non-existent and in France onLy the
mjnimum wage is forma[[y adjusted, 0ther Member States have some degree
of wage indexation with the most comprehensive and rapidLy working system
found in ge[gium, Luxembourg and ItaLy. ALthough the infLationary dangers
inherent in fuLL and rapid indexation systems,are evjdent enough as theoreticaI
arithmetic propositions, espec'iaLLy in the case of major'qxternaL price
shocks, it is necessary to proceed with caution before drawing too strong
or simpLe concLusions on the effectjve impact of such.mechanisms. First Iy
it is to be noted that in the Community there is.no simpLe correspondence
between the propensjties of Member States to have higher or lou/en rates
of infLation, and the extent of their wage indexation practices. Thus, at
the two extremes of each variabLe there are at present apparentLy
contradictory experiences: fuIL and rapid indexation going 1.;jth high
infLation in ItaLy and Low infLation in BeLgium, and the complete absence
of indexation going with Low inftation in Germany but high infLatjon in
the united Kingdom. SecondLy, the absence of such simp[e cbrreiations does not
4}
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mean, however, that indexation pract'ices may not be damaging to the economy
in diffusing and increasing price shocks, and in preventing economicaLLy
desjrable adjustments in retative cogts and income sharesl rather, the
absence of the correLation refLects the fact that the totaL wage and
satary bitl has severaI determinants (for exampIe a "reaL" wage adjustment
as weLt as a.pi^'icd adjustment), and infLation aLso has severaL origins
(as itlustnated in Tab[e 2.4 abo've, which showed import price, taxr. tabour
and other contributing factors)
A further reason for caution is that indexation practices can be
fundamentatty different' in thejr impact dependjng upon what may seem
to be technicaL variations in their definition: e.g. in the percentage
extent of cost of Living compensat'ion, the delay before compensation is
made, and the possib[e existence of speciaI adjustments to the consumer
price index (for examp[e to exc[ude indirect tax changes, energy prices,
etc.)
Among the main quaLities torbe sought in pay bargaining systens
aretheirabiLity(a)to,minimjseuncertaintyandindustriaLstrifeand
(b) to permit rationaL rea,ctions to unexpected price shocks and the needs
to adjust for reaL competitiveness. Indexation systems, to the extent they b
are comprehensive in coverage, ri LI tend to favour the :former criterion and
to ignore the second. Indexation systems which are tess comprehensive may
irnply a greater degree of compromise. The ideaL pay bargaining environment
vould seem to be that in uhich a sustained record on priqe stabi[ity assures
the absence of uncertainty, and in which absence of indexation assures the
possibiIity of adjustmqnts in reaI incodtes.
The apprroaches foLLowed in the Memben States on these questions
in the past yeap have aLso been very heterogenequs. Ln severaL countries
where the indexation is widespread, there have been efforts to Iimit
the inf Lat'ionary impact of the o'iL pri ce rise. In Denmark, energy products
have been withdrawn from the reference price index; in the Netherlands,
there has been a temporary price freeze; in BeLgium, the emphasis has
been on [ow "reaL" wage demands; in ItaLy, adiustments of the indexation
system have been debated, but not effected
?
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:|rrlh'iLe the techniques of wage ad3ustment are extreme[y varieC,
there is no avoicing the fact that wage bargainers haverone way or the
other, to accept the income Loss implierJ by a major deterioration in the
terms of trade - if the underlying rate of inftation is to be kept down.
Whether this shoulcl be done by adapting inCexation mechanisms or Lowering
reat wage cLa'ims is essentialLy a matter to be worked out in the specific
situat ion of each Member State.
An examination of devetopments in reaL per capita compensation and
reaL unit Iabour costs presents a very different picture. From
an annual average.ot 671 growth in the sixties and early seventies,
'reaL compensation dectined untiL 1977, and after rising
again in aLL countries in 1978 and 1979, feLI back sharp[y 'in 1980 as the
rise jn consumen pr"'ices at first kept ahead of rises in compensation. , In
the year as a whole, there is expected to have been a 1% rise..Significant
faIts in reaL income occurred in the-ttettreri'fhdb and Denmark, with
modest rises in Germany, France, BeLgjum aqd.Luxembourgr.and ar'Large rise in
,IreLandidue to .substantisl pubLic sector pay rises. In 1981, the emphasis
given to counter infLationary poLicy by governments is tikeLi to restrain
reaL compensation to a further smaL't improvement, forecast to be Ar5% for the
Community as a whote.
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Taking into account devetopments in productivity, however, the
downward tnend in real wages probab[y represents no more than some catching-
up of non-[aboun incomes for the [osses experienced in 1974/75. The huge
increases in both nomina[ and reaL wages in those two years far outstripped
the jncreases in both consumen prices and pnoductivity as aggressive wage
bargaining in the wake s1 the oi L, pri ce shock ens,ured that Labour .incomes
did not suffer any Loss. From 1976 onwards, however, this devetopment
changed: productivity growth in 1976 was substantia[, and in every subsequent
year has exceeded the rate of growth of reaL compensatjon per emp[oyee.
Moreover, the recent experience of individuaI Member States with ;
respect to reaL comnensation and reaL unit Laboun costs has been reLativeLy
simiLan, with moderate nises comoared to 1974 and 1975, orland a rather
convergent pattern comparecl to the divergerces in current nominaI pay
deve Iopment s .
FqnctignaL Income DistJ;ibution
Despite the retativeLy sLow increase in unit Labour costs in
recent years, income distribution in 1979 renained heavity biased in favour
of tabour income, as opposed to corporate profitabitity. The measure
used here, caLLed "normaLjsed Labour income", is Labour income as a percen-
tage of net domestic income at facton cost",incLuding an imputed tabour
income for the se[f-employed to adjust for changes in the structure of
empLoyment. In 1979 the normalised labour income ratio of 8615% remajned
stiLL about four points oven the typicaL LeveL witnessed in the period
1960-19?3. The ratio rose to a peak of 8717% after the first oiL crisis
then subsiding somewhat to 86% in 1g78, before nising again Last year.
tr|hiLe the figures for the Conrmunity as a whofe show a remarkabLy stabLe
deveLopment (see Graph 2.D a country-by-country anaLysis reveaLs strong
fluctuations often reIated to exchange rate developments, as seen in the
cases of Ita[y and the United Kingdom especiaLLy.
A[though the normaLised Iabour income ratio may be somewhat more
comparabLe from country to country than the unadjusted data, figures shouLd
be interpreted with great caution, partfcuLarLy in the case of economies
where wage and saIary earners account for a reIativety [ow share of totaI
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empLoyment Like in IreIand and ItaLy. A cross-country comparison of
these normaLised LeveIs may nevertheLess give a cLue to potentiaL
income adjustment probfems and hence to the prospects for obtaining a
higher degree of price convergence among the Communityrs Memben States.
One major conc[usion to be drawn fnom a cross-country comparison
is that Germany on the whole has been rather successfu[ in sotving the
jncome adjustment probIems foLIowing the 1 9?4 oil crisis. The Iabour
income natio in 1979 was back to the leveL of 19?1/72 and is now some
three points Lower than the Community average. ALso the French Iabour
jncome ratio is reLat'iveLy [ow, aLthough the comparative advantage is
less pronounced than i n 1972/73, Among the smaLL industriaLised Member
States, the Labour income ratios in Denmark, the NethenLands and BeLgium
have shown a strong[y rising.trend over the past two decades, reIative
to the Commun'ity average. The exceptionaL rise in the natio in Luxembourg
in the mjd-seventies reftects the weight of the steeL industryrs crisis in
that country. In ItaLy, where in the Late 1960s the normaLised income
rat'io t"las onty 3-,4 points above the Community average, the LeveL is now
some 9 po'ints higher, To some extent this may howeven be attributed to an
increasing under-recording of non-wage incomes and not excLusiveLy to a
genuine shift of income distribution in favour of wage incomes. It is
difficuLt to evaLuate the retative importance of the various factors, but,
on batance, it woutd seem that aLthough a reduction of the ltaIian Labour
income ratio to the average LeveL of the Community appears unLikely, a
certain ctosing of the present gap shouLd be sought as part of the ItaLian
adjustment process
This wouLd atso seem to be the case for the United Kingdom, where
there has in 1979 and 1980 been:a massive shift in income distribution in
favour of Labour income. As recentLy as 1978, the ratio may have been cLose
to the Community average but this has now moved sevenaL points above,
implying an adjustment probLem perhaps as big as in ItaLy
Thus in both ltaty and the United Kingdom, real h,ages need to rise
[ess than Labour productivity for a period of years ahead'
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t'Jage indexation' in the Community
Denmark: t,Jage rates are traditionaLLy fixed accord'ing to comprehensive
nationaL agreements covering 'two years. These agreements aLso fix the
rutes of indexation. The indexation system is automatic and semi-
annuaL, wjth adjustments effected on 1st March and 1st September on
the basis.of the average of ihe three months ending in January and
JuLy respectiveLy of a speciaL wage reguLation index derived from the
consumer price index, excLuding indirect taxes and subsidies. Compen-
sation is normatLy granted in the form of a fixed sum reLeased when
the index vaLue reaches certain threshoLds (impLying a higher percentage
compensation fon Low incomes).0n average, compensat'ion has in the past
corresponded to around 60-70% of the amount corresponding to fuLL com-pensation. In the context of a major poLicy package aimed at dampening.
cost'increases and reducing the baLapce of payments deficit the index-
ation system was modified as from 1st January'1980. Energy products were
excLuded from the reguLation index and wage indexation restricted to
the average increase of other prodtrcts,, wage adjustments due for 1st
March 1980 were cancelLed and the reguLation index rebased to January
1 980.
Germany: Accor{ing to the currency Law of 20th June'1948 authorisation
ET,l,qiired fpr any index-Linking of financia[ cl"aims and this is not
granted. There are no indexation c!6uses'in wage contractsl parties
may, howev€r2 agree to review the wage levet if thq cost of tiving:
exceeds a certain threshotd.
France:-In France, purchasing power guarantees have in the past been
appLied in certain nationaLised indust.ries, but at present onLy the
minimum wage (SMIC), covering some 4% of the active popuIation, is
formaLLy Iinked to a cost-of-L'ivin9 index.
IreLand: In lreLand wage and saLary increases are normatLy fixed in
Tn]ilET-nationat agreements. Such agreements have from time to time(five of the Last eight) provjded ior cost-of-Living adjustments in the
course of the contract period. According to the Nationa[.Understanding
which expired in August 1980, wages r"tere adjusted for the najority of
wage and salary earners on 1st Manch 1980 on the basis of the cost-of-
tiving increase during the 12 months up to mid-November 1979. The
adjustment amounted to 1% for ea'ch percentage point increase in the cost-
of-tiving index between 7 and 127! and about 60 pence orabout 0.TZforeach
pojnt between '12 and 16%. The new NationaI Understanding proposed in
S eptember 1980'does not expLicitLy provide for wage indexation
ItaLy: Al.I coLtective wage contractsprovide for indexation along a common system of adjustment, granting
a compensatory increase of 2389 Lire in monthLy ea'rnings for each per-
centage point increase in a special cost-of-living index for wage
earners. At present leveLs of earnings and consumbn price'index, a 1
percent increase in consqmer'prices wiLL entajt a 0.7% rise in aver-
age earn'ings, with adj ustments taking pLace on 1st 'February, ltlay,
August and November on the basis of the increase in the index over the
pneced'ing three month periods. Since March 1980, adjustments of pay in
the pubLic sectol' are made according to the'same system as jn theprivate sector.
n
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Netherlands: In most of the 1970s wages have been fixed through sectoral
hesotfffins in the absence of national. agreement, Most wage agreements
have provided for indexation taking place in January and JuLy on the
basis of movements ;
reguIation index excLuding indirect taxes and wjth a reduced we'i9ht
for medjcaI servjces, Atijustment of the mi4imurn wage is, however, pro-
vided for by Law. The adjustment is genera[[y granted as a percentage
increase correspondjng to the increase in the refenence jndex. Howeven,
based on a speciat taw covering income formation in 1980, the cost-of-
Iiving adjustrnent of Ju[y 1980 was given in the form of a ftat rate
'amount of 26 HfL to all emptoyees with the exception of minimum wage
receivers (36 HfL).
Be[gium: Index-[inking of wages and salafies has been widety used in
Effijur since 1948 and at present is appLied to the wages of pract'icalLy
all empLoyees in the private and pubLic sectols' trlages are fixed on a
sectoraL basis and the system of index-Linking may vafy from branch to
branch depending upon the'prov'isions of the wage agreements- The
adjustments are granted in most cases after One month in the fdrn of
a percentage increase .in wages corresponding to the chahge in the
reference index wjth certain threshoLds. In the publ'ic sector, adjust-
ments are made according to Legat provisjons
Luxembourg: Index-Linking of wages and saLaries is apptied generatly in
tTte ilb-iE and private sectors. Lega[ provisions fix the ruLes of adjust-
ment for pubL,ic sector empLOyees and the minimum wage.. Adjustments are
made in the form of a percentage incfease in wage rates correspOnd'ing
to the increase in the index, whenever the average of six precedjng
monthst 'index vaLue reaches threshold vaLues (2-5%).
United Kinqdom: Index-link'ing of wages and saLaries has generaLLy not
appi$A-T-The post-lvar period, except under the'incomes poLicy arrange-
ments in 1972/73 (jn Stage'Three from November 1973 onwards). This
incLuded a provision for threshoLd agreements giving compensation for
the rise'in the retail price index above a certain Levet (6%) from its
October 1973 levet, and certain other coLLective bargaining agreements
have aLso incLuded threshoLd cLauses prov'iding for renegotiation of
the contract if price increases exceeded certain values. The indexation
arrangementstarting in 1973 Led fairLy quickLy and cLearLy to a major
acceLeration of infLation, and in subsequent incomes poLicy phases,
and wage bargaining rounds, automatic cost of Living adjustments have
been practicaLLy non-existent.
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Tabte 2.1
Consumer prices and the GDP price defLator.
(nationat currencies) (percentage increase)
1964-73 1974 1975
average
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
estimate forecasts
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
L
UK
613
317
417
519
4,8"-
512
318
3rO
4.r9
1315 gr4
7,1 61113,? '11 ,415,8 2?,3
2O,g 17,6
10,0 10,712.6 12,49rO 11.2
'17,3 ?3.6
Consumer pri ces
9 rO 1O,g g 144,5 3,9 2r5
9 18 9,2 gr519,2 12,6 7,918.1 19.2 12 rg8,8 5,g 4,28r3 6rg 4 14
9 14 6,7 3r5
't5,4 15,1 g16
f17
319
1CI15
1?,?
14 rg
416
3rS
415
1211
17\
513
1219
1815
2015
619
6r1
614
18 r7
10.r 0
4r0
1a r7
12,8
15,3
6r8
5r5
516
14,O
EC
st
De
andafd
vlat?on
415
1r0
1217
411
918
414
713
312
8r6
4r1
12 r0
c,7
9r'7
319
1215 10,3
5,7 4r?
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
L
UK
6r8
412
419
7,?
5r4
5rO
411
411
511
o?
417
11 ,0
15,g
1?,1
517
513
415
alrl
916
4r?
11 ,1
11 ,94q1
6,?
516
6rA
15,1
6DP price deftator
12,5 11,7 7,g g,?6,9 617 3r3 3rg11,1 13,4 1A ) 9,0611 22,2 ?1,0 13,018,5 17 ,5 18,0 19,1
9 ,3 1112 . grg 6131?,4 1214 7 rg 61715,5 2,1 1?,5 1,7
15 ,1 27 ,1 14 15 '13,7
916 7,1
3,9 3r89,3 1013
11 ,3 13,?14,1 15,1
5r1 3r9
4r5 4rO4r4 9,410,3 14.4
n
EC
Standard
Devi at i on
11 ,2 13,6
3,8 7,2
419
111
9!'
5r2
915
511
815
3r5
817
413
1'l r1
611
917
319
Note: Consumer prices = impLicit price index of consumersr expenditure. GDp pricedefLator = impLicit price index of GDp.
Source: Eurostat and Commission staff.
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Components of consumer price deveLopments (percentage'inc rease)
Food Non-foodgoods
Fuet and
Light Rentl'2 servi ces3 Tota L
EC Total
1974 '.
1975
.1976
1977
1978
12,3
1j,8
1?,9
13 17
714
14,6
1?13
819
915
713
25 14
14 16
12.9
11 ,8
711
811
12rO
11r2'
818
6r4
10,1
15 19
1213
819
913
1224
13,3
10r 8
1013
715
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
s
.L
UK
818
1:7
915
14 14
13 18
211
O15
216
12,6
12,2
517
11,3
14 
'6
413
519
12,6
1979
39,2
20rB
76,o
14,3
18,5
7,0
13r8
14,1
8r0
312
1'l ,4
914
27 19
618
6ra
:
?o15
9rZ
414
11,2
14 11
417
516
11 ,5
916
411
10,7
13,?
14 r7
415
414
416
1314
*
EC- totat 9r? 10.1 16,1 '14r3 917 919
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
L
UK
11 19
415
10,4
'larz
15 21
416
4rO
311
13r7
Percentage
,15.8
613
16 15
29r{
10r5
816
74 15
ipcrease Juty
36rg
414
?5 11
51 ,1
5613
2118
:
17,3
' 
'28.3 :
1980 I JtttY
714
514
13r'l
.:
20.3
a?
, 
t 2'
- 
618
'29.4
1979{4'
914
512
1313
ti"'o
615
5r7
:
22 r9
12,8
515
13.7
?g13
2117
715
v13
614
16,9
EC- totaI 10,1 74.O ?3,8 1S,8 1218 1317
1 Inctuding repairsr maintenance and other expenses retative to property ovnership.
2 Fo. IreLand = Housing.
?
; :Jtil#r:;"lir, ,," rrerand, June 1e80/June 1e7e for rtaLy.
Note: Consumer prices = consumer price ind'ices.
Sources: OECD and Commission staff.
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TabLe 2.3
Contributions to, consumer price increasesz EC totaL
Food Non-food FueL and Rent Services Totat (2)
Goods tess Light
FueL &
Li ght
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
2r5 216
2,9 5,5
3r? 4r9 0,6 1,2
3rA '3r4 or5 1r1
3r2 3r8 or5 or9
1 r7 2rg or3 0,6
?r2 3r8 0r7 1r4
1980 (1 ) 2,4 -5,2 1ro 116
0r3 or8 1r9
1,o 0,p 212
315
?17
?r0
2ro
211
2r8
811
12 14
13 13
10, E
1015
715
919
13,7
(1) JULY 1980/'JgLY tgZg
(2) TotaLs may not add because of roundinE adjustments.
Sources : OECD and Commission Staff
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Tabte 2.4 Origin
(contributions to
of price increases
the increase in the
(finat expenditure)
deftator of totaL
EC TotaL
finaI expenditure)
Imports
Unit
Labour
cost s
. othe (1 )i;f'.'tr] ,.::lkl, rotar. (2)
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980 
(3)
1981 
(4)
613
1rO
218
2rO
011
2,?
3r8
2rO
113
?,?
215
?11
117
117
119
?,?
17 t?
1119
916
817
, 5,8
619
12,t
914
618
714
3,?
316
3t1
318
irt
412
o18
113
117
1rO
Q19
114
115
lrO
t (1) p"r" unit of output(2) 
roa"t = deftator of totat finaL expenditure.
(3) 
ertimate.
(4) Fo.".."t
Sources: Eurostat and Commission staff.
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Tabl-e 2.5
Per capita compensat'ion of empLoyees.
percentage change
1960-73 1974 1975 19V6 1977 1978 1979 1980 19E1
forecast
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
L
UK
1017
1013
1'l r8
1217
12.9
13ro
1g16
10r0
815
17,8 1315
1Or1 4,1
19 13 17 ,720,4 2810
2415 ,21,51612 12r8
2Or2 15r?
2612 12rg
21,5 29,8
1?,9 1Or?
7 14 6191611 73,4
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3. ExterlaI pe.rformance : bbLance of payments 
\
In common with atmost atL other industriaLized countries the
Community has suffered a very sharp deterioration in its current ba[ance of
payments as a resuLt of the two and a haLf-fol.d increase in the orice of oiI
between 1978 and 1980. So far, however, it has been markedLy Less successfuL
than its two ma'in competitors, the United States and Japan, in diverting real
resources'into the external sector'to offSet the adverse movement in its
terms of trade. Thd Communityrs cost and price competitiveness has been somewhat
eroded during 1979-1980 and there are some signs of a Loss of dynam'ism in its
export performancel its share of won[d export markets has ceased to grow and
'it appears to be becoming increasingLy,vutnerabLe to competition froi the
newty industriatized countries. ALthough member countries have experienced nodifficuLty so far in financing the'ir current deficits through capitaL imports
and the value of their officiaL reserves has.been greatty increased as a
result of the steep rise in the prjce of gold, progress towards reaL adjustment,particuLarLy in the case of some of the smaLLer couhtri€s7 ctear[y needs to be
a c ce L erat ed.
The pattern of current baLances 19Zg-19g1
.;
The sal.ient feature of the Last two years has been another massive
improvement in the terms of trade of the oit export.ing countries, resuLting
in a huge lncrease in their current surptus at the expense of the rest of
the wor[d- So far the greater part of the corresponding current account
deterioration of the oiL importing countries has been borne by the advanced
industriaL nations. In aggregate these countriesr current u"Lan.es 
".. 
.
estimated to have experienced an adverse swjng of over 6 90 biLLion
between 1978 and 1980. The absoLute deterioration in the combined current
balances^of the deveLoping count.ries over the same period has been retativety
rnodest (approximateLy I 25 biLtion). However, these countries, unLike the
industriaI nations as a uhote, h,ere atready in deficit in 1g1g. This year
they are expected to have a combined current deficit of around g 60 bitLion,
chich is approximatoty three-quarteri that of the industriaL countries and
far greater ln reLation to export earnings and reserves.
t
t
3(" 3.2
/
For the industriaL countries as a whoLe the deterioration in their
current account between 1978 and 1979 ? I 44 biLLion) can be whoLLy accounted
for by the increase in their oiL irnport biIL (+ I46 bilLion). However, th'is
was not the case for aLL countries in the group, particularty those of the
European Comrirunity. For EC countries as a whoLe onLy about two-thirds (8 17
biLLion) of the total $ 29 bitLion) adverse shift in their current baLance
can be accounted for by the higher cost of oiL imports. By contrast for other.
industriaL countries, considered as a groupz the h'igher. cost of oi L imports
G g 29 biLLion) was substantiaLly greater than the increase in their current
deficit. (+ I 15 biLLi.on) so that this group of countries, in particutar Japan
and the USA, had ctearty begun to make some progress towards externaI adjust-
ment atready in 1979. I ,:
. t^lithin the Community aLt member countries, except the Nethertands
and United Kingdom, have expenienced a serious wol.sening of thein current
baIances. The shifts have been particuIarty Iarge in absoIute terms in
-Germany, France and ltaLy. But it is the position of certain smaLLer
member countries which gives the most grounds fon concern. Denmark,
Ire[and and Belgirr'rer" aLready in deficit before the 197911980 oiL price
increase and their deficits are now disturbingLy Large in reLation to their
export earnings and output. For these countries therefore an arduous adjust-
ment cannot be postponed much Longer.
Pqogress towqrds. externaI adjustment
It is estimated that between 1978 and 1980 the terms of trade of the
industriaI countries have worsened on average by about 1A%. TabLe 3.? shows,
for each member of the European Community, as we[[ as for the United Statqs
and Japan, the cost of-this'deterioration, measured as a percentage of GDP.
It a[so shows the extent to which the terms of trade shift has been offset
by an improvement, on aggravated by a worsening, of the real trade baLance.
duri'ng the two years 1979-198A, and on the basis of Commission forecasts,
in 1981. These forecasts are part'icularLy dependent on OPECTs pricing and
output decisions.
n
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The process of externaL adjustment has atready begun in the two
Largest industriaI economies outside the Community - the United States"and
Japan. These two countries were particuLarLy hard hit as regards their terms
of trade; those of the United $tates are estimated to have deteriorated by
11% between 1978 and 1980 and those of Japan by as much as 307. over the same
period (these figures amountlng to 1.2% and 5.2% of GDP respectivety - see
tabLe 3.2), the adverse impact of higher oiI prices having been aggravated
by a steep falt in the exchange rate of the yen. Both countries have, hourever,
achieved a substantiaL shift of reat resources into the externaI sector, aided
in this by the big improvement in their competitiveness (see below) and, in
the US case, by a sharp falI in the reLative pressure of demand as the economy
has sunk into recession.For both the United states and Japan the improvement
in the reaL tnade baLance during 1978-1980 is estimated at 1.77, of GDP, but
.bearing in mind that in both countries, and especial[y the United States,
the externaL sector accounts for a fairLy smaLL proportion of the economy
as a whoLe, this amounts to a very Large shift of output in the tradeabLe
goods and services sectors-
, The experience of the Community has been strikingl"y different from
that of its ma'in competito'fs. The average terms of trade deterioration in
l Co,ntrn1ty countries during 1979-1980 has been Less severe than in the USA
or Japan (approximateLy 5 % cqnpared with 11% and 30% re.spectiveLy), but
the cost, in reLat'ion to GDP has been higher than in the USA (though st'iLL
Lower than jn Japan - see TabLe 3.2) since foreign trade accounts fon a
h.igher proportion of output in the community than in these countries. Fgt
certain individuaL Menrber Statesr' however, notabLy IreLand, Denmark and
ItaLy, it has been particularLy high. Moreover, the effect of the worsening
terms of trade has been aggravated' rather than offset, by a deterioration
in the reaL trade balance, due in part to a weakening of the Community's
competitiveness vis-i-vis the other major industriaL countries, particuLarLy
Japan, and to the fact that the rate of capac'ity ut'iLisation in the
Community as a whoLe has not falLen so far or so fast as in some other
countries, particuLarLy the United States'
*
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However, there have been exceptions with'in the community tq this
overaLI pattenn- Both the Netherlands and Denmark, where domestic demand
has been particuIarLy severeLy. restricted. have achieved substantiaI reaI
adjustment' The united K'ingdomfs penformance has aLso differed sharpty'from the
generaL pattern, refIecting the change jn the structure of that countryrs
foreign trade now that it has achieved virtuaI seIf-sufficienty in oiI produc-
tion. This transformation wou[d in any case have caused an" rnrted Kingdomrs
'terms of trade to improve, for preciseLy that reason for which,other inaur-
triat countr'iesr terms of tnade have deteniorated. But superimposed upon this
"oiI effect" has been a much higher than average rate of infLatjon and a
strongLy rising exchange rate. The consequent deterioration in the reaI trade
baLance is estimated to amount to 2.4% of GDP 1n 1979 and 1980 combined,
Larger than for any other industriaL country, and this despite the dispLace-
ment of imported by domesticaL[y produced oil suppLies and the aLmost complete
stagnation of domestic demand
The weaker evoLution of economic activ'ity expected in 1981 shouLd Lead
to an improvement in the reaL trade baLances of the industriaL countries,
which, in the case of the European Community may amount to about 0.3% of GDp.
Since it is hoped that the terms of trade wiIL stabiL'ise, this reaL improve-
ment shouLd be very Ia'rgety refLected-in nominaL current baLances. So far as
the Commun'ity 'is concerned, however, this wi L L be no more than a smat I f i rst
step in the process of externaI adjustment. 0n the basis of present forecasts
onLy about one-seventh of the estimated I 60 bitIion adverse swing in the
current balance between 1978 and 1980 wiIL be reversed .in 1981. By contrast,
it seems that the United States wilI by thlen have achieved a much more
compLete adjustment. Much the same appLies in the case of Japan where export
voLume is now showing rBmarkabte growth and'import votume has faILen in
absoIute terms
t
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Financino and reserves
In 1929 the Community's totaL current'deficit of ECU 14 bitIion was
aggravated"by a net outfLow of non-monetary capitaL amounting to some
ECU 3 biLLion, most of it from Germany in the form'of export credit' The
resuLting defic'it of neanLy.ECU 17 bitLion on totaL non-monetary tnansactions
was financed by a net infLow of banking capitaL of over ECU 19 biLLion,
main[y into Germany and the United Kingdom, where a combination of high
interest rates (nominaL in the United Kingdom, reaL in Germany) and confi-
dence in the exchange rate (due to reLatively Low,inftation in Germany and
to North Sea OiL in the United Kingdom) lffened 
an attractive risk return
ratio to foreign investors. TotaL Community reserves therefore increased
by ECU 3 1/2 biLlion, before vaLuation adjustments'
During the first six months of 1980 the current deficit widened
sharpLy to about ECU 18 biLLion (not seasonaLLy adjusted). ALmost the whoLe
of this appears to have been financed by capital i.nfLows, mainLy in the form
of public sector borrowing and an increase in the LiabiLities of the banking
sector, so that, so far as the Community as a whote is concerned, there has
been only very modest recourse to the use of officiaL reserves' Indeed,
1 taking the whote period from the end of 1978 to mid-1980,.:::t, communitv
reserves actuaLLy increased by sLightLy more than ECU 2 biLLion if valuation
adjustments are excLuded. German reserves feLL by approximateLy ECU 8 bitLion,
aLthough from an initiaL LeveL that was abnormatLy high fotLowing the opera-
tions in support of the US dolLar in late 1978, whiLe France and, to a lesser
extent, the United Kingdom and ItaLy aLL substantiaLLy increased their
re se rves
t
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As mentioned above, the forego'ing references to changes in reserves
are fLow figures consistent with,baLance of payments data and do not take
account of vaLuation adjustments. However the stock figures have been affected
by vaLuation changes in two important respects. In the first pLace the ECU
appreciated against the US dotLar by about 6%'between the end of 1978 and
mid-1980, thus causing a falL in the ECU vaLue of reserves he[d in doILars.
SecondLy, and quantiiativeLy much more important, the free market prjce of
goLd rose very steeply during 1979 and earLy 1980. The physicaL quantity of
gold held by Community centraL banks hardLy changed over the period from the
end of 1978 to m'id-1980, but the.value of these holdings, if gol.d is vaLued
according to the market-reLated price formuLa used in the EMS, increased
from ECU 68 biLLion to ECU 157 bilLion or nearly two and a haLf times.
As a resuLt, totaI Community reserves increased from ECU 139 biLLion to
ECU 223 biLLion, or by 60%. This was considerably faster than the rate of
growth of totat Community'imports over the same period so that the reserve:
import ratio for the Community as a who[e increased fron 4?% to 50%. This
shouLd be reassuring at a time when the Community is faced with a large
externaL deficit that is LikeLy to persist for some t'ime, al-though there
does appear to be some reluctance on the part bf the monetary authonitjes
actuatLy to use go[d as a means of settLement
Price Competitiveness
Since the European Monetary System went into operation earIy in 1979
intra-Commun'ity exchange rates have for the most part been fa.irLy stabLe.
The principaL changes have invotved ster['ing. which appreciated on a trade-
weighted basis against other Community currencies .by 132 between the end of
1978 and mid-1980, the Danish krone, which depreciated by 1?% over the same
period and the ItaLian Iira, which depreciated by 6.5%.
l
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of exchange rates during the past eighteen months has not conformed particu-
Larty c loseLy to the theory of punchas'ing pohrer parity. As a resuIt there
- have been severat significant changes in competitiveness not onLy among
Member States but between the Community as a whoLe and the rest of the
industriaL worId.
.
' From the end of 1978 to the second quante.r of 198A, Commun'ity
currenc'ies apprec jated in nominaI terms aga'inst the doL [ar and the yen,
the currencies of the Communityrs major competitors on taorLd markets.
0ver this period the ECU rose against the doltar by 6% and against the yen by
22%. As a result the Community!s competitive'position vis-i-vjs the outside
worLd has weakened (see TabLe 3.5) whiLe Japanrs has improved spectacuLarLy,
especiaLIy against the Community, aLbeit from an init'iaL positjon at which
the yeh was perhaps overvaIued. Japan being a major trading partner of
the United States, the weakness of the yen has caused the doLLar to
appreciate on a trade-weighted basis and the United States gtobaL compe-
titive position to deteriorate somewhat over the Last eighteen months,
but this has enoded onLy a smalL part of the advantage built up during
eanL'ier years. Vis-i-vis the Commun'ity the United,states competitive
position, which was aIready strong at the end of 1978, has continued to
I i rp.ou"
llithin the Community itsetf too the competitive positions of memben
states have changed aga'inst one another, as can be seen from TabLe 3.6 (which,
for each member country, indicates changes aga'inst othen Community members
only and not against the wortd as a whole). As is frequentLy the case with
comparisons of this kind, the picture to emerge from tfre table is not entireLy
unambi.guousr since the various inf,ices do not alI point in the same direction.
NevertheLess, there are a number of interesting concLusions which may be drawn
from the data presented.
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The Federat Republic of Germany appears to have improved its. price
competitiveness vis-A-vis the other lrlember States quite significantIy over
the period under review, the result of maintaining a stabLe effective
e.xchange rate white the internaL rate of infLation has been weLt bel,ow the
Conmunity averagq. This improvement has more than canceLLed out the Loss of
competitiveness suffered during 1g76-197E, with the resuLt that the German
competilive position viq-A-vis other Community countries is today stronger
than at any time for.the Last five years.
The competitivenbss of French industry vis-d-vis the rest of the
Coprmunity seens to have undeigone LjttLe change over the Iast eighteen months.
IteLy, on the other hand, does seem to have suffered an appreciabLe toss of
conpetitiveness during 1979-1980, the exchdnge rate depreciation over this
iperiod having been substantiaLl.y tess than the adverse inftation differentiaL.
NevertheLess the deterioration has not been sufficient to erode compteteLy
thc competitive gains against other Community countries achieved durlng
1976-1978
The toss of competitiveness hasr. however, been far more serious in the
united ringdom. BroadLy speaking, it.pp'.urs ttr"t united Kingdom."r;r-."; ori."r"f
have risen by about 20ll in neLation to those of.other Community countries since
the end of 1978, thus more than offsetting the gajns chaLked up during 1976-1977.
So far the UK share of both intra-Community and wortd trade has held up surpri-
singty weLL in spite of these development,s (see foItowing section), but Loss of'
competitjveness on this scaLe seems bound to affect the United Kingdomts trading
performance in future
47
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SuperficiaLl.y the figures for the BeneLux countries appear fairLy
satisfactory.0n average the NetherLands'export prices have risen faster
than those of competitors, but this can probab!y Oe accounted for Largety
by the reLativeLy heavy weight of naturaL gas in Dutch exports. Since fueL
prices.have risen b/orLd-wide, higher naturaL gas prices do not entaiI
any Loss of competitiveness for the NetherLands. If aLLowance is made for
this factor, Dutch export prices have probabLy moved broad[y in line with
world prices, which is what one might expect in the case of a smalL
economy which is a "price-taker" rather than a "price-maker" in interna-
tionaL trade. BeLg'ian export prices have conformed to th'is pattern too.
The f igures for whoLesaLe pri ces of manufactures and unit Labour
costs in manufacturing indicate a very striking'improvement in the compe-
titiveness of both the NetherLands and Belgium, but these figures may be
misLeading for a variety of reasons. The indices of reLative consumer
prices, aLthough in theory not a very satisfactory guide, seem to conform
more cLoseLy to what is known from other sources about these two countriesl
trading perfonmance in industriaL goods, nameLy that there has been some
'improvement in their competitive positions over the tast two years or so,
but that this has been insufficient to undo compLeteLy the Losses suffered
in earLier years.
Denmarkrs competitive position was aLso seriousLy undermined during
the early seventies, when the krone appreciated with other "Snake" currencies
so that the start'ing point for the indices used (1910-1975 = 100) was aLready
one of substantiaL overvaLuation. That overvaLuation increased during the
period up to the end of 1978, but since then there has been a very strik'ing
improvement. Between the end of 1978 and mid-1980 the krone depreciated on
a trade-weighted basis against other Community currencies by 12lZ ln nominaL
terms. However, contrary to what might have been expected jn a smaLL, open
economy with a fainLy high degree of indexation, this nominal depneciation
apBears to have been fuLLy absorbed, thereby improving competitiveness.
t
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Iretandrs competitive position vis-A-vis'the rest of the Community has h
improved steadiLy throughout the seventies. The continuatjon of this trend
during the Last eighteen months, however, probabty owes much to the fact that
the competitiveness gf'the Unjted Kingdom, which is stitL by far and away
IreLandts most important trading partner, has deteriorated very steepty.
'Vis-A-vis other Community countries, towards which Irish trade is increasingLy
directed, the cost competitiveness of Irish products probabLy worsened,
as a resuLt of the combination of a stabLe exchange rate with a h'igher than
bverage rate of infLation. Such : deveLopments can onty damage the prospects
for the growth of export orientated empLoyment, which remains vitalty impor-
tant for Irel,and.
For the most part, the changes in intra-Community reaL exchange rates
that have taken ptace over the past eighteen months appear at least to have
been in the right direction. In the case of both Itaty and the Unjted Kingdom,
some :rea[ appreciation was acbeptabLe particuLar[y from the point of view of
internaL poLicy objectives - i.e, reducing infl.ation - aLthough it may be that
sterIingrs reaL appreciation is greater than can be sustained in the medium
term, Among the smaLLer countries both Denmark and tr.eLand cte-arty need to shift
resources into the externaLrsector and,the reat depreciation of their currencies
that haS occurred should bontribute towards the achievement of this objective.
The question of whether a reaL depneciation of the Deutsch mark vis-A-vis the f
rest of the Community, of the order of 107. is appropriate in present condi-
tions is more debatabte. AdmittedLy, the FederaL Repubtic of Germany is at
present running a current deficit which is a tittLe higher in reLation to
exports and output than the corresponding figure for the Community as a whoLe.
Houever, the German economy, with its reputation for financiaL stab'itity and
abundant reserves, is better pLaced than atmost aLI other member countries
to finance a sizeabLe current deficit over a period of several years. If the
improvement in German competitiveness t.las to Lead to a sharp re[ative improve-
ment in the Federat RepubIicts current account performance, this couLd render
.t for Member States wherethe process of externaL adjustment more ditficul
the need for such adjustment is considerabLy more urgent.
,-
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Market share performance
The modest increase in the Communityrs bhare of the industriaI
uortdts exports in the Latter ha[f of the 1970rs came to a haLt in 1979,
uhil,st the Unjted States has reversed its [oss of share. Cornprehensive data
for 1980 are not yet avaitabl.e, but it is to be expected that the Communityrs
Loss of competjtiveness witt have some further adverse effect on its export
performance. Japanrs share of industriaL countriesr exports, which had
increased substantiaLLy during the mid-nineteen-seventies, feIL sharpLy
ia 1978-1979. RecentIy, Japanese export voLume has been groring vigorousty,
buf because of the weakness of the yen this has not yet been reflected
ln Japanrs export share measured in current price.terms.
The deveLopment of the commodity composition of Communjty exports to
the rest of the wor[d gives grounds for some concern. The share of machinery and
transport equipment.has diminjshed sharpty, whiLe the share of those commodities
most vuLnerabLe to third worLd competition has increased.
t./ithin the Community itseLf there have aLso been changes.
Both the Unjted Kingdom and lta[y have increased their export shares at thc
-I 
"*p"nre of other members. That the United Kingdom shoutd increase its share
of intra-Community trade in the post-entry period was to be expected. What
is, at first sight, somewhat more surprising, is to find that the United
Kingdom share in Community exports to thjrd countries has also increased.
o
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The expLanation appears to be that the United Kingdom aLready had fairLy
cLose commercial, ties with the oiL exporting countries of the Middle East
where demand for imports ha,s proved the most dynamic element in worLd trade
during the period under consideration. The United Kingdom, ItaLy and Iretand
aLso no doubt benefitted from the consjderabIe improvement in their competi-
tive strength during the.mid-nineteen-seventies, although the recent
deterjoration in thejr competitiveness mehtioned above is LikeLy to affgct
their performance in future
By contrast, and as m'ight have been'expected, those countries whos'e
competitive strength had decLined during the mid-seventies tehded to Lose
market share, both in intra-Community trade and i1 Conmunity exports to third
countries. This was the case with the FederaL Repubtic of Germany and the
BeneLux countries and aLso Denmark, where one wouLd normaILy have expected
an increase in the share of intra-Commun'ity trade duning the post-entry
period, but where in fact there was a decLine.
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TABLE 3.1
Current balances 197E-1981 I bi tLion
1978 1979 1980
( forecast )
1981
(forecast)
0i L exporters (OPEC)
Indust ri at countries(0ECD)
+5
+8
1 1t?
91tZ
3
1t2
6
1
1
1
7
+68
-36
-14
3
5 1l?
+ 11t?
1 112
+5
2
- 3112
5
-??
+ 179
43
3
- 15 1t?
I
11lz
6
:- ? 112
4 1/2
-41
-60
-17
+110
-65
-36
3
- 
12 112
I 1/2
111?
3 1/2
1 1t?
-6
+ 1 1/?
-29
-63
-16
of which :
E. C.
of which :
DK
D
t
IRL
NL
BL
UK
0then industriat
count ri es
+15
-35
-10
I DeveLoping countries
0ther countries
43
18
TotaL (1) -32 -29 -4? -36
!ggg: Commission services
(1) In principIe uor[d current baIances
practice they do not, due to errors
should, of courser sUm to zero. In
and omissions of various kinds .
o
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TABLE 3.2
Changes in the terms of trade'and reaL adjustment in 1979 to 1981
1978 to 1980 cumuLative change Forecast change in 1981
Terms of trade(1)
Loss (-) or
gain (+).
Change in reaI
trade batance
Terms of trade(1)
Loss (-) or
gain (+)
Change in reaL
trade batance
as 7, ot 1978 GDP (e) as Z of 1980 GDP (e)
DT
D
F
IRL
I
NL
B
UK
4.5
?,6
2...4
6.0
4.1
2.4
2.3
3.0
3.6
0.7
0.6
0.7
?.2
?,?
1.4
2.4
- 0.2
- 0.1
- 
0.1
- 1.3
- 4.7
n. c.
- 0.2
+ 1.?
+ 1.1
+ 0.3
+ 0.4
+ 1.7
f 0.6
- 0.5
- 0.?
- 0.4
TotaL EC
USA
J apan
2.O
1,2
5.2
0.8
1.7
1.7
+ 0.3
+
+
(1) EquaL to the additionat exports required to teave the batance of trade
in goods and services unaLtered and then expressed as a percentage of GDP.
(Z) For practicaL purposes these percentages can, for each country or region,
be added together to derive the change in the trade batance in nominal
terms as a percentage of GDP.
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TABLE 3.3
BaLance of payments financing 1979498A ECU bilLion
ECUKBLNLDK IRL
1979
Current account
Non monetary capitaL(incLuding errors and
omi ss'i ons)
Bank s
SoR aLIocation
+
+
T
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
41-''14l. I
. + 0.2(est)
0.3 + 0.5(est)
0.2
2.C
?1
7.4
0.2
0.8
0,8
1.0
0.1
- 2.0
1.6
0.1
2.8
0.4
?.2
0.1
3.7 -13.7
n? 
-?n
6.4 +19.2
0.3 + 0.1
Chanoe in reserves (1) -n,l -'1.8 +1.5 -0.4 +2.7 -0.3 -0.9 +2.7 +3.5
1980 (Jan/June) (2)
-
Current account
Capitat movements
SDR aLLocat'i on
++
1.2
0.7
.+
4.8
1.6 +
o.2 +
2.9
9A
u.c
0.6 -4.0 -1.5
0.7 +2.7 +1.6
. 
+ 0.1 + 0.1
- 1.6 - 1.8 -18.4
+ 1-9 + 1.7 +16.2
+ 0.1 + 0.3 + 1.0
Change'inreserves(1) -0.5 -6.2 +5.9 +0.1 -1.2 +0.2 +0.4 +0.2'1.2
('1 ) ExcLuding vatuation adjustments
(2) ProvisionaL estimates, not seasonaLLy adjusted.
il trtote : F'igures ane on a transactions basis, except those for ItaLy and the NetherLands,
which are on a payments basis. This explains the discrepancy in the current
ba[ahces of'these two countries compared with those shown in Table 3.1-
o
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TAFL€ 3;4
European Community officiaI reserves 1978-1980 ECU biLLion
ECUKBLNLDK IRL
End, December 1978
Foieign currency,
SDR and IMF position
Gotd
Tota L
2.3
n?
35.3 6.7 1.9 8"1
18.8 : tO.Z 0.1 13.2
?.6 54.1. 22.9 ?.0 21.3 12.4 9.7 14.4 139.3
3.7
8.7
2.9
6.8
10.8 71.7
3.6 67 -6
End June 1980
Fore i gn
SDR and
Go l"d
Tota I
cur ren cy,
Ifvl F position 1.7
0.7
26.6 8.9
37.5
1q
0.2
8.0
30.5
3.2 3.?
15.6
13.3 66.5
156.98.
21.9 223.4
43 20 
"1
2.5 7A.2 46.4 1.7 38.6 23.3 18.8
Note : In order to fac'iL'itate comparison between the two dates member countriesl-..T ECU hoLdings, which did noi exist in December 1978, ari noi rno"n
separatety in the table. The doltar count'erpart to re,serves hetd in ECUis inc[uded with foreign currency and the goLd counterpart with goLd.
GoLd is vaLued here, as in the EMS, e'i ther at the average pr.i ce of
. the preceding:six months or at the price 9n the penuttimate working day
of that.period, whicheveli s the L,ower.
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TABLE 3.5
Indices of effective exchange rates price competitiveness l
The Community, USA and Japan Index : 197A-1975 = 100
1978
AIV
1979
OIV
1 980
A II
Effectjve exchange rate
rNorcEs or pn-rceJoMierrrrvrr,lqgs :
Export unit vatues
t^JhotesaLe orices
Consumer Prices
Unit Labour costs
98.9
107.2
104.0
1 00.9
109.0
107.3
110.7
111.8
110.3
122.7
106.4
110.9
'111.0
110.4
123.1
*)
USA
Effective exchange rate
IllDICES OF PRICE COMPETITIVENESS:
Export unit vaLues
WhoLesate orices
Consumer prices
Unit Labour costs
84.0
92.2
88.0
75.3
71,2
86. 1
93.9
93.3
80.0
75. ?
85.9
89.5
95.6
80.9
76.4*)
I J APAN
Effective exchange rate
INDICES OF PRICE COMPETITIVENElS :
Export unit values
hlhotesate pri ces
Consumer pr i ces
Unit Iabour costs
1 48.7
10:4.9
119.7
157.2
1 45.4
118.5
89.0
94.8
118.s
105.7
122.3
93.5
96.6
120"4
*)98.9
*) Figures for 1980 aI
Note : The effective exchange rate'index represbnts the weighted average exchange rate
change of the currency of the country/ or group of countriesr.concerned against
the currencies of other industriaL countries. The indices of price competiti-
veness represent effective exchange rate changes adjusted for inflation diffe-
rentials, four separate measures of inf'Lation (as indicated) being. used for
this purpose. In catcuLating the effective exchange ratelcompetit'iveness jndex
' for country Ar the weights accorded to countries B, C, D... take account of
the Lattersrimportance to country A, both as trading partners and as competitors
in third markets
{
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TABI.E 3.6
Indices of effectives
European Community
1978
o1v
Effective exchange rate 108.5
INDICES OF PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
exchange rates and price competitiveness in the
Index : 197V1975 = 100
99.0
104.6
'108-3
98.8
1979
O IV
101.1
94.6
9s.8
100.2
91,3
94r 8
95.9
97.7
100.5
104.0
55. 0
98.8
96.3
87.2
93.0
116.1
102.7
91 .1
107.9
96.4
1980
O II
95.1
90.7
91.2
91.8
86.5*1
94.3
93. 8
99.5
1 00.6
105.5,t)
53.6
105.1
98.4
89.2
94.3*)
1 15.8
102.4
87.4
104.6
93.g*)
1978
OIV
152.2
10s.6
105. 5
10t6.9
110.7
79.0
97.E
96.8
92.7
93. 0
122.6
104.0
105. 3
115;4
95.7
64.?
104.5
98.8
88. 0
90.8
1979
OIV
155.1
95.7
101.6
101 .8
105.0
1980
O II
152.2
89.6
96.3
95.8
101.%;
75.9
88.4
87.3
91 ,1
90.8* )
124.5
111'.9
93.8
105.9
85.5't )
119.3
123.7
113.5
111.O*)
DK
Export unit values
tJhqLesaLe prices
Consumer prices
Unit Labour costs
Effective exchange rate 95,8
INDICES OF PRICE COMPETITIVENESS
Export unit values
WholesaLe prices
Consumer prices
Unit taboun costs
95.9
97.4
1 00.2
103.1
91.7
91.1
83.0
88.0
99.3
97.6
11 4.4
1A2.9
78.5
95.3
94.9
95.0
9?.4
NL
Effective e,xchange r,ate 57.3
INDICES 0F PRICE C0MPETiTIVENES!
120.9
108.5
97.9
1A8.4
E6.5
109.5
110.2 I
99.1
104.7
67.0 72.7
bExport unit vaLues
WhoIesate plices'
Consumer pni ces
Unit Labour costs
Export, unit vaLues
t,lhoLesaLe pri ces
Consumer pri ces
Unit Iabour costs
Effective exchange rate 117.8
INpicEs 0F PRrcE C0MeETLIIV-ENEss
UKBL
''t) Figures for 1980 QI
Note: The indices in TabLe 3.6 are constructed in accordance with the same principles
''=:::-: r;-ttor"-rn Tabte 3.5, except that they represent the development of each
ind.ividuaL community cauntryrs effective exchange rate/competitiveness vis a
vir otn".'coi*uniiy'rornl.iLr onfy, rather than vis 6 vis aLt 'industniaL
counTiTes.
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TABLE 3.7
Share in industrial(excLuding intra-EC
countries totaL' export.s
trade) per cent
Average 1974'1975 1977 1978 1979
EC
USA
J APAN
OTHER
35 .0
25.3
13.7
26.0
35.8
2s.o
15.4
25.8
3s.7
23.1
1\A
1).>
?qA
24.3
13.7
26.4
source : OECD statistics of Foreign Trader June 1980
TABLE 3.8
Commod'i ty shares(excLuding intra
in Community total exPorts
EC trade)
per cent
1970 ' 1973 1977 1978 1979
f,
Food, beverages, tobacco
Fuet products
Raw materiaLs
l'lachi nery and transport equ'ipment
ChemicaLs
Intermedi ate manuf actured products
t4anufactured products in finaL demand
Mi sceI Laneous
7 12 7,7
?r9 3r1
2r7 2r8
41,6 41,1
11 r2 11,+
22,? ?3,0
918 913
117 116
613 616 6rE
4,3 4r1 5,3
2r3 2r3 2r4
43,1 4115 39,6
11 17 11 17 1?,1
2or8 2119 21,4
9r2 9r7 9,9
2r3 2r3 2r4
tota L 100 100 100 100 100
Source : Eurostat - MonthLy' externaL trade buLLetin - SpeciaL number 1958-1979
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TABLE 3..9
Shares 
.in intra-Community and extra-Community exports (%>
Intra=Communitv exports,Extra-Community exports
Average
1974-1975
Average
1978-1979
Average
1974-1975
Ave rage
1978-1979
DK
D
F
IRL
I
NL
BL
UK
2.7
2?.9
17.5
1.5
10.3
16.5
14.1
9.5
2.4
27.2
16.9
1.8
11.5
15.0
13.4
11.8
3.1
31.9
16.7
0.5
12.5
7.0
6rA
19.3
2.8
34.0
16.g
0.6
13.4
6.6
5.7
20.0
EC 1 00.0 100.0 100.0 1 00.0
Source :,Eurostat -
I
Month[y trade buttet.in - SpeciaI numbe r 1g5g-197g e)
n
sy
t
4.1
4. Budgetary poLicy and :ectora,L tjnqncjgL baLances
After stimuLative measures in 19783 budgetary poLicy, wh'ich i n 1979 gLobaLLy
exerted a smaLL contractionary impact, is in 1980 and 1981 expected to pro-
vide a certa'in support to activ'ity, due essentiaL Ly to the operat'ion of
automatic fi'scal stabi Lizers under recessionary conditions. Despite the
fact that budget deficits in the Late seventies are generaLLy Largen than
in the prev'ious decade, the demand impact seems to be [ower noll than earlier,
when certa'in adjustments are made for infLation. Thus government defic'its
have in part refLected interest payments to offset substantjal Iosses in the
reaL vaLue of domestic private sector hofdings of pubLic:debt. In somg :
rnember countries these factors may go some way to expLaining the sharp rise
in nominaL savings of househol,<1s since the f irst' oi L cris'is. The f inanciaL
deficit (as % of GDP) of the entreprise sector after a decLjne in 1978 rose
in 1979. A further rise may have taken pl.ace in 1980 but the LeveL of the
def ,icit 'is LikeLy to'remain beLow the record vaLues of 1973 and 1974.
Budgetar"y poIicy and its measunement
The trend in the recent past has been for Community governments to
babe budgetary policy to a greater extent than hitherto on medium-term
rather than on cycL'icaL demand-management considerations. In a number of
countries governments,have been seek'ing to dampen the ri5s jn tax
pressure, especiaLly that of direct taxeg in an attempt to strengthen
incentives and encourage productive investment. At the same time efforts
are being made to stabiLize or reduce general government deficits as a
proportion of gross domestic prorluct. The principat factor underIying
these efforts is a perceived need to ensure consistency between budgetary
policy and a monetary poLicy which has been given a central roLe in medium-
term stabiLization programmes; in some cases foreign trade imbatances have
been seen as an additionaL factor dictating budgetary retrenchment.
The weakening of economic activity in 1980 and 1981 has increased the
room a L Lowed
t
di f f j cuLties of reconci L'ing these various
by governments for budgetary poticy as a
objectives and
short-term stabi tizer" in recessionary
conditions has been very Limited, as is borne out by the budgets adopted or
ptanned for 1980 and 1981. 0n'the basis of budgets currentLy adopted, Com-
mission forecastsrsuggest that the aggregate deficits of generaL governments
in the Community, as a proportion o'f GDP, are reduced to 3r5i/,in 1980 from
316% 1n 1979, 6nd that there ,wil.l be a'sLfght rise, to 3197. in 1981
(TabLe 4.D .
the
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In 1980 iurrent receipts.of generat government rise faster than
nominaL GDP (FespectiveLy 14r4"A and 12r5%>. 0f the major categories
of receipts, 'incji rect taxes are ri sing most rapjdLy, ref Lecting 'increases
in tai."i", in some countries during 1979 and 1980. TotaI current ex-
ipenditure rises at the same ratle (4.4%> as current receipts in 1980,
but "other current outlays" (mainLy debt interest payments) rise considerabLy
more napidLy. It is noteworthly, howeven, that the reLat'iveLy
strong increase in government consumption in 1980 stems LargeLy from
increases in compensation of government empLoyeesr'white in votume terms
government consumptjon in 1980 t'ises by onLy 2r07;. The increase in current
transfers, especiaILy in view of the increasing number of recipients of
sociat benefits, impIies some reduction of benefjts in the aggregate in
reaL terms. Government fixed capitaL formation rises by 13F27, jn nominat
terms1n 1980, a faster rate of increase than that in nominat.GDP. How-
ever, aLthough a voLume figure is not directLy avaiLabLe, the fact that
constnuction pri'ces are forecast to rise more rapidLy than totaL invest-
ment prices in most Community countries suggests that IittLe change or
perhaps even a fa[[ in the volume of government investment in the Commu-
nity is impLied.
r
The budgetary forecasts for 1981 indicate that the main categories !
of current receipts wiLL rise at a rate simitar to that of nqminaL GDP
On the expenditure side, debt interest payments will again rise rap'idLy,
whjLe current transfers and government consumpt'ion wiLL also outstrip
nominaL GDP growth.Qnce aga'in, however, the voLume growth in government
consumpt'ion w.i LL be modest , at 113% A f aLL in the voLume of government
i nvestment seems L i ke LY 
'
The Community aggregates are the resuLt of. action taken in the Member
States which refLect their differing economic circumstances. Thus a con-
tinuation of externaL or int'ennal imbaLances, excessive infLatjon rates '
and probLems of consisiency between monetary ancl budgetary poLicy have
ted to measures of budgetary restraint 'in Denmark, IreLand, the. Nethertands,
BeLgium ancl the United Kingdom. In ltaLy the authonities are aiming at a
nestrictive stance of budgetary pol'icy but without, as yet' the assurance
of achiev'ing it in the short term.
)-7
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Thus in Denmark (TabLe 4.2), extensions to the muttiannual program-
me were adopted in Spring. TotaL pubLic expenditure ptans for 1981 wiLL
be reduced by 8 000 miILion kn which implibs'that the actual Level in rea[
terms is maintained for the centraL government and that the increase for Local
authorities is reduced to 2%. Indirect taxation was raisecl at the end of
June and in October. to yield some 4 000 miLlion kr annuaLLy, of which the rise
in the VAT to 227l accounts for some 3 ?00 miL[ion kr and taxes on energy for
another 900 miLLion kr..Taxes on personaL income wiLl be raised in 1981 by some
1 0C0 miLIion kn. FinaLLy the framework of the industriaL and empLoyment program-
me vaLid for the period 1981-83 is impLemented to the amount of 5 400 miILion kr
jn 198,1. Despite these measures, a number of autonomous factors continue to
exert a pressure on the generaL government borrowing requirement which in 1981
couLd rise to some 4% of GDP aga'inst an estimated requirement of 3.5% of GDP
thi s year
In Ireland the 1980 budget sought to set in train a recluction of the
budget deficit: it impLied a tight controL of non-wage pubLic expenditure
and a shift from direct to indirect taxatjon. The original target for the
budget deficit (10 1 /2% of GDD) seems LikeLy to be considerab[y overshot,
partl.y as a resuLt of sL'ippage'in pubLic sector pay. The 1981 budget has
frot yet been prepared, but Commission forecasts assume that tax poIicies
wiLL be rather restrictive in that yea?, whiic.rovernment capitaL spending
is expected to rise somewhat in voIume terms. Given only modest economic growth
in 1981, and based on the Commissionrs assumptjons and forecasts, the generaI
government budget deficit is LikeLy to be simiLar, expressed as a percen-
tage of GDP, to that for 1980, at 1218%. Govqrnment poticy has been to
seek a faL L in the undenLying defi cit.
In the NetherLands the LikeIihood of a shortfa[['in tax receipts in
1980 Led the government to propose substantiaL cuts in pLanned pubL'ic sector
wages, social transfers and government purchases to prevent an overshoot'ing
of the 1980 target for the pubLic sector cash deficit (incLuding, loans and
participations this was set at 5 3/4% of net national income, with the medium-
term target setat 4,AY). Present budget forecasts assume that there wiLL
be a further shortfaLL jn rece'ipts in 1980, so that the budget def ic'it, orr this
basis, under the impact of recession, wiLI reach 6%. The.budget proposal.s for 1981
aim at reducing.the pubLic sector cash deficit to 5 1/4% of net nationaL
income by further cuts in expenditure of about 3 600 miLLion gu'iLder, a
sLight increase in indirect taxation and a sharp increase in natural gas
fvenue, compensated by a substantiaI reduction of charges for enterprises
e 000 miLLiod and some other measures to stimu[atg activity.
fv
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In the remain'ing countries poLicy has had a more neutraI stance
In Germany the budget outtunn in 1980 is tikel"y to reveat a deficit
simiLar, as a percentage of GDP, to that for 1979. A reduction in
personaL income taxes'and increases in certain sociaL benefits are due
to take effect at the beginning of 1981, taking the increase in current
receipts beLow that in nominaL GDP. At the same t'ime, accord'ing to present
Commission forecasts, current spend'ing wi LL rise more rapidLy than nominaL
GDP. These forecasts envisage a widening of the generaL government deficit
to l]7, of GDP in 1981 .
In France it seems likeLy that the 1980 generaL government deficit
wiLL be very sLightLy higher than originaLty 
-ptannecJ 
(just over 40 000 mitIion
FF as against 34 000 miLljon). Given the twin aims of stabiLizing tax pressure
and reducing the budget deficit, a strict Limitation of government spending
has been provided for in the budget pnoposaIs for 1981: the generaI govern-
ment borrowing requirement wiLL rise, to 1'17, of GDP, owing to a signif icant
worsening of the financiaL position of the sociaL security funds
In Luxembourg, the Budget Law for 1980 reduced the tax burden on
househoLds and ftrms, the generaL government buiJget surpLus being
eLiminated as a result. For 1981, Commission forecasts assume stower
growth of investment and empLoyment in the pubLic sector. However, the
deceteration in the tax base in paralLeL with weak actjvityr"as weLL as
rapid growth in transfers to househoLds and enterpr'ises, wiLl entaiL
a generaL government defi cit.
The generaL impression which emerges from these deveLopments and
forecasts is that attempts are being made to Limit the impact which
recessionary conditions wouLd normaLLy tend automaticaL Ly to have in
increasing budget defi cjts (for exampLe through shortfaL Ls in tax re-
ceipts and increases in unempIoyment benefits). The Ljmitation 'is being
effected through a restriction of reaL government spending and reaL per
capita sociaL benefits beLow the leveLs that might have been expected
if uncJerLying grouith prospects were more favourabLe. Hot,lever, in certain
countries estimates of trend output growth, and hence of medium-term
poss'ib'iLities for af fording government consumption, have been revised
downwa rds .
t
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An indication of changes in the'budgetany policy stance nlay be obtained
from rudimentary estimates of "constant act'ivity" budget baLances based
simpLy on'the additions to (or reduct'ions in) tax revenue, at unchanged
average tax/GDP ratios, which woutd occur jf reaL GDP growth in each year
were such as to keep activity unchange'1 from the,pretrious-year, with
an acljustment made for the actuaL increase in expenditure on unempLoyment
benefits. Estimates 
-of these';constant activity" balances (TabLe 4.3)
show a t'ighten'ing for the Community by some 0r5% of GDP in .1980 wjth a fqrther
sl.ight tightening il 1981', suggesting that in.both years discretionary budgetary
poLicy - on the assumptions made - exerts a contractionary 'infLuence on activity
(compared to the forecast of an actuaL tightening of only 0r17, in the baLance
between 1979 and 1980 and a widening o.f 014% in the actual Cefi cit between 1980 and 1981) .
In order to give a somewhat sharper impression of the demand impacts,
a simpIe jncome-expendjture modeL iras been used to weight changes in com-
ponents of the budget baLance according to their demand effects. Estimates
of the reaI f i rst-round impact (before aL low'ing for muLt'iplier ef f ects)
are thus derived. Commission forecasts of govennment rece'ipts and expend-
itures for 1?80 and 1981 are used in calculating the impacts for these *
years. The est'imates conf i rm (Tabte 4.4) that in 1978, in the context of
the "concerted action programme", budgetary changes in the Community couri-
, (aLthough this stimuLus'
wou[d not be wholLy feLt in tr978 - the impact estimates do not take account
of Lags in the muLtip[jer process) . In 1979, however, budgetary changes
contractionary'impact, even at the absoIute tevet of
activi ty, not just at the theoretica[ "constant activity" LeveL of
activity. For 198O,and 1981 the p'icture varies from country to country.
For the Community as a whole there is a st'imuLus (to the absolute LeveL
of activity) in both years, but its s'ize js smaLI compared w'ith those
in the 1g74/75 recession.
',*
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The estimates take account neither of monetary repercussions (rrotabLy
the possibility of the "crowdingrout" of private investment as a resuLt of
the tntenest rate impact of pubLic sector deficits ) nor of weaLth effects
of budget baLance changes. In particuLar, as regards weaIth effects, they
negLect changes in the reaL vaLue of the stock of pubLic debt whiLe incLuding,
as "true"'income of the private sector, a[|. interest payments on the public
debt. For some countries with consistentty h'igh budget deficits in recent
. 
years (for example Belgium and ltaLy) there is eviclence to suggest that
some dampen'ing infLuence has been at work to prevent Large budget deficits
be'ing transIated into unusuaI Ly high pressure of domestic demand. Indeed,
neither capacity uti Lization indicators nor unempIoyment rates (both of
wh'ich are admittedLy faLLibLe guides) would suggest that the pressure of
domestic demantJ has been consistent[y hjgher in these two countries than
in the Community as a whole.
As shown 'in the foLLowing section on sectoraI financiaL batances
the increase'in budget defic'its (and thus the positive demand'impacts
shown in Tables 4.3 and 4.4) has been accompanied by an increase in the
savings ratio of househoLds, this reLativeLy weak demand from the private
sector having offset in some degree the stimuLus to demand emerg'ing from
t the pubLic sector. This deveLopment seems to be particutarty pronounced
in countries with above-average infIation rates (IreIand, ItaIy, United
Kingdom). Thus in assess'ing the demand impact of changes in budget baLances,
some part of current pubLic expenditure on interest rates couLd be regarded
as an acceLerateci redemption of the national debt, and might, notionalLy,
be counted as Lowering the effective size of br,rdget deficits. Such adjust-
ments to budget accounting shou[d, of course, bg regarded as aids to
understanding the workings of the economy, and not'in a normative sense
t,o dismiss the argument that very high pub['ic def i cits are l'ikel.y to be
prejudiciaI to monetary stabi Iity and efficient ressource aLLocation.
(r)
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financia, <fl
For five years there has been a h'igh IeveL of financiaI surpLus in
the private sector (see TabLe 4.5) because of the persistenc,e of high
net Lending by households (due to a high gavings ratio) and Low net
borrowing by:enterprises, oart[y reflecting a low investment ratio. Con-
sequentty, the overaLt demand of the private sector has rema'ined weak.
This has to some extent been offset by the increase in the generat govern-
ment borrowing requirement which was very largeLy induced by the sLow-
down in economic growth (in particuLar because of the sma[er rjse in tax
increase jn transfer expenditure). The behaviour of thereceipts and the
domestic sectors as.a whole was refLected in a Community baLance posit'ive
and negative by turns: its rnovement cLearLy refLects the variations jn
real growth but aLso the fact that the balance of payments has been a
prime concern of economic poIicy. The persistence of. inftation and the.
growing importance which economic agents attach to neaL varjables he[p
to expLain the new distribution of balances between private and pubLic
sectors. InfLation is in fact pLay'ing a redistributive roLe in respect
of reaL weaLth: the holders of monetary and finnacial assets the value of
which is fixed innominaIterms suffer a toss in reaI terms white debt.ors
benefit from a net gain. wtore specificaLLy, because of their net tending,
households ane net hotders of assets and consequentLy see the neql vaLue
of their, baLances being eroded by infLatjon whi[e enterprises and, in par-
t'icuLarr general government, which are net 6g516rs., benefit in reaL terms
from this situation,
Hguseholdsr net lencjing has' sjnce 1970 foltowed a r.ising trend
(Graph' 4.1). The' very high surptus of saving ovelinvestment observed in
1975 was corrected in 1976 and 1977 but since then, and contrary to
expectations at the t'ime, househoIds have maintained their,net Lending,
as a percentage of GDP,at a high level. The main determinant of the move-
ment of this baLance is the trend increase in the savings ratio (Gnaph 4.3)
There are a variety of causes for this trend: if the rise in reaL persona[
d'isposabLe incomes probably favoured the pnocess up to 1974, it has since
GITIe enterrprise sectbr' js itseLf the aggregation of the institutionaI
. sectors non-financiaL corporate and quas'i-corporat,e enterprises,
credit institutions and insurance enterprises.
3
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t sLowed and cai therefore no Longer have as much influence. The pre-
cautionary motive has certainty pLayed a important part in the rate of
saving with account being taken of the rise in unempLoyment and the
sLowdown in growth. But infLation seems to be the cruciaL factor expLain-
'in3 the rise'in the savings ratio. By raising the savings rat'io, house-
hoLcjs have sought to mainta'in the reaL vaLue of their cash hoLdings and
financiaL assets. Whereas a fLight from money might have been just as
probabLe, at Least when infLation was acceLerating, this has not taken
pLace. 0n the contrary, the succession of high inflation rates has.
certainLy taught househoLds to adjust to the infLat'ionary environment and
money iLlusion has been reduced. Efforts were then concehtrated on pre-
serv'r n9 a rea L leve L of savi ng ( 1 ) .
The greatest rise in the househoLd savings ratio occurred'in ItaLy,
the United Kingdom and lreland (Graph 4.3), i.e. in three countries in
which infLation was particutar(y pronounced. In these three Member States,
the 1974/75 crisis was refLected in a falL in private consumption in 1975
(as earLy as 1974 in the United Kingdom) and in a resumption of its rise
up to 1978 which was sLower than in the other Member States. In France,
the savings ratio has generaILy stayed higher in the Last few years than
* 
at the beginning of the decade. Germany and Bellgiumr.bY contrast, returned
to lower than pre-cris'is sav'ing LeveLs; the retativeLy smaLL scaLe of
variations in the infIation rate perhaps made it poss'ib[e in these countries
to timit the changes in expectations, thus heLp'ing to sustain the rate of
consumption retativeLy weLL.
The trend of househo[ds'net LendinE as a percentage of GDP foLlows
the same direction as'the tnend of the savings ratios in the four Ldrge
Member States (Graph 4.D. ItaLy stands out because of the sca[e of'ItaLian
househoLdst net [ending as a percentage of GDP which is counterbaIanced
by a very high generaI government borrowing requirement. ALthough there
are specific causes to expLain the exceptionat leveL of Itatian househoLds'
net Lending, nameLy a shar.p surge in wages and structuraLty weak housing
expenditure, these arguments nevertheLess seem insuffic'ient. In fact it
is possibLe that the successjon of heavy budget deficits in a highLy
ffin-ecbnometric anaLysis of these phenomena entitLed I'The effect of
infLation on household consumption" tnras pnesented in Europe-an Economy
No 5, March 1980, P. 39.t
("//
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infLationary environment has pushed the curve of the househotdsr baLance
upward. Adjusted for the effects of infLation on the reaL vaLue of the
pubLic debt to househoidr, househoLdsrnet Lending is in neaLity Low
whiLe generaL government indebtedness is greatIy reduced.
The macroeconomic importance of the Loss in reaL vaLue of househotdst
financiaL assets is particuLarLy great in the countries'uhere the LeveL of
pubLic debt has been retativeLy high and which have experienced a marked
acceLeration in the infLation rate (TabLe 4.O. Thus in Itaty, hotders of
pubIic securities have suffened heavy Losses in reaL wea[th, The annuaL
amount of these Losses can be put at a LeveL of between 5 and 8% of GDP
since 1973, and this could go higher in 1980 and 1981, As a result of such
a Loss in reaL weaLth, househoLds have probabLy moclerated their
overaIt demand fainLy appreciably, and have in partjcuiar devoted a Large
part of their incomes from interest,payments to reconstituting their assets
in reaL terms. Large budget deficits and high infLation rates in IreLand
have meant that since 1973 the extent of the erosion in the real value of
the private sector's hoLdings of pubLic securities has been at Least as
great as in ItaLy
0f the other Member States, the purchasing power Losses caused by
the erosion of the reaL value of the publ'ic debt held by the private
sector have been rather Low in 6ermany, France, the NetheiLands and Den-
mark (aLthough in Denmark they may be greater in 1980 and1981). This-isdue
to the relat'ively smaU. scaLe of the pubLic debt andlor the more moderate
rates of infLation in these countries.
The United Kingdom and BeLg'ium are in an intermediate position. In
the former count?y, the public debt as a percentage of GDP was high in
the earLy seventies (some 60%, having been even higher in the sixties)
and the rapid infLation in 1974 and 1975 caused heavy Losses in the real
vaLue of the pubL'ic' debt. This couLr:J weLl. be one of the factors expLain'ing
the financial behaviour of househoLds since 1973. Fron 1975 on, the annuaL
purchasing power losses have faLLen to an average of some 5% of GDP
because of. the substantiaI reduction between 1973 and 1975 in the size
of t he pub L i c clebt as a proport j on of GDP
*
l
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In BeLgium, the ratio of pubLic debt to GDP is reLativel-y high
(aLthough Lower than in Itaty and lreLand) but infLation has been reLativeLy'
Low so that the purchasing power Loss in respect of the hoLding of publjc
debt assets is distinctLy'smaLLer than in IreLand and Itaty' sLightLy
smaLLer than in the United Kingdom but sLightLy greater than in the
other Memben States
As a resuLt of the 1974/75 cris'is, the JinanciaL management of enter-
prises became strjcter than in the past. This trend is cLearLy reftected
in the decLine in enterprises'net borrowing as a percentage of GDP since
1974 Graph 4.1). The marked change of d'irection in the curve in 1975
is connected with the Large cut in investment in that year- The upturn
which foLLowed brought no'return to eartier net borrowing, Levets and 1978
actuatLy saw a further.cut in net borrowing as a percentage of GDP' The
, generaL weakness of investment enabLecl enterprises to decnease their
externaL borrowing (Graph 4.il. The gross profit margin of enterpr'ises
(ratio of enterprisesrgross operating surptus to their vaLue added - see
Graph 4.6) tended to decLine up to 1975 and then recovered sLightLy from
1976 to 1979.. Comparing this deveLopment of gross profit marg'in with the
sL'owdownintherateofinvestmentand,atLeastuptol9TS,reduced
3 recourse to outside financing an improvement in the cash 
position of enter-
prises in the Last few years can be observed'
since 1976TheincneaseinfixedcapitaLinvestmentinreaLterms
Positive trend of theirhas been greatest in German enterprises' The
profit margin has enabLed them to invest whiLe reducing their r'eLiance
on externaL financing, at Least up to 1979' In Fnance and Ita[y' by contrast'
we see a steady reduction in enterprisesrnet borrowing (Graph 4'4), a
decrease in their caLts on outside sources of cap'itaL and a sLowdown in
earLY seventies. Yet thethe rate of investment as compared with the
profit margin of ItaLian enterprises has recovered to.':-:, extent since
1975 and, if the French profit margin has narrowecl sLightLy, this is due
to the reLativeLy poor resuLts of soLe, proprietors and partnerships
(mainLy of agn'icuLture) and not of compan{es, whose marg'ins have consoLidated
since 1975.This Leads to the concLusion that French and ttaLian enterprises
I
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have made it a priority to reduce their jneJebtedness and their net
borrowing and have not sought to take advantage of the improvement
in their resuLts to engage in a v'igorous investment drive. In the
United'Kingdom, the sudden increase in enterprisesr externaL financing
in 1979 does not particuLarly refLect an investment drive as it does
in Germany, but a deterioration in profitabi Lity.
A number of favourabte signs appeared ih 1979, in particular in
the enterprise secton. l^lith good saLes prospects and operating' resuLts,
firms were increasing their investment expenditure even if this meant
increased borrow'ing. It is true that the process was favoured by a steep
rise in the prices of manufactured pnoducts: ALthough the saving level
.of househol.ds remained high overaLL, the rise'in real personaL incomes
meant that a high rate of consumption couLd be maintained. ConsequentLy,
the generaL government baLance benefited from the.revivaI of activ'ity,
whiLe a decLjne in the terms of tr"ade contributed to the deterioration
of the external baIance. ALthoug,h greurth was improving, inf Iation was
rising too, mainLy because of a strong surge'in import prices
The forecasts for 1980 and 1981 have'been estabLi'shecl on the assump-
tion of no change in econom'c poLicies, and must therefore be'interpreted
as tracing the most probabLe path in the absence of new exogenous eLements
or of poticy changes. in 1980, the savings ratio and net tending of house-
holds shouLd be [ower because of a marked stowdown in the rise of neat
incomes. Faced with less buoyant ddmestic demand, enterpriseg shou[d see
;their net borrowing increase, no Longer because of heavy investment expen-
diture but because pnoductivity growth w'iLI be reduced, teading to a
squeeze on margins. Recessionary tendencies are therefore particuLarty
cLear for 1980 within the ptivate sector in the Community. The high rate
of infLation makes the situation inore difficuLt, In 1981, the upward
movement of prices shoutd sLow down. Compensation of empLoyees shouLd
rise more moderateLy, but househoIds shouId:see. their reaI incomes improve
as prices rise more sLowty. The sav'ings ratio coutd move b.ack upwards
sLightLy. It shouLd not, however, regain its 1979 Levet and shouLd remain
w':tL betow the rates reached during the 1974/75 recession. The investment
ratio of'enterprises shoutd remain Low overaLI and shoutd in atI cases be
;:t':;:' :::::,;:,,::::
b
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TechnicaL note to TabIes 4 4 anr) 4
In IC.b.!.*J- the changes in "adjusted" budget baLances 'i ndicate
the budget baLance which wouLd have resuLted (given the average net
tax rates jn the year in question on househoLd income, business income
and private expdnditure) if gross domestic pr^oduct in that year had
risen at a rate suffircient to maintain the LeveL of unempLoyment unchanged
fnom the previous year (aLso assuming the djstribution of factor in-
come between househotcJ, business and public sector unchanged), An adjustmentjs mafle for,the change 'in unempLoyment benefits brought about by the actuaL
change in unempLoyment jn the year in question (and the average net tax
rate, counting transfens aS negative taxes on househotd incomes, is aLso
adj usted accordj ng Ly) .
For the yeans 1970-73'a constant LeveL of act'ivity is defined as the[evel of activity which woutri have resutted if GDP had rjsen at jts 1960-73
trend rate. For the period 1973-81 the rate of growth of potentiaL output
has been assumeC to be higher than the actuaL trend oven th'is period, the
gap resuLting mainLy from the Lower degree of uti-Lisation of labour
nesources
Average tax rates are assumed to represent marginaL rates. Si;rce in
most countries the eLasticity of taX receipts with respect to income may
be greater than unity and greater than the equivaLent eLasticity for trans-
fer payments, the automatic effects of changes in activity on budget baLances
are thus LikeIy to be underestimated. There is LikeLy to be an opposite/'
hiut probably smaLLer, bias'in the caIcu[ation of the adjustment for unenploy-
ment benefits'since no account is taken of the growing proportions of young
peopLe and marfied women in the unempIoyed, and-thus the average payment
per unempLoyed person is probabLy overestimated-
The "first-round" budget impact est'i mates pnesented in Ig!te a. 
represent wejghtEd changes in budget.baLances, changes jn the van'ious com-
ponents ,of generaI government recejpts and expenditures being given weights
accor^ding to their fir^st-round demand effects. The. lleights are caLcuLated
using a simpLe income-expenditure modeL, foL Low'ing the methodoLogy described
in the 0ECD SpeciaL Study rBudget Indicators", JuLy 1978-
The parameters of the model were assumed to be fixed over the period
covered (97A-81), with marginaL vaLues equaL to average vaLues except in
the case of import propensiiiu., wh'ich were taken from the OECD.0ccasionaL
Study 'FiscAl CoLicy SimuLat'ions with the 0ECD International L'inkage Modelr,
JuLy 1980. For the years 197.t'77 the data source was (except for import
propensities and price defLators for government jnvestment, obtained from
nationaL sources where avaiIabte) the sectorat accounts pubLished by Euro-
stat within the framework of the European System of Accounts (ESA). For
1977-81 data were taken from nationaL sources, adjusted where necbssary to
conform with the ESA, and from estjmates and forecasts of the Commissjon
servi ces.
' TabLe 4.5 attempts to give estjmates of the Loss of purchasing
power of pubLjc debt heLd by domestic private sectors. The estjmates
do not, therefore, correspond to the so-caLLed "infLat'ion tax", which
is usuaLLy defined as the Loss of purchasing powen of pubLjc debt Less
interest payments on the debt. The estimates are obtained through
deftation of the nominal vatue of outstanding domestic pubLjc sector
*
bs
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debt 'in domestic currericy with the percentage increase over previous
years'in the private expenditure defLator (see be[ow). A 10 percent
rise in this defLator thus results'in a purchasing power loss amount-
ing to 10 percent of outstanding debt.
Estimates of this nature present severe probtems, and no pretence
is here made that TabLe 4.5 represents a satisfactory resoLution of
these probtems. There arer'in fact, considerabLe statistjcaL and concep-
tuaL difficuLt.ies an.l the estimates are reproduceri only to point out the
potentiaL importance of tosses of "reaI va[ue" of, the pubtic debt.
The concepts used are as fotlows
Denm.ark: centrat government domestic currency debt excLuding hoLdings by
the centraL bank (source: Konjunkturoversigt, Danmarks Statistik; estimates
of Commission services).
France: centraL government domestjc currency debt (source: BuLtetin du
coniETt NationaI du Crediti estimates of Commission services),.
IreIand: doemstic hotdings of capitaL Liabi Lities of centraL government(source: Centr'aL Bank QuarterLy BuLLetinsi "Irjsh PubLic'Debt", R. Bruton,
ESRI, Juty 1978; estimates of Commissjon services).
Italf: generaI government doemstjc currency debt excIuding centraL bank
hotdings (source: "II B'ilancio deL Settore PubbIico e gLi EffeLti di
Spiazzamento: um Esarne deI ttEsperienza itatiana", F. Cotuta, R. ftlasera
and G. Mercatdg rev'ised version of paper presented to conference of CEEP
and Centio Torre Argent ina, 14-15 December 1979; "ReLazione suILa stima
deI fabbisogno deL settore pubbL'ico aLIargato per ['anno 1980", quanter^Ly
report to ParIiament of the lvljnister for the Treasury; estimates of Com-
mission servi ces)
NSI-hS1-!AO!-C: centraL government domestic currency debt (source: Nether[anCs
Bank AnnuaL Report).
BeLgiurn: domestic hotdjngs of centraI government debt (.source: NationaL Bank,
AnnuaI Reoort).
Jlnjtal--Kin,Jclcru dot'lestic private sector ho['jings of generaI government debt
.-(Guii,ffi-btic sector Debt", D.J. Reid, "Ecoiomic irends',, Flay 1977; Bank
of EngIand QuarterLy BuItetin; estimates cf 0ommjssion services).
Nomjna[ (as opposed to market) vaLues of debt are used in att cases.
l.lhiLe this makes no difference to the totaL Loss of purchasing power on a
bond over its Ljfetime (when the Loss is measured at prices rul.ing at the
time oT redernption), the profiLe of losses over time'is rather aiiterent.(see"rReaLt nationat savings and its sectoraI cornpos'ition" c.T. TayIor and
A.R. Threadgotd, Bank of Engtand Djscussion paper, Nc 6,0ctober 1979). This
means that great caution shoutd be exercised in retat'ing the figures for aparticular year in TabLe 4.5 with the first-round impact estjmates givenin Tabte 4.4. An additional difficuLty anisbs where bonds are issued betowparr'but this problem js unlikeIy to be quantitativeLy important.
The estimates in TabLe 4.5 are different fnom those in TabLe 4.4 inthat no attempt has been made to assign demand-'impact "weights" to the
estimates in the fonmer tabLe, there being no clear guider.either
theoreti caL or empi ri caL, to llhat vaLues iuch we'i ghts migilt Oe expected
to have
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TabLe 4.5
Net Lending or net borrowing by the Community as a pencentage of gr^oss domestic product
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
?:;l:H.;::::'o,t 1,2 z'1 o,e 0,8 5,4 3,2 3'2 4'6 3'o 1'8 2'6
Genera L
government 0r3 .-0r4 '1 ,3 -016 .-1 .8 -513 -3r7 -3r1 '3,9 -3,6 -315 -3:9
Commun i t y
to on f rom 0,5 Q.8 0,8 0.2 -1 0,1 'A,5 0r1 0,7 -0,6 '1 ,7 -1 ,3
ab road
Sources: Eurostat. Commission staff forecasts.
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Graph 4.1
Sectoral'accounts statistics distinguishing between househotds and
enterprises are availabLe onLy for the four Large Member States:
Germany, France, Ita,Ly, the United KingCom. The pLotted Lines in
the graph show the sectoraL baLances for the aggregate EUR-4 (the
figures for these four member countries aggregated using current
prices and exchange rates).
Graph 4.3
The gross savings ratio of househoLds is the ratio, expressed as a
percentage, Of gross saving tO gross disposab[e income of house-
hotds
For Denmark and the NletherLands, the figures refer to the gross savings
ratio of the\ private sector
The gross savings ratio for the Community is caLcuLated by weighting
the nationaL savings ratios by 1978 cDP
Graph 4,5
The externat financing ratio of enterprises is the ratio, expressed as
a percentage, of their net borrowing to their gross capitaI formation.
Graph 4.6
For Geimanyr'France and ItaLy, the gross profit margin is the ratio of
the gross operating surptus of enterprises (inc(uding soLe prorietors
and partnerships) to their vatue-added. The gross operating surplus of
sote proprietors and partnerships has. been spLit into tbro components:
"wage" iniomes imputed to proprigtors and partners, equaL to average
compensation of empLoyees in the main corresponding. branches of activity;
and a component representing the gross profit margin of sote proprietors
and partnerships.0nty the second component has been incLuded in the
numerator of the ratio, In ltaly, the gross operattng surpLus of soteproprieiors and partnerships has been arbitrarity caIcuLated as 90% of
the gross operating surplus of househoLds.
For the United Kingdom, the gross prolit margin is the ratio of gross
trading.surptus of companies and pubLic cooperations to theirradded-
vaLue (soLe proprietors and partnerships be'ing excLuded).
The gross profit marg'in EUR-4 is weighted by 1978 GDp.
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5.1
5. filonetary poLicies
The monetary disorder'of the 1970s aggravated inftation and the
probtems of growth and emptoyment. The appropriate lessons b,ere drawn nith
the introduction of monetary targets and, in particular, wjth the
estabtishment of the European ltlonetary System (Ef'lS) at the beginning of
1979. Despite the difficu[ties resu[ting from the second oiL price shock,
the discipLine thus imposed is beginning to produce resutts. Changes in
centra[ rates have remained Limited. In 1980, for the first time in ten
years, monetary expansion in the Community is cLose to the trend of. the
1960s. A greater convergence of monetary poticiesrreinforced by the trend
of interest rates, is serving to resist inftationary pressure$ and diver-
gences in cost and price trends. This is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for u[timateLy achieving convergence of cost and price trends. The
time needed for monetary poLicy to produce results is often tong, and struc-
turat distortions, or indeed a recession, may devetop if stabitisation remains
pureLy monetary. This is a[ready evident in some countries. If the chance of
stabiLisation and convergence provided by present monetary poticy is not to
be missed and if improved prospects for growth and employment are to be
restored, this effort must be supplemented by pubtic finance measures, by the
restructuring of subpty and, in particuLar, by a rapid adaptat,ion of the
trend of incomes to neht conditions.
Past experience (1)
{ The 1960s were characterized by moderate inflation rates and by
fixed exchange rates trhich, in some cases, had to be adjusted upwards or
downwards because of externat disequiLibria that were regarded as funda-
mentat. Though there Here no monetary targets, aLL the member countries
showed great stabiIity in their money suppLy trends. This was the resu[t
of efforts to achieve the "intermediate objective" of exchange rate
stabi ti ty. The average i nf tat i on rate under the Bretton I'loods system tras
Largety determined by the dominant economies. Any countries exceeding thfs
inftation rate rapidLy incurred the sanction of an externaL deficit: a
restrictive monetary poLicy became necessary at domestic tevet so as to
compLy with the rutes of the system; thus, the margin for infLationary
trends in incomes and pubLic finance $as reLat'ive[y narrow. The
surges in inftation in 1963/64 in ItaLy, France and the NetherLands
(1) See Graph 5.1.
t
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- nith the.subsequent stabitisation which avoided,devaluations - ere an
exampLe. The countries whose stabiLity obiective uas more afibitioUs than
the average inftation rate of the system experienced probLems of a.different
nature. Germany is the prime exampte in this respect: the revatuaitions of
1961 and 1969, the recession of 1,967, the ove,rdevelopment of the lexport
sector and the simu[taneous importation of capitaL and tabour must be
--- 
-- I
intenpreted in this Light. Domestic monetary policy was confroltQd t{ith
the dilemma of being setf-defeating untess a moderate revaLuatiorl was
carried out in time. The Bretton-tloods system thus imposed rutes lon the
conduct of domeitic monetary poLicy; houeverr it was not abte toifunction
satisfactoriLy unless the country whose currency was the reserve cuirency
observed these ruLes itsetf. This was no Longer the case towardsithe cnd
of the 1960s.
The period 1969-73: The period of relat'ive price stabiLity came
to an end around 1969. The acceleration in the growth of uage costs in
practicaIty aLt the member countries in 1969 and 1970 was due notabty to
strains on the tabour market, to the feeLing that the share of wages and
sataries had to catch up again folLoving its decLine since 1963, but atso
to socio-poLiticaI unrest in severat member countries and to the betief
that the pubtic author:ities wouLd be abLe to ensure fuLl empLoyment jJ
irrespective of the behaviour of empLoyers and empLoyees. In 1969, this
trend occurred despite the marked sLowdown in monetary expansion'in practi-
caL[y aIL the member countries, However, the unprecedented surpLuses in.
the Communityts and most of the member countriest ba[ances of pbyments (on an
officiat settlements basis) in 1970 and 1971 undermined the scqpe for ,
monetary poticy in Europe. The infLow of Liquidity from the Amdrican
deficit and the EurodoLLar markets, the maintenance of the doLll'ar exchange
rate untit December 1971 and the fear that domestic monetary poticy might
provoke a stabitisation crisis set the stage for an upsurge
of infLation: the rise in prices and wage costs acceterated or remained
at a high tevel, and the groh,th in the money suppLy for the Cotnmunity as
a r.rho[e neached an unprecedented rate, particulacty in 197? and 1973.
These devetopments and the death throes and finat demise of the Bretton
htoods system in $larch 1973 opened the'way for major divergences uithin
the Community and these became ctearLy evident starting i n 1972173.
L
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The autonomy of domestic monetary poticy created by the switch to fLoating
exchange rate5 was used to pursue a very strict counter-infLationary poLicy
in Germany and a vigorous expansionary poLicy in ltaLy and the United
Kingdom. In 1973, the monetary authorities in Germany regained controt
of the gro.wth of the money suppty, whi[e in Itaty and the United Kingdon
monetary expansion acceLerated and approached annuat rates of 23% and ?6?(
respectiveLy. At the same time, 'the infLuence of exchange rates on prices
and costs Led to "virtuous" and to "vicious" circLes, whiLe substantiaL
divergences emerged in ba[ances of payments. France occupied a middLe
netary expansion rough Ly toLLowed theposition in this context: its mo
Community average and its weighted exchange rate varied relativeLy LittLe.
WhiLe in 1972173 the infLation rates of the major countries were stilL
on[y sLightLy divergent, though high, it was the poLicies pursued during
this period that were the root cause of the wide infLation differentiaLs
observed later in the Community.
The period 1974'752 The first oiL price shock occurred in a
situation where most of the countries, to differing degrees, enjoyed amp[e
Liquidity aLLowing price rises to be passed on to incomes. Thus, major
second-round infIati onary effects devetoped through a second expLosion
in wage costs with uhprecedented divepgences between countries; these
second-round infLationary effects are the refLection of the money suppLy
and exchange rate developments of the previous years. The combinatjon of
the oiL deficit and the effects of the divergent poLicies pursued in the
previous period Led to a very uneven distribution of balance of payments
surpluses and deficits and to untenabte situations for. the countrjes whose
currencies had depreciated strongLy. This and the continued acceLeration
in inf[ation obLiged the authorities in atL the member countries to curb
monetary expansion significantLy; Thus, the growth of the mgney suppLy
in the Community feLl f rom 17 112'A at the end of 1973 to 12'll2% at the
end of 1974. The effects of a Festrictive monetary policy combined with
the continued sharp increase in wage costs hetped to bring about recession
and an increase in the shafe of wages and saLaries, thus undermin'ing
profits, investment, growth and empLoyment welL beyond this period.
t
t
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The period 1976-78: FoLLowing this stabil.isation, in 1976,
the increase in trage costs fel.L by about haLf, or by even more in sone
countries, and there Lras a vigorous but temporary revivaL in grolrth. rn
addition, most of the member countries introduced intermediate objectives
in the monetary fieLd between the end of 1974 and 1977. However, the growth
of the money suppLy during the period 1976-78 came down much tess than the
trend of wage costs, thus re-estabLishing conditions for a more normaI
economic development. The retative stabi[ity in the growth of the money
supply in the Community did not mean that trends by country were atready
convergent. Horever, Germany, the Benetux countries and Denniarkl(ceuntries
participating in the "snake") and France (which aimed to achieve a degree
of stabiLity in its effective exchange rate) successivety regained rates
of monetary expansion during this period which were comparabLe to those
of the 1960s. The average inftation rate in the Community felL, but
divergences betteen countries -remained substantiaL. Some'countries
(Germany, BeLgium, the Nethertands and Luxembourg) virtuaLLy succeeded
during or at'the end of this period in bring'ing down inf Lation rates to
the Levet of the 1960s. But these successes aLso indicate the'substantiaI
time-'Lags between the intrqduction of monetar'y measures aimed at sta-
biLization and their impact on the reat economy and show the timitations
of a stabiLization based almost exclusiveLy on monetary poLicy. Experience
in Germany and in BeLgium appears significant !'n this respect. In Germany,
efforts to regain control of money suppty growth, which were begun as
earty as the spring of 1973, were immediate[y accompanied by a major
revaLuationr. but did not entai t an adjustment in the trend of nominat
incomes untiL earLy 1976. In BeLgium, the spectacutar reduction in the
inf Lation rate.betrreen the end of 1974 (6'l a year) and the end of 1978
(about 4t a year) ulas secured essentiat[y through persistent efforts
on the part of monetary poticy to maintain the exchange rate trithin the
"snake". However, neither the adjustment in the retative trend in wage
costs compared to' the other Community countries nor the stabiLisation
of pubLic finances were obtained; this situation seriousLy affected
competitiveness - not in terms of prices, but in terms of costs - r
l
}
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profitab'iLity, investment and employment and it [argeIy expLains the
part'icutar probtems in BeLgium in 1979 and 1980 regarding the batance of
paymentsrthe pubLic sector deficit and the Levet of reaI interest rates.
This exampte hightights the di Iemma which arises if stabi Iisation is
essentiaLLy based on monetary poLicy and is not backed up by a complementary
effort in the areas of incomes and pubtic finance
Monetary policy in 1979 and 1980
During the Last two years, monetary poticy in the comrnunity
has been marked by the introduc,tion of the European Monetary System (EMS),
the effects of the new oiL price shock and the reversaL in the retative
cycLicaI positions of the Community and the United States.
The introduction of the EfrlS may be regarded as an institutionaI
attempt to draw the relevant Lessons from,the experiences of the past
as outIined in the paragraphs above. The two key objectives of the EMS,
defence of centrat rates and convergence towards price stabitity, impose
certain ru[es on the conduct of domestic monetary pol-icy in the parti-
cipating countries. [rlonetary poticy in one country whose cost and price
trend is diverg'ing "upwards" compared with the average of its partners,
shouLd be reLativety more restrictive so as to maintain the centraI
rate and exercise pressure towards stabiLisation of costs and prices.
Experience shows that th'is process can take severaI years and that it
is important to suppLement monetary pot'icy measures by an adequate
poLicy mix, notably in the areas of pubLic finance 6nd the adjustment of
the gronth of nominaL incomes. Devatuation wouLd disturb the stabiti-
zation process and shouLd be avoided if at aIt possibr.e. rf it is
regarded as unavoidabte, it shoutd be Limited in size and should be
accompanied by a domestic stabiLisation poIicy so as not to trigger
a vicious circ[e between exchange rates and inf[ation. By contrast,
monetary policy in a country where the trend of costs and prices is
diverging "downwards" compared to that of its partners shouLd not aim
to adjust to an "average LeveL of infLation", but should continue to
be directed towards the price stabiLity objective. rn order that
ll
3
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t United States. In order to moderate a tempor?ry but significant tendency
for the dolLar to appreciate against the DM and the ECU, uhich wouLd
heve increased stitL further the Community's oiL biLl", the Bundesbank
made massive interventions on the exchange marke'ts at the end of 1979
and during the first haLf of 1g8O, and this aLso prevented a further
escaIation of interest rates in the Commun'ity.
Quantitativ@ (1)
The growth of the community money suppLy is probabLy the best
singLe indicator of the monetary situation in the Community. However, the
stabitity of the demand for money varies from one co.untry to another,
and this is one of the reasons for the diversity of the intermediate
object'ives adopted by member countries, another reason being the extent
to which their economies are open to externaL inftuences.
, Germany, France and the.United Kingdom express their intermediate
objectives in terms of the broadLy defined money suppLy (2). In Germany,
the concept invoLved is "centraL bank money", which is a weighted average
of the major components of the money suppLy broad'Ly defined.
Achievement of this target is pursued through aLL the instruments
avaiLabLe (interest rate poLicy' changes in minimum reserves, 'in re-
discount and Lombard ceiLings etc., but excLuding credit ceiLings)'
During the first haLf of 1979, the target figure moved towards the top
of the desired range 6% - 9%), but a fairLy restrictive poLicy stowed
down monetary growth appreciabLy dur:ing the second haLf of that year'
The relativeLy Low leveL thus attained served as the reference point in
setting the target range for 1980, which aims at Lower growth than the
previous one $"1 - 8%r.In August 1g8O, actuat monetary grobrth' at
about 4 1121z a year, was indeed s[ightLy beLow this range, and this
represents a considerab[e sLowdown compared with the rate recorded at
the end of 1978 (2.1% a yeail. In relation t.o probab[e growth of about
7i4 in nominaL GDP in 1980, monetary poLicy is having a major restraining
effect based on the need to fight inftation and on considerations of exter-
naL equiLibrium (see above). In France, the intermediate objective of
(1) See Table 5.1(2) Notes and coin in
time deposits and
circuLation, sight deposits, and, to some extent,
savings accounts.
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monetary poticy js expressed in terms of tl3.The main instrument 
"used in
achieving this objective is a system of ceiLings imposed on bank
tehding. In 1979, the growth of M2 acceterated U4.4% a year at the
end of 1979 as against 12.27( at the end of 1978>, and the target
(1% a year) hJas .overshgt. Neve.rtheLess, the authorities took the
leveL reached at the end of 1979 as the base for" cairy'ing over their
112 target into 1980. During the first haLf of this year, the rate of
monetary expansion feLL sIightLy, and the target nate couLd be appro-
ximateLy achieved in the second hatf of the year; it woutd thus be
1 1tZ to 2 percentage points bet,ow the probablg growfhlof nominaL
GDP in 1980' (3 /.r. The monetary target in the'United Kingdom,
sterLing frt3, excLudes residentsr foreign currency hoIdings, which are
not considered to constitute potentiaL demand for domestic production.
This target is pu,rsued main[y through interest rate poLicy and by
Limiting the pubtic sector borrowing requirement; the system of direct
controI on banksr interest-bearing Liabi tities ("suppLementary speciaL'
deposits scheme" or "corset") was ended in June 1980, and this
distorted the s'terting frl3 statistics from Juty onwardsl the 82 growth
of sterLing gS in JuLy and August uas probabLy due in Large measure
to reintermediation fotLowing this institutionaL change, but it may
atso reftect a Iimited and temporary relaxation in monetary poLicy
in view of the tiquidity probLems encountered by firms. An analysis
of the methods to be used in order to achieve monetary targets is at
present being carried out in the United Kingdom (1). It seems
probabLe that the reserve assbt system wiLI be repLaced by a fairLy
[ow cash ratio to be appLied to the whoLe of the banking sector. The
target range.for sterling M3 was successive[y reduced from the 92 - 13'A
announced in 1 976 to 77, - 11:^ 1n June 1 979; as part of a medium-term
financial p[an, the rate is to be towered gradualLy to about 6% in the
year beginning 'in the spring of 1984. ,The annuaL rate for the actuaL
growth of sterLing M3 feLL f rom 13.3i4 at the end of 1978 to 11.7"1
at the end of 1979, and in the first haLf of 1980 it t,las between 102
and 127., whereas the growth rate of nominat GDP ros'e from 13.TY. in
(1) See "Green Paper on monetary controt", Cmnd. 7858, H.M.S.O.,
Itlarch 1980.
I
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1978 to about 18% in 1980 under the combined inftuence of infLation and
the recession. However, Leaving aside the difficuLties of statisticaI
assessment which emerged in JuLy 1980, the poLicy pursued is one of
vigorous stabiLisation comparabLe in some respects (incIuding the area
of the effective and reaI exchange rate) to that pursued
by Germany in 1973 and 1974. It c[early raises the
question of the time Lag in the effect on incomes, and the question of
the appropriate poLicY mix.
ELsewhere in the Community, definitions of inter-
mediate monetary poLicy objectives differ more wideLy. In ItaLy, the
authorities express their target in terms of totaL domestic credit.
The principal means used in pursuit of this target is a system of
ceitings on Lending by each bank to the private sector. The officiaL
target for total credit t,las achieved in tqZq and nesulted in a
reduction in the rate of expansion. In ApriL 1980, the Ministry for
the Treasury confirmed that, for 1980, it had adopted a target of
Lit 59 300 000 miLLion in new Lendingr i.e. a further reduction in the
rate of expansion to 17.4:1, which represents a considerabLe restrict_ion
I since nominal GDP is LikeLy to groh, by some ?3'1. This poLicy
stance found practicaI expression uhen, uith the economy showing signs
of overheating, the authorities announced tighter Limits on the
growth of bank Lending to the private sector in JuLy 1980 and
stricter penatties for overshooting these Limits; In BeLgium, after
having in the past set targets for the growth of credit, the
authoritjes have for the past severaI years made the defence of the
exchange rate in effect the intermediate objective of stabiLisation
poLicy, and nake use mainLy of the interest rate instrument to achieve
this objective. In DenmarkrsimiLarty, defence of the exchange rate
' ptays, in principLe, 
_an important roLe in stabiLisation poLicy, and
the measures taken by the authorities to control the growth of
domestic Lending and interest rates have recentLy been mainLy dictated
by the need to cover a chronic current account deficit. In the
Nethertands, the authorities nou concentrate mainLy on an intermediate
objective expressed in terms of domestic money creation, i.e. the
{
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growth of the .money supp[y minus the change in the net externat position
of the banking system. The present monetary target, thus definedris 8%,
which, in view of the position of the externat account, may be regarded
as consistent with forecast growth of nominat GDp of about 7"A in
19gO' this gr:owth being mainly due to the rise in the infLation rate",
The Irish authorities concentrate on bank Lending to the private sector.
The extremeLy rapid expansion in tending during 1978 uas considerabLy
stowed down i n 1979 and, given that the target for the present year
U3D is LikeLy to be achieved, this couLd heLp to reduce the high
inflation Fate.
The scate of the reduction in the growth of monetary
aggregates in the community between the end of 1978 g3 1/??( a year)
and the end of 1980 (probab[y 10 - 11% a year) becomes clear when these
monetary growth rates are compared with those of the communityrs
nominaL GDP, which increased by 10.9% in 1978 and witL probabty
increase by 12 1/2% in 198a, mainty as a result of infLation. rn 
-the
present situation, however, the growth of Lending to the domestic
economy is, in most member countries, greater than the growth of the
money supp[y. This phenomenon is tinked to the monetary impact of the
current payments deficit. Payments by residents to non-residents absorb
a part of the money suppLy created by tending by the banking system
to residents; at the same time, the banking system reIies heaviLy
on externaI resources (see TabIe 5.2).
Tabte 5.2 aLso provides some indication of the rote which the
financing of pubLic deficits has ptayed in monetary growth. There
are considerabLe differences between member countries in this respect:.
In France the impact of the pubtic sector on monetary expansion has been
been negligibLe, whereas in rretand, Denmark, Belgium, and, to some
extent, ItaLy the recourse of the pubtic authorities to banking systems
cannot but be regarded as disquieting. since, however, such recourse in
the united Kingdom and Germany has been more moderate, it can be appro-
ximatety estimated that in the Community as a whole the pubtic sector has
recent[y absorbed only one fifth of new bank credit, by far the greater
part of that credit being taken up by companies and households,
a
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Interest rates (1)
The acceLeration of infLation in 1979 and the measures taken
to curb the expansion of the monetary aggregates ted, in 1979 and at
the beginning of 1980, to. a generaL rise in interest rates in the
community comparabLe with that in 1973174. The increase was particu-
[arty pronounced in the case of short-term rates. The yieLds on medium-
and Long-term bonds foLLowed more SLowLy, the financiaL markets
be[ieving that infLation rates as high as those at the end of 1979
and at the beginning of 1980 wouLd not persist. Taking the Community
as a who[e, short-term interest rates thus overtook::::::":m rates
from the third quarter of 1979, as r.ras the case in 1973174 (see
Graph 5.1). Monetany poLicy ih Europe had aLready switched to a
restrictive stance when the FederaI Reserve Board in the United States
announced its measures of,6 october 1g7g. The most 'important point
for the Community was that the United States authorit'ies expressed their
wiLLinEness - soon carried into a.ction - to aLiow a much wider range of
interest rates in order to achieve their ouln money suppLy objectives (2).
The rise in United States interest rates tlras a reaction to the
infLation rate, which was acceterating rapidLy. ConsequentLy, it did
not necessariLy and by itseLf restore confidence in the doL[ar, but
it occurred at a time when markets were becam'ing aware of the cycLicat
Communityrs and the United Statest position on
current account, Leadjng to massive outfLows of capitaL from the
Eunopean Community. The most s,pectacuLar of the immediate reactions
in the community was undoubtedLy that of the Bank of EngLand' which
increased its minimum [ending rate on 16 November 1979 by 3 percentage
points to 177,. This decision was aLso dictated to some extent by the
(1) See Table 5.3.
(2) Three-month money rates reached 13.7%.
December and 1 8.4% at. the end of March
at the end of Augustr 1980.
in New York at the end of
1980. They were at 9.6%
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tifting of a[[ renaining exchange controI restrictions in the 
-United
Kingdom on ?3 October 1979, fotLowing which it became necessary to
compensate for outfLows of capitaL due to portfotio adjustments by
attracting foreign capitaL to the United Kingdom.0ther member
countrjes fett it necessary to attract foreign capitaI or to prevent
capitaL outftows, particuLarLy BeLgium, the NetherLands and Itaty,
yhich increased its discount rate on 1 December 1979 by 3 percentage
points to 15?(. In Germany, the Large-scate interventions on exchange
markets at the end of 1979 and at the beginning of 1980 (see above
- the officiaL reserves fetL by DM 21 000 miLLion between October 1979
and trlay 1980) put pressure on bank Liquidity, uhich was retieved mainLy
by increases in radiscount quotas in October 1979 and in February
and Apri 1 1980 and by a reduction of the minimum reserve ratio at
the end of ApriL and by simitar measures in JuLy and August 1980. At
the same time, thg restrictive stance of Germany monetary poIicy
was refLected in successive increases in the discount rate, which rose from
from 3t at the beginning of 1979 to 7.5% on 2 l4ay 1980, whereas interest
rates in the United States had been dectining since the end of trlarch 1980.
In Germany, however, the.LeveL of market interest rates in 1979/80
did'not reach the peak recorded in 1973t for exqmpte, the three-month
interbank rate, which reached a maximum of some 1O% in Apri L/fvlay 1980,
h,as a great deat betow the record levets in excess of '14% recorded
at the end of 1973. In the United States, on the other hand, the leveL
of interest iates ,in March 1980 outstripped by far the- maximum levets
in 1973/74 (the yield on 15-week Treasury bi[Ls was in the region of
7% in 1974 and approximately 15% in trlarch 1980), This was one of
the factors which heLped to trigger the American recession, with the
resuLtant appreciabte reduction in demand for credit Leading subse-
quent[y to a faLI rn U.S. rates.
Concern has frequentLy been expressed that the rise in interest
rates in Europe might further curb growth rates which are aLready slacke-
ning sharpty.ALthough the rise in interest rates has generaLty been Less
spectacular than the maximum levets reached in the past, such a danger
cannot be ruLed out entirety. However, the tinks between nominat
interest rates on the money market and the reat eoonomy are very
compIex. General.Ly speakingr. there is a fairLy cLose rel.ationship
t
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between money market rates and bank Lending rates, and bond rates have
tended to foLLow, aLbeit more stowLy, the rise in short-term rates;
this may curb investment activity- It has atso been
argued, however, that in many countries the rise in interest rates
corresponds broadLy to the rise in infLation rates and that
there is nothing worrying about reaI interest rates. The very high
real interest rates in BeLgium and Denmark are due to the speciaL
situation in these countries ftudget shortfaLL and externat defi.cit)
and the posit.ive reaL rates in Germany are in Line with the Level
reached in earLier periods of stabiLization. For some firms, however,
arguments concerning reaL rates are Less significant than the impact
of high nominaL rates on cash fLow. In the context of the EMS and the
defence of centrat rates, high nominat interest rates have genenaLLy
served to channeL short-term capitaL fLows and have heLped in the
[onger term to finance the Communityts deficit on. cunrent account.
Furthermore, if the poLicy pursued had not in generaL protected
exchange rates, the infLationary pressures caused by devaLuation wou[d
have required much more drastic measures subsequentLy. Overat[,
therefore, it is fair to say that the interest-rate trend in the
Community during the period in question has been appropriate, given
the need to guide the economy through a particuLarLy peritous period.
OutLook for 1981
As in previous years' the Commissionrs departments have
attempted to estimate fbr the current year and to forecast for next
year (1981) the growth of the. broadLy defined money supply in member
countries (frlZ, except for Germany and IreLand (ttl3) and for the
United Kingdom (sterLing M3) - see TabLe 5.1). These forecasts have
been drawn up at the same time as those for the reaL economy; the
main hypothesis as to monetary poLicy underLying these forecasts
is that efforts wiLI continue to be geared to moderate and steady
expansion of the monetary aggreg.ates in the medium term, incLuding
a graduaL reductlon in the rates of, money supply growth for those
member countries in which infLation and monetary expansion are stjLL
very high. This hypothesis takes account of past experience and impLies
maintenance of the poLicy stance adopted in 1979 and 1980 by the
monetary authorities in the member countries; it is in Line t.lith the
I
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need, in the EMS (see above), to restrict the danger of dlevaLuations
as nucn as poss'ro[e and to enhance convergence towards price stabiLity.
The forecasts show, that, on a Community average and for most member
iountries, monetary expansion in 1981 is LikeLy for the second
consecutive year to be cLose to or even sLightLy beLpw the trend
in the 1960s. Thus, desp'ite major difficuLties, monetary poLicy
shouLd satisfy an important condition for the return to a more stabLe
and more convergent trend with'in the Community. It is ten years since
such a prospect tasi arose. It must be stressed, however, that these
monetary expansion r'ates are,on[y a necessary and not a sufficient
condition for a more stabLe and more convergent trend'in prices and
cobts. Past experience has shown not onLy the Long time Lags between
monetary poL'icy measures and the resuLtant adjustments'in the reat
economy, but aLso the serious probtems which may alise if efforts
towards stabiIisati'on are based exctusiveLy on monetary poIicy.
It is therefore important to try to shorten these response Lags and to
suppLement monetary measures by action in the fietd of pubt'ic
finance, by moves to restructure suppty and, pa;rticutanLy, by efforts
to adapt the growth of incomes to the new conditions.
The need for this wouLd seem to be particularLy pressing
in those member countries in which the Limits of purety monetary
stabiLisation are cLearLy in evidence. If there are no further
disruptions from outside the Community, the degree of restrictiveness
of this monetary policy stance depends to a large extent on the
behaviour of emptoyers and unions. A further acce[eration of internaL
price rises and/or a wage cost exptosion, such as experienced in
1974/75 in the Community 'and most member countries, wouLd make present
monetary poIicy extremeLy restrictive and rebession might weLI become
inevitabte. To try to avoid such a recession through a sharp
upward adjustment of monetary expansion rates woutd be to abandon the
struEg[e,for stabitity and converlence in the Community and wouLd
probabLy only postpone the recession and aggravate it at the end
t
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of the day. If, on the other hand, the movemen't of internaL prices
and wage costs adapts rapidly to the environment of reLative
stabiLity estabLished by monetary poLicy, the growth and emptoyment
Losses resuLting from the second oiL crisis can be contained and the
stage set again for an'improvement in the outLook for growth and
empLoyment. In this case, with a given.rate of monetary expansion,
the LeveL of interest rates can come down. not onLy, in a first
stage, in response to the drop in credit demand caused by the
temporary and inevitabLe sfowdown in growth, but aLso, subsequent[y
and more permanentLy, as a result of the reduction in in:ftationary
expectations and of weaker growth in the votume of lending as price
and wage cost increases s[ow down. However, the interest rate trend
depends aLso on the batance of payments and other internationaL
factors; if there is further stabiLisation in the United States
and if the reduction in interest rates there proves to be lasting,
a further faLL in interest rates in Europe might weLL become possible
and, where appropriate, be supported by concerted action by the
authorities.
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6.1
6. The European Mgnetary System : l
The European Monetary System'is intended to,estabL'ish greater monetary
stabiLity in the Community, and since its entry intO force, qn 13 March 1979'
it has futfitLed this function. The exchange rates of the partj.cipating cur-
rencies have been more stabte than before. Centra[ rate adju9tments have been
minor, infrequent, and orderLy. Success is howeven relative. The system has
worked wetL over ihe last eighteen months partLy as a resu[t of favourabLe
underLying circumstances and partty as a resutt of the workings of jts own
mechanismi. If the system is to continue to contribute to mone monetary stabi-
Ljty in an increasingLy unfavourable environment the existing mechanisms must be
strengthened and new ones developed, in add,'itjon to the improvementsr'in
economic performance required.
The experience of the s'eventies demonstnated the disadvantages of using
exchange rate.fLexibiLity as the preferred instrument of externaL adjustmentl
especiat[y in that this poticy response has often worsened domestic imbatances.
Faced with a decLine in their terms of trade caused by successive oiL pnice
rises, and with the emergence of new competitors on the worLd stage, Community
Member States have recognized since the mid-seventies the need to pursue and
imptement rigo'rous stabitization policies. 
'
, The dangers of hjgh and djvergent infLgllon-rates together
with Low growth rates,orere behind the initiative in 1978 of setting up a
European Monetary System, initjaL[y termed a "scheme for the creation of closer 3
mcnetary cooperation teading to a zone of monetary stabiLity in Europe". The
purpose behind the E M S is therefore to reduce macro-econonic and monetary
uncertainties whjch have inhibited the pLans of economic agents, their propen-
sity to investr their entrepreneurship and their abiLit'y to stand their ground
on Community markets. Att these factors are in the long run cruc'iaI for growth
and fuLL employment in Europe
Exchanqe rate devetopments of E M S currencies
In its first eighteen months the E lrl S has not experienced any exces-
sive or lasting strains, both because the pressures affecting each of the cur-
rencies individualLy have for: the most part been moderate, and to a certain
extent because of active use of the systemts mechanisms. The fotLowing para-
graphs wjLL discuss the movements of the'currencies and the next section wiLI
e.xamine the ro[e of the mechanisms.
n
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The averige fLuctuation measured against the ECU has been consideiabty
smaLLer in the [dst eighteen months than in preceding years, both for the
currencies whjch had been floating separateLy before 1979 (French franc, Ljra
and lrish pound) and for the currencies which formed part of the earLier mone-
tary arrangements (the ".snake"), with the exceptionr howeier, of the Danish
. 
crown (see Table 6.1). The markets in the E M S currencies have therefore not
experienced the pronounced upheavaLs suffered by the other major wor[d cur-
rencies ( 1 ).
There have been two changes of centra[. rates over the eighteen month
period. In September 197g the DM r"las nevaLued by ?iA agalnst a[L the other
currencies except the DKR against whfch it moved up 5 7..At the end of November
there was a further downward movement of the DKR by |rf!b% against aLL the other
currencjes wjthin the systen. Between these changes the currencies have aLt re-
mained within thejr fLuctuatibn margjns of 2.25 percent (6.0 percent fbr the tira)
as required by the system. There have been changes in the reLative positions
of the participating currencies (see gnaph 6.1), but these moveme,nts (discussed
beLow) of each of the currencies shoulC
ground of generaL stabi LitY-
be seen against this back-
The DM remained strong mainLy refLecting doLLar weakness unt'iL earLyt?autumn 1g7g, and on severaL occasions even reached the upper Limjt of its
margin of ftuctuation against the Betgian franc and the Danish crown. This strength
tnlas however short-Lived and after the September 1979, reaLignment of the cen-
traL rates within the system, the Gernan cunrency graduaLty became weaker
reIative to the other currencies wiihin the system refLecting growing market
abrareness of the deterioration in the Genman current payments baLance. As one
of the worLdts major internationaL currencies the DM tends to be increasingLy
affected by the position of the do(iLar; consequentLy a further factor in its
weakness has been the effects'of the restrictiVe measures adopted by the
American monetary authorities, which Led to substantiaL capitat ftows to the
United States. In the first quarter of 1980, the doLlar became
definiteLy firmer and the. DM has moved,to the bottom of the system and even
needed sporadic suPPort-
(1) HoweverrunLike the Other main third c0rrenciesrthe Sraiss franc rer:ained reLa-
tivety stabte agajnst atL the E M S currencies on the initiative of the
s"irl'authonities who have qfficia[[y set themseLves, since October 1978,
a',concrete objective for the rate of the franc, defined by reference to
it.-r"rt " is""'qr.-lrl.iion"f" iui.=", "TAches, moyens draction, organisation",
Zurich, 1980).
t
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The Lira was also firm in the first months of the systemf s operat'ion,
but its position graduatty decLined from the end of 1979. This change became
more pronounced from earty summer 1989 onward resuLting in an overaIL move-
ment from March 1979 end September 1980 of 5 % against the ECU. The causes
behind this were ItaLyrs worsenjng competjtiveness and its deteriorating cur-
rent payments batance. However the authoritiest resolute poticy of supporting
the currency (raising interest rates to a record Levet, intervening on the
foreign exchange market, charging part of fjrmsrsociaI security costs to
generaI taxat'ion, etc... ) have made 'it poss'ibLe to, contain the. Lack of conf i-
dence in the tira.
te been the most persistantLy
weak currencies since the system came'into operating, atthough within the tast
few months they have strengthened. Apart from this their experience has been
different. The Danish crown has onLy recovered at the price of th,o successive
devaLuations amounting in total to about 9 ;6 against the ECUlwhercas the Be[gian
franc has remained with the other cunrencies. This has been achieved by tirm
actionrespeciaLLy on interest ratesrby the monetary authorities.
Since tate 1979, the French franc has been near the top of the exchange
rate system apart from a temporary setback Iast summer. The reasons behind its
corparative strength are: a competitivity margin (for Iabqur in particutar) as
a resutt of the depreciation which occurred during the period of fLoating; the
manketrs positive appraisaL of rnonetary poticy.which treats defence of the
currency as a priority, the medium-term impact of the French pIan to diversifY
energy sources and reIativeLy better baLance of payments position as compared
with other part'icipants (in particuIar Germany).
I
The lrish pound and the gui[der have not been under any signifjcant
pressure and have remained for most of the period towards the centre of the
system. This generaI stabiIity rand famjLianity wjth the operation of the newly
set up foreign exchange market in DubLin, a[Lowed the Irish authorities to
end on 13 June the transitionat period introduced when parity with sterLing was
bnoken. Duning this period the issuing institution harl monitoned currency
ftuctuations ctoseLy. The guitder has progressivety appreciated towards the
end of the period and is currentLy at the top of the system.
n
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I The pound sterling, which does not participate in the exchange rate
mechanism, has fIuctuated much more than the other Community curnencjes,
Over the period March'1979 to Septemben 198A, it has appreciated 11,3 % aga'inst
the ECU. Its effective exchange rate (as caLcuLated by the Bank of EngLand) has
reached its highest LeveI for five years and its manket rate against the doLtar
is back to the 1967 Level. This performance is mainty a result of the increase,
in the price of oiL with its affect on the UK baLance of payments and
on the majntenance of particuLarLy high intenest rates as a part of domestic
monetary poIicy.
Ihe roLe of the e M S rlechanisms_
The underlying economic data havithus contributed to the stabLe deveLop-
ment of exchange rates, but the neLatjve[y satisfactory p*rformance
of the system over the first eighteen months a[so o,les a consjderabLe
amount to the workings of the mechanisms of the system. However t.hese mecha-
ni sms are incornp Letc and in some cases unused.
The short di scussi on be Low suggest s t hat :
-'The exchange nate mechanism isrfor the rnoment at Leastrthe backbone of the
system, but its roLe in overaLL currency deveLopments especiaL[y as regardq
C pnessunes from outside the system remains to be more preciseLy defined.
= A substantial quantity of ECU have been created. they have been used both in
of the very short term financ'ing and for some spot settLement, but
their existence remains precarious and their quantity depends upon the exchange
rate of the doltar and the price of gold.
- The short and medium term credit faciL'ities avaitabLe to the system were in-
creased to 25 bitLion ECU at the start of the system, but they have remained
unus ed.
In the absence of centraL rate changes the main roLe of the exchange
rate mechanism is to retain currency fLuctuations within the margins at the
Limit of whjch there must be interventjon jn Community currencjes. PoLicy
measure.s others than. intervention can be. triggered by the divengence indjcator
and the systern recognises the neerl for both intra-marginaL. intervEntion in
Community curreneies and intervention in doILars. There are however no cLear
ground-rules for these interventions and this has [ed to some confLicts of
interest
I
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Intervention and doniestic monetary,poIicy measures have
succeeded in curtaiIing the excessjve fLuctuations of exchange rates, but
the system foresees the need for centra[ rate reaLignments from time to time.
There have been two adjustments (see above) and these have been orderly, have
not been preceded by excessive specuLation and have been carried out by mutuaL
agreement r
ALL the Community centrdL banks have transferned 20 percent of thejr goLd
assets and the same percentage of their doLLar reserves to the EIICF bnd againSt
quant i ty of Ett"l have been c reated.
these a-u"ii iluliuiiiaIi'it'i-'i"iniiJ-lis-J,] fo,r the tnansfer, a system of three-
month revoLving swaps against goLd and doLLars has resuLted in the mobiLization
of part of the centra[ banks goLd holdings' tdhi [e this 'method has in the c jr-
cumstances glven some extrA room for manoeuvre by mak'ing avajLable additionaL 
,
means of setttement, it has'resu[tea in a very Large incnease in the number
of ECU which i's quite independent of any policy wjsh of the system. Thus the
appreciation of the price of gold atone entajLed a 75 % incrbase in the EMCFTs
he central banks (when the E.M.S. came jnto force, the Latter
hetd a tota[ of 26.000 mjLLion ECUs (1), and at the end of Augus:t 1980 this
amount was 45.500 miLLion ECUs)
Intervention jn Communit'y currencies has taken on a greater importance
than in the system which preceded the E.M.S., the "snake". The amount invotved
isstiLthoweversmaLtconiparedwiththeamountof,intervent.io1]n*L[ars.
is made at the margin, the debtor may chosd whether or not to
activate the very short-term financing mechanim (vsTF). If he choses to do so
he has a right to use ECU to settle upto 50 percent of the c[aim. In cases where
the finaneing mechanism is not:activated the two banks may agree,that some or aLL
of the setttement shouLd be made in ECU. When intra-margjnaL: interventions takes
ptace, the debtor has no right to the vsTF but it may be granted with the agree-
ment of the creditor in which case the above rules'for settLement'in ECU would
ag,r'in appty.
?
n
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(1) IncLuding the Bank of EngLandts deposit whjch was made onLy in JuLy 1979'
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t ^ central banks have therefore aLready made fairly wide use of the50me
ECUs with whjch they were credited on the books of the fMCf in return for
their goLd and dol.Lar contribut'ions; others, in contrast, because of the better
performance of their currencies, have kept thejn ECU a[[ocat'ion, and even
accumuLated a net credjt position on the EMCF. It shouLd be reca[[ed, in this
connection, that these assets have apprec'iated in recent months, and that the
ECU, the vaLue of which is a weighted sum of a[L the Community currencies, has
itself advanced both aga'inst the doL[ar and against the SDR (see Gnaph 6.3).
The net ECU positions resuLting from the above transactions are not however per-
manent to the extent that they are based on the sHap-system for creating ECU which
is Limited to tt",o years.
0f
has been
ci es
the cred'it mechan j sms, onl.y the very short-term, f inancing f aci tit'y
used, and for moderate amounts, jn orden to support certain curren-
- mainLy the BeLg'ian franc, and to a Lesser extentr,the
Danish crown. The overaLL outstanding amount of these financ'ing arnangements
Q.IOO mitIion ECUs) represents onLy a smalL part of aLt gLobaL intervention
by centra[ banks, both jn Commun'ity currencjes and more importantLy in doLlars.
The amounts were repaid in fuLL in March 1980 and the faciLities have not been
used since.
l} ProbLems to be so[vell
The analysis of the first eighteen months of the E M S teads to the
concLusion that it has been reIativeLy successfuL in contrjbuting towands
achieving the aim of a zone of greater mohetary stabiLity. However this success
is partLy a resuLt of favourable circumstances and is only partja[. As seen in
Chapten 2 there has been a considerable rise in the averag'e rate of jnfLation
and an jncrease in the dispersion of price performances in the Member States.
The E M S must contnibute towands resolv'ing these problems and to do this
the main questions are i) how a correct ba[ance between financing of payments
imbaLances and adjustment to them both through externaL and internal'measures
can be achieved; and the effects on domestic Liquidity; ii) how a policy
vis b vis third countnies can be determinedr and iii) how domest'ic monetary
poticies can be better co-ordjnated in the context of the system.
The provision of credjt within the system shouLd aLLow participants to
fJnance terporary jmbaLances rather than resort to adjustments, lthich couLd be
*harmful both to themsetves and othen participants. It is however CifficuLtto .ieterrnine ex ante what is a temp orary and what is a mOre
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tastjng imbal.n... Cooperatjon'between panticipants cou[d be increased wjth
a view to making such'decisions jn common. Credjt may also have a roLe to play
in cases where jmbbLances are not temponary and adjustment is necessaryras it
can expand the poLicy chojces open to the authorjties. Thjs is especiat[y im-
portant in that the Logic of the EMS is that adjustment shouLd where pos-
sibte reLy on internaL measures rather than exchange rate changes. The roLe of
the system,'its liqu'idity creation powers and the function of the ECU in
these areas,need to be deveLoped. At present when a partic'ipant chooses to
finance an imbaLance it must opt for recourse to Communjty cred'its or for
recourse to the markets. So'that Member States are not encouraged by un-
conditionaL financing to postpone unduLy the adopt'ion of the necessary ad-
justmenf fieasures orutes shoutd be establi shed for access to Community as-
sistance, and these shouLd encourage'its ear[y use. However, the current
paynents deficit of aIt the participants makes any substantiaI recourse to
EMS short and medium term credits diffjcu[t at the present time. The Community
is in fact examining the possib'iLity of settjng up a nenewed Community Loan
mechanism, simiLar to the one' introduced 'rn 1975 foL[owing the f irst oi L
shock, but one which wouLd encourage the recipient Member States to adopt
the proper adjustment measures, as soon as any imbalance beqame apparent.
The EMS cannot however sunvive in a vacuum. It has been seeh above that
outside events can have a large effect on its working. For these reasons
poticies towards third currencies and the doLLar in particuLar shouId aLso
be coord'inated. In this area progress has been made: consu[tations between
centnaL banks, in which the Member States are now taking a more active part,
have been increased; detaifed exchanges of vjet"ts on the market situatjon and
future trends take pLace at regular intervats. The coordination of nationaI
positions is neverthetess ,inrrfticient , and coondjnation of the actions of
the Community centra[ banks can stjLt be'improved, so as to arrive at coherent
attitudes towards the doLtar not on[y by Limiting its erratic day-to-day
varjat'ions, but aIso by reduc'ing the sca[e of cyclicaL oi short-Lived movements
which are jncompatibLe with the underLying economic trends. Such action has
been undertaken jn the Last few months.In partjcuIar jn the fjnst quarter of
this year when the sudden jump in interest rates jn the United States caused
the doItar to apprec'iate by more than was ju'stified by reIat'ive competitiveness
I
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on either side of the Atlantic. In this event, the movement of the doLLar,
which h,as excess'ive and was the vehicle bringj.ng infLat'ionary dangers
to the European countries had, by generat agreement, to be contained.
However, on other occasions, doLtar interventions have increased strains
between currencies participat'ing in the E fvl S exchange rate mechanism.
This was the case when the dolLar shot upward in the third quarter of
1979. Intervention by the German Bundesbank then heLped the mark to appre-
ciate within the E M S, and this caused difficuLties for the weakest cur-
rencies in the system (the Betgian franc and the Danish crown). SimiLarLy,
doLlar interventions to reinforce the cohesion between the currencies of
the system have had destabiLizing effects on the American currency's ex-
the third quarter of 1980 when 'in a periodchange rate. This occurred in
of pronounced weakness for the American currency, the centraI banks of
the Member States participating in the E M S were overaLL net seLlers of
doL[ars, because of the intervention of a s'ingLe centraL bank designed to
Limit the faLL of its currency (the Iira) against'its partners. Indeed,
the persistence of simuLtaneous reverse doLLar operations (with some Commu-
nity centraL banks buying whiLe others seLL doLLars) conforms neither to
the letter nor the spirit of the system.I
In addition to the difficuLties in estabtishing a common attitude
to the doLLar, there are those stemming from temporary confLicts between
intervention made necessary by observance of the margins of fLuctuation
and the effect of these on domestic Liquidity and the pursuit of nationaL
monetary poLicies based on quantitative targets. So far these confIicts
have not been great since the absence of sharp strains within the system
and the smatt scaLe of intervention has not affected the conduct of mone-
tary poLicy in the,countries which have set themse[ves money suppLy targets
(in particutar France and Germany). It shoutd be noted in this connection
that to the extent that policies are defined in terms of medium term tar-
gets, or expressed in the form of a nange, day-to-day movements'in exchange
markets may not create persistent strains.
lo 5
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Transition to the institutionaI stase of the EMS
Thebasic.textsinstjtutingtheEMS(seeEuropeanEconomy,No3,
JuLy 19?9) suggest that aLL the m€chanisms of the system should
be consotidated after a transitjonaL phase. They also contain 'important
pointers as to what shouLd happen in the next stage: the ECU shouLd assumejts roLe as a fuLLy utjLised reserve asset and settLelnent instrumentl and the
exchange rate and credjt mechanjsms.shoul.d be consolidated in a newLy created
European Monetary Fund (EMF).
The work done alleadl and-the experience derived from the workineg of
the system makes'it possibLe to assesq the scaLe of the pr:oblems and to iden-
tify the possibLe chojces between the djfferent soLutions whjch can be envj-
saged. The Commission has earLier reviewed the pnogness made and some of the
difficutt:ies to be overcome i'n its report on the Eunopean Monetary'Fund which
it presented to the European CounciI in March 1980 (see box).
It has a[so become evident that the upheavats in the international en-
vironnent which have occurred since the start of the EMS pose nell questions that {.,
must be deatt with in'the period ahead'. The reemergence of an acute recycfing G
problem foLtowing the rise in oit orices, the resurgence of infLation, the
soaring price of goldr'the".swetIing of internationaI liquidity are aLL changei;
giving new dimensions to the probtems to be sotved.
The form of the Fund and the rote of the ECU are centra[ prob[ems, on
which ideas are befng concentrated at present. Ifthe ECU is to be freety useable
as a reserve asset and means of setttement, it is necessary to envisage etimi-
nating the present restrictjons on jts acceptabiLity and to study the questions
reLated to its convertjbiLity and negociabiLityrwhich a[so raise probLems about
the way in which internationaL reserve assets are transferred to the future
EMF. Added to theserare questions about the rote that the ECU witt play in the
consoLidated credit mechan.isns and whether it couLd have any place in the re-
cycLing process.
b
Work js contirtuing in aLL these areas in various Community bodies.
l"b-?
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EUROPEAN TVIONETARY FUND
Report from the Commission bf 20 March 1980) to the European
Counc i I
I. At the DubLin meeting on 29 and 30 November 1979, the
EuroDean Counci t invited .the Commission to subm'i t, fot' the meeting
in March 1980, a.repont setting out the progress made in studying
the estabLishment of rthe European Monetary-Fund and pointing out
any difficuLties.
The studies on the European Monetary Fund were started by
the Commission as earLy as tvlay 1979. Since then, the Monetary
Committee and the Committee of Goveriors have looked into this
question, and their respectiVe chairmen have reported to the CounciI
on the progress of work. This work has not yet been compLeted; rather
than produiing spec'ific guidelines,.it has so far made it possibLe to
identify problems and possible cho'ices between soLutions. However, as
can be seen from the anaLys'is'betow, the pretiminary technicaL work
has shown that, if it'is to make a neaI extra contribution, the tran-
s'ition to the institutionaI stage of the European Monetary System can
be carried out onty if certain bas'ic questions have been resoLved which
have no.t yet been fulLy clarified.
II. Current work is based on three ma'in elements :
A. The first'is the desire expressed by the European Counc'iL in
Bremen and Brussetsr.to transform the EurOpean Monetary System 'into a
"durabIe Scheme" guaranteeirig the creation of a zope of monetary stabi-Lity in Europe. For the purpose of attaining this objective, the
European Counc'iI defined the operating rules of the system in the first
stage and indicated certa'in characteri;stics of the "finaL.stage".
B. The se6Ond is the Lessons to be Learnt from the first year of
operat'ion of the European Monetary System and from monetary and exchan-
ge rate deveLopments in the Community since 13 March 1979.
The assessment of the operation of the European Monetary
System in its first year is targely positive. The proceduresfor con-
sultation betueen the authorities of the Member States in the various
Community bodies have been improved. Despite sharp economic and mone-
tary disturbancei which entai Led interest rate incneases nanging from
3 to 5 points according to the country, the group of participating
currencies maintained a greater degree of cohesion than that recorded
since 1972. Two adjustments of centraI rates in'September and Novem-
ber 1979 were carried out in good tirne and fairLy smoothLy. LastLy,
the mgnetary compensatory amounts were reduced appreciabLy, reflecting
progress towards the objective of uniform prices on the European agri-
cuIturaL market.
t
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, In stress,ing the pos'itive factors, the Commission is expres-
sing its conviction that it woutd have been much more dit'ficuLt to
achieve t.hese resuLts if there had been no European Monetary system.
However, between the end of 1978 and the end of 1979, the average rate
of inf Lation in the community rose from 6.9 'l to 9.0 l, and the spread
between the lowest and the highest rate of inftation in the Member States
widened from 10 to 17 points. Although progress has thus been made
towards exchange nate stabiLity, the same his not been the case in thefieLd of prices. consequentLy, the European Monetary System must be
consoLidated and strengthened so as to make its own active contrfbution
to better economic equiIibrjum in Europe. Econohic poIicjes for theirpart wiLL have to be brought to converge more cLoseLy to ensure the
stabi Lity of the monetary system.
C. The third etement is the deveLopments in the internationaI
economic, financiaL and monetary situation. ln 1978, the serious dis-
ruption of exchange rates, payments ba Lances, pri ces and fi nanc i a L mar-kets caused by the 1971-74-monetary and energy crises, seemed to be
about to ease. Today, the threat of renewed-disequitiOria in interna-
tionat payments reIations is growing.
The future deveLopment of the European Monetary System must'
therefore be such as to contribute activeLy to the overiLL stabiL.ity
of the international f,inanciat and monetary system and to meet the
Csmmunityrs generaL interests in the trade uni tinanciaL fietds - bothits ourn interests and those of the countries with which it his particu-
LarLy cLose reLations.
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III. The Commission and the committees concerned have primariLy
concentra.ted on the role of the ECU and on the organization of the
credit mechanisms in the European Monetary Fund. -They have examinedthe institutional. aspects, which nriIl be Iargety governed by the soIu-tions adopted to the questions of substance discussed above.
The c redi t mechani sms1.
Two featunes of the credits granted unden present agreements
shoutd be, noted : to a Large extent they are biLateraL cred.its, the
accounting procedures for which ane handled by a community body, the
EMCF; and;ir1ce the body which issued the ecUs - the EMci - is onty
an accounting intermediary in the credit operations, these do not give
rise to the direct creation of ECUs.
... 
TTo probIems have been studied in particular : first, the
consoIidation of existing credits (short-term and medium-termj and of
very short-term cnedit f Ici Lities. It became c tear ir.rrl, -"nuiuu".
soLution is adopted/ this is not.a fundamental probLem in thu transi-tion to the institutionat stage of the European Monetary Fund.
laI
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the EMFrs abi Lity to create ECUs against credits,
which is a cruciaI issub, This ability rajses the problem of the
Limits and conditions under which these ECUs couLd be created or the
credits couLd be granted, and therefore that of the means which wouLd
be avaitable to the European Monetary Fund to impose tighter monetary
disciptine in the Community. The so[utiorts to this probLem wiLL depend
to a Large extent on the ro[e of the ECU in the instttutionaL stage of
the European Monetary System.
?. The ECU
(a) In the present system, the ECU serves as the numeraire for the
exchange rate mechanism, as the basis for the divengence indicator, as
the denominator for intervent.jon openations and as a means of settLement
between the Community's monetary authorities.
However, the ECU Lacks the principaL feattrres of a currency:
it is not an instnument of payment; there can be no autonomous cneation
of ECUs through the credit operations; and though it appears in the
centnal bank's balance-sheets, this does not mean that jt is a genuine
reserve instrumentrsince it is meneLy the expression in the accounts of
the assets (doLlars and goLd) aga'inst which it has been jssued and whose
movements it ref Lects automati ca L ty.
(b) The dec'isions taken at Bremen and BrusseLs, certain fundamen-
taL considerations and recent monetary trends together mean that the
development of the ECU wi[[ be the tocomotive for transition to the
institutionaL stage of the European Monetary System: it is by expan-
ding the roLe of the ECU that the Community wiLl be abLe to organ'ise
internaILy the coordinated action necessary to achieve a greater degree
of monetary stabiLity and estabLish its monetary identity at interna-
tionaI LeveL.
(c) The fu[|' and comp[ete use of the ECU as a means of payment
and ihe reguLation of the creation of ECUs to Serve the objective of
monetary stabiLity raise the,question whether, to what extent and under
what conditions the future Monetary Fund couLd possess an independent
poh,er of money c reat i on.
If it were g'iven such pohier, the future European Monetary
Fund could create ECUs in two ways : against a contribution of reser-
ves (as is done under the present agreements), or through credit ope-
nat'ions; these two methods couLd even be combined.
The fuil use of the ECU as a means of payment or reserve ins-
trument within the Community wouLd require that severaL conditions be
met :
i
(t)
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- first, certa'in legisLative measures llouLd have to be taken to abolishthe Iimits to the acceptab'ility of ECUs to the centraL banks, to providethat a certain percentage of reserVes must be held in the form of'ECUs,
and possibLy to impose the exclusive use of the ECU as;an instnument of
settLement between the Communityts centraL banks;
- i f the t irnits to the acceptab'i L ity of the ECU were aboL i shed, the
ECUs inherent characteristics (convertibiLity and yieLd) wouLd have tobe strengthened to make it as attractive as the ot'her possibLe reserve
i nst rument s;
(d) Apart from the role to be performed by the Ecu in the areasdescribed above. a second maior decision of nrinc'i nlp r.ri | | hirra tn h
)
, j p i c.ipte wi IL ave to betaken; this concerns the wider use of the ECU outsiderthe system of
community centraL banks, both on the private financiaL markets and bythe authorities of non-communi'ty countries, so as to ensure the fuLI
negotiabiLity of the ECU and to enhance its status as a re$erve'asset.In this context, the question arises as to whether the strengthen.ing
of the rote of the ECU might aLlow it to ptay a part .in recyi[ing the
surpLuses of the oiL-producing countries.
IV. once the European Monetary system enters into its institutionaI
stage/ consistency between domestic monetary poL'icies, credit mechanisms
and exchange rate agreements wiIL have to be ensured within a s,ingIe
system of procedures, so as to prov'ide a ful L ancj proper basis foi ttre
smooth operation of the system and the achievementlof monetary stabitity.
Th'is'raises the question firstLy, of the institutionaL powers
with which the Fund wit[ be endowed in order to administer the systemitsell and, second[y, of the back-up measures which wiil. have to betaken so as to ensure the smooth working of the system, including mea-
sures such as the coordination of exchang€ rate poticies vis-i-vis non-
community cuirencies and the achievement of a suff,icient degree of
convergence in the economic and monetary/pursued in the Member. States.
Examinat'ion of the ins'tituti::iltl:;.cts has aIready besun.It has started from the principLe that a Fund endowed with increasedpowers shouLd be integrated inio the institutionaL sysiem of irr"
Community and of the existing internationaI monetary organizations onthe basis of clear and precise IegaI arrangements. Fut[er examination'of the institutionaI aspects must necessari[y be carried out in p0raLteL
with the basic guestions raised above; ii is'on-the solutions 
"rriveoat with regard to these basic questions that the powers of the EuropeanIvlonetary Fund and the nature of the bodies running it wiil. to a [arge
extent depend. It wiLt at at[ events be necessary to work out a balan-
ced system of tasks, responsibitities and safeguards tor i6" ir."p"""
3
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Monetany Fund; this is essential tb the exercise of any functionof a monetary nature. A batanced system of this kind is, moreover,to be found in alL the Member states, though the features of each
system differ in accordance with national IegaL and institutionaI
ci rcumstances.
Some of the functions or tasks aLlotted to the EuropeanMonetary Fund once it is estabIished wilI probab[y have to betaken up only gradualty depending on how the reLevant poLiticaL
authorities assess the way in which the situation is deveLoping and
on whether they find the mechanisms suitabLe.
In concLusion, the commission proposes that the European
counciL request the reLevant community bodies to pursue their work
aLong the lines set out i.n th'is report- The commissjon is readyto provide the Europe'an counci t with further informat'ion on theprogness achieved and difficuIties encountered in setting up the
European Monetary Fund proposed in the texts that were reteased afterthe meetings of the European council .in Ju[y and December 197g.
/lz-
TabLe 6.1
Variation of major currencies vis-a-vis the ECU
E. M. S.
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 '1978
Mar
sep
sep
Sep
79
80
79
80
B/tFR
DM
HFL
DKR
FF
LIT
IRL
Average EnS
FS
UKL
I
YEN
9 14 11,4
8r1 46,3
8,7 27,8
16.1 1113
1216 1316
11r2 5018
3411 45,0
14,3 29,5
n.a, n.a.
34,1 45.0
11rO 34,?
n.a. n.a.
2019 9,6 38,5
1619. 7 17 42,7
1711 614 39,9
1516 5,7 33,8
?2,0 26,9 30,1
3319 1413 55.5
19r? ?8,3 63,5
20,8 1411 43,3
n. a. n. a, 43'5
19,2 Z8r5 63,?
25,7 47 15 2A,1
n.a. n.a. 34'1
6,2 1114
11,6 11,?
5r7 11,3
3214 7,7
9,6' 18,0
7111 24,E
1113 2318
13.9 1r,3
4515 53rg
1113 2318
24.9 49,1
39r2 70,8
419
?,6
511
39 14
511
21rA
716
1219
17 19
3412
29;o
6613
415
717
313
28rz
418
1E,3
417
'lOrz
19 rz
35 17
24,8
49.0
(1) The standard deviation of the end of month
average.Resutts are muttipIied by 1.000.
Source : Services of the Commission.
rates for each currency divided by the
b
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TabLe 6.2
Interventions in Community currencies (ApriL 1979 to August 1980)
(mi L L'ions ECU)
Interventions in Commun'ity currencies notified
to the E.M.C. F.
- of which settLed by spot transfer of ECU
- of which financed through the very short
term support mechanism
0ther intervention'in Community currencies (1)
1.932,-
2,230,-
4.162;
2.738r-
TOTAL 6.900,-
('l) 0f which about
Source: Services
1/3 are interventions by the Centrat
of the Commission.
Bank of Iretand in Sterting.
fTabte 6.3
CentraL rates of Commun'ity currencies jn ECU
1979
13 March
1979
24 September
1979
30 November
Z variation (1)
13 March 1979
30 Nov. '1979
B/L FR
HFL
DKR
Dl'l
LIT
FF
IRL
39.4582
2.72077
7.08592
2.51064
1148,15
5.79831
0.66?638
39.8456
2.74748
7.36594
2,,48557
1159.42
5.85522
0.669141
39.7897
?.74362
7.72336
2.48208
1157.79
5.64700
or 668201
+
0.83
rl
9.81
8.21
:
1.15
0.83
0.83
0. E3
(1 ) A + sign 'i ndicates an
Source : Services of the
appreciation of the currency v'is:A-vis the ECU.
Commission.
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7.1.
7.
The new situation as negards energy and the internatjonaL division of
Labour catLs for a rapid adaptation of the productive apparatus. The brunt of this
adjustment fa[[s on industry. Even though the sca[e of unemptoyment stiLI presents
a major cha[lenge, the faiture to bring inf[ation under controL and the externaL
constraint impose strict Limitations on overaIt demand management poticy. In this
context, a return to mone sustained growth and a reduction in under-empLoyment are
conditionaL on measures aimed at achieving better adjustment of the factors ofproduction. Restoring a satisfactory LeveL and rate of productive jnvestment is
a key objective of this suppLy poticy. The giowth in productive capitaL formationin recent years has not been sufficient to permit at the same time the restructu-
ring that is necessary foLtowing the dectine of dertajn activities, the introduc-
tion of new'production techniques and the commitmeht of aLL the investment needed
to cope with the energy constraints. In addition to an appropriate macroeconomic
management poLicy, specific incentive poticies are essentiaI if there is to be
a return to the high rates of investment on which any impr,ovement in the emp[oyment
situation depends. This is particuLarLy true in the energy fieId, where the
objectives which the Community has set itseLf caLts fon an appropniate poticy onprices and on measures to stimuLate investment.
Inadgquate jnvestment 
_growth
. 
After stowing down significantty in 1974 and 1975, the rate of growthjn gross fixed capitaL formation in the Community has faiLed to cIimb back to the
buoyant LeveLs recorded in the 1960s; thelaverage annuaL growth nate of Z.AIZ
achieved in the period 1976-80 is haLf that observed in the period 196O-7O, and, 1
incieed, a negative growth is expected in 1981.
It is in this depnessed environmerit that firms in Europe wiLt need more
than ever to adapt their manufacturing processes to the cond'itions of a production
situation that has been profound[y affected by successive oi L shocks and the in-
creased pressure of internationaL competition. The retativeIy s.Iack rate of
investment expenditure constitutes a major obstacte to the acljustments neecled
ting in a fatI in potentiaI pnoductivity gains and a continuing contraction in
'industria I emptoyment
thei t
res u t-
IO
t
7.2.
Further, the persistent dispar itjes in the annuaL r^ates of investment
growth between Member States remain one of the major featunes of economic deveLop-
ment in the Community. The spread of the individuaI countrjes' rates of growth'in
gross f ixed cap'i taL formation, which was reLat'i veLy nar^row before 1973, has widened
sharpLy since 1975, add'i ng over the year^s to the Lead bui Lt up 'i n the f iel.d of
structuraL adjustment by the countries recond'ing the best economic performances
(see TabLe 7.1).
Investment growth has thus been aLL the more remarkabLe in Germany,
returning since 1976 to the rate observed in the pre-crisis years wjthout showing
the sIightest s'ign of losing momentum (an annueI rate of over 6 % in reaL terms),
By contnast, the rate in Fr.ance has not exceeded 2.5 % per annum, white investment
in ItaLy has picked up somewhat onLy since 1979. The contrast even more marked in
the case of the Un'ited Kjngdorn, which has recorded a succession of negative growth
rates, but aLso jn the case of Denmark and, s'i nce 1979, the f,letherlands (aLthough
a sharp recovery in investment was registered in the Latter country aften 1975).
The sectoraL anaLysis brings into somewhat sharper reLief the picture
afforded by the analysjs carried out a.t Community leve[.. It hjghtights the key
roLe pLayed by investment in the market senvices sector Q3.3 % in 1970 ancl
28.3 %'in 1980, at 1970 prices and exchange rates), the reLative stabiL'itY sinceo1975_
vestment in the energy sector (some 8 % of totaL investment), the decline since 1970
'in the share accounted for by industriaL investment, and the contraction since 1977
in the share accounted for by pubIic-sector investment (see TabLe 7.2 anrl Graph 7A).
The sectoraL data avaiLabLe for each countny (see TabLe 7.3) confinm the
d'ivergences observed at macroeconomic Ieve[. Besides recording the sharpest expansion
in investment in the market services sector between 1975 and 1978 (an annuaL increase
ol ? %, compared wjth 6.6 % ln the Nether-.Lands ancJ 5.5 % in BeLgium), Germany is the
onLy country where industriaL investment has grown at a rate equivaLent to that
reconded in the years of rapid expansion prior to 1973. By contrast, the rate of
growth of investment in manufacturing was negatjve between 1975 and 1978 in France,
ItaLy and BeLgium. It was low eLsewhere. However a reversaL in the situation is
under way in the NetherLands and IreLand.
*
t
tlr
7-3
WhiLe pubIic incestment pLayerJ someth'ing of a counter-cycticaL roLe
during the recession in 1975-75'in Germany but above all in France ancl the NetherLands,
it has since incneasecl onLy very sLightLy or inrleeeJ fa[|en in most countries.
, Trend of invqst,me'nt ;, morg iationaLizat.ion
Thjs inadequate rate of investment growth'in virtuatLy atL Member States
'is severety impeding the expansion of thejr econom'ies; however, white investment
is a key determinant of rJemand and, operat'ing through the mu[tiptier effect, d.irectLy
infIuences the LeveL of production, it aLso shapes the development of future productive
capacity. This prompts an ana[ys'i s of'the impait on each count.ryrs procfuctive
apparatus of what has aLneady been a long periori of reduced capita['investment,
with account being taken of the changes discernible in the type of investment under-
t a ken.
In thus aLLocating fewer resources than previousLy to new investment,
f'irms in tlte manufacturing sector - those in the market services sector having
continued to expand - seem to have devoted a greater proportion of their expen-
diture to purchases of pLant and machinery, thereby cutting back on the setting
up of new production units more l'i keLy to absorb a rapidty expand'ing popuLation
of working age.
The analysis of investment by major product categories shows (see Tabte
7.4) that, with the exception of the NetherIands, plant and,machinery account for
a growing proportion of investment and that, taking into account nationat pol-icies
, 
on aids to the residential construction industry, the share of what can be regarded
as an.extension of productive capacity jp fatLing. AdmittedIy, sinc'e movabte capitaL
goods are, by their very nature, repIaced more frequentLy than immovabtes, the break-
down of firmsr annuat investment tends to show a steady shift in favour of the former.
This trend seemsr however, to be gathering momentum. Between 1976 and 1980, invest-
ment in plant and machinery expressed as a proport'ion of totaI gross fixed capitaI
formation rose by 1.9 percentage pojnts in ItaLy, by 2.6 percentage points in
Be[gium, by 3.1 percentage points in Germany and by 7.1 percentage points in the
United Kingdom. In aLt cases, the rate of growth is more rapid than in the past.
In the case of France, data are not availabte for 1979 and 1980, but between 1976
an'J 1978 this proportion aLso increased by 1.4 percentage points. In the NetherLands,
foItowing a buoyant recovery in residential investment, the f.igure forr 1980 is
Lor,rer than that for 1979' aLthough the Iatter was the highest ever recorded (up
3.'l percentagd po'ints on 1976).
I
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I Th'is behaviour on the part of investors is attributabLe both to recent
economic deveLopments and to the growing pressures on the productive apparatus
over the tast few years. The effect of these pressures has been to focus specia[
attention on measures to rationatizg productjon and mgdern'ize manufacturing pro-
cesses, often at the expense of industriat empLoyment. A wide variety of factors
have aLso contributed to this trend inc[uding the foLLowing:
Prior to the 1973-74 increase in oiL prices, the more rapicl gr.6wth in the cost
of Labour compared wjth that of capitat had been one of the factors in the
'qteady increase in the capitaL/Labour ratio (see TabIe 7.5); and the new cost
of energy - by making part of the stock of ptant and machinery obsolete - has
aIso encouraged substitution between factors of production;
- The existence of unused product'ion capacity has not fostered the setting up
of new production units but,'if anything, has encouraged firrns to replace their
existing means of p;oduct'i on graduaLty 'in orden to be jn the best posit'ion. pos-
sibLe to face the new conditions of internationat compet'ition;
The monetary poticies pursued, invoIving a pronounced rise in nominaI short-
term and Long-term interest rates have tended to make private i.ndjviduaLs more
cautious jn their purchases of durabte goods and housing and to cause managements
to postpone certain tong-term investments in fixed assetsl
The investment incentive poLicies which have been depLoyed have served above
atL to promote punchases of pLant and machinery; tax incentives in particuLar
have had a more direct impact,on p[ant and machinery replacement than on new
buitding, for which the deprecjation period is much Longer.
InveStment in h'ighLy Labour-intensive industries seems to be directed
towands areas where labour costs are rnore favourabte. However, despite greater
reLocation of certain types of production, the amounts of investment invoLved are
stiLL Iimited. In Germany, for exampLe, new direct investment abroad in 1979 totaLled
DM 5 900 miLlion, or around 1.8 % of totaL gross fixed capitat formation at nationaI
LeveL. In the United Kingdom, it woutd seem to account for less than 3 % of domestic
investment. These investments appear to have been made ma'inLy in
|]
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order to expLoit the changes in comparative advantage or to penetrate protected
markets, It is difficuLt to assess a priori their possibLe repercussions on the
baLanc,e of payments and on emp[oyment. Most of the studies carried out suggest,
houever, that the repercussions on empLoyment wj[[ probabLy be stight.
Neverthetessr'in Line with the restructuring which is under way in many
branches of industry and which is already having a direct adverse effect on emptoy-
ment, the proLiferation of Iabour-saving investments is contributing to the contrac-
tion of the Labourmarket but has not as yet managed to counteract the sLower rate
of growth in tabour productivity taking the Community as a who[e, 3.6 % a year
between 1975 and 1977,2.7 % in 1978 and 1979 and 11 % in 198|D
Ihe period 1980-81 : a varied but. generaLly unsatisfactory F,icture
Gross fixed capitaL formation wiIL probabty increase at a somewhat
s.[orer rate in 1980 than in 1979, with the rate then fa[[ing in reaI terms in 1981.
Atthough the retatjvely high growtfi rate recorded in 1979 continued during the
first haLf of 1980, the weaker jn economic activity observed during the second
ihal.f of the year is expected to continue in 1981.
,This picture of the Community in general masks very pronounced d'ispari-
ties between Member States. In Germany, the Iong-term poLicy of improving suppIy
conditions, wh'i ch r"ias geaned in part'i cutan to the need to boost investm'ent has
meant that capitaL formation has grown at a very satisfactory rate in recent years.
This is true notabty of plant and machinery, where reaI growth rates of 4.5 % and
2 % are expected in 1980 and 1981 nespectivety. No othen country has experienced
as stabLe and as steady a rate of investment growth jn the medium term.
It ii onLV in ItaLy that the prospects in this fie{.d for the:period
1980-81 are equatLy favourabLe. Investment in new pLant and machinery is expected
to grow by 13 % in reaI terms in 1980, aLthough a fatL of 5 % is then projected for
1981. This growth comes after a Long peniod plior to 1978 in which investment
marked time or fell back and folLowing which many firms were faced with shortages of
pLant and machinery. It is stiLL too earLy to say whether the growth recorded during
the period 1979-80 marks the beginning of a more buoyant expansion of medium-term
i nves tment
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In France, the sIow rate of investment growth in recent years is ex-
pected to continue owing to the anticipated faLL in demanc1 in the second haLf of
1980 and in 1981. This demand trend wjLt offset the effects whcih product'ion bottLe-
necks and the generaL improvement in firms'financiaL pos'itions m'ight be expected
to have in the normaL course of events.
In BeLg'ium, deveLopments simiLar to those jn France are envjsageci fon
1980 and '1981 (with investment expanding by ? 7, and 1.2 % respect'iveLy), aLthough a
substanti,aL voLume of investment wiLL be clevotecl to industries experjencing serious
structuraL probLems (steeL, textj les ,and shipbui Lding).
In Luxembourg and in the NetherLands, the authorities have taken measures
to boost investment. The fact that Luxembourg continues to attract foreign companies
ancl the effor.ts made to diversify the Luxembourg economy wiLL probab'ly Lead to some
sLight gnowth in investment in 1980 and 1981. In the NetherLands, however, the
forecasts for 1980 and 1981 suggest a fail. in investment in reaL terms, despite
the investment aid programme,
Three Memben States - the United Kingdom, Denmank and IreIand - are ex-
pected to recor.d negat'ive rates of investment growth in 1980 and 1981. In the United
Kingdom, the faLting demand, high inter^est rates, Iow pnofit LeveLs and the finan-
ciaL constraints on the pubt.ic sector wiLL Lead to an appreciabLe contraction in
investment, the impact of which wiLL probabLy be feLt more in the buiLding and
construction inclustry than at the Levet of pLant and machinery. A simiLar situation
preva'iLs in IreLand, where, after cLimbing very rapidLy for a numben of years,
investment is expected to falL by more than 10 % in'1980 and 1981. In Denmank,
the tight monetany and budgetary poLicy pursued, togethen with the decLine jn do-
mestic and export demandr goes a tong way towards expLaining the marked sLowdown
in the rate of investment growth that is aLso expected jn this country.
With the exception of some countries (ItaLy and IreLand), budgetary poLi-
cies wilL pnobabLy continue to'impose restrictions on the growth of pubL'ic-sector
investment. This approach is aLready a feature of the situation in the United King-
dom and jn Denmark but is aLso expected to be adopted in 1981 jn Germany,'in the
Nethertands and in BeLgium, exerting a further squeeze on the voLume of pubLic-
but which has, however, grown appreciably in 1980.
*
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P,oLicy measures to support inyestment
One of the prioriti objectives of the macroeconomic poticy pursued by
14ember Statesr governrhents in recent years has been to nestofe firmsr financing
of the first oiL shock, and rising energy costs aggravated the constraints on
the fictors of production, which were aLready affected by the increase in the share
ofwagesandbythefinanciaLcostsofahigh[eve[ofindebtedness.
The profit margins needed to permit investment have been restored in
virtua[[y aLL the Member States since 1975. In 1980, the adjusted share of wages,
expressed as a percentage sf GDP, is generatty speakingr 2 percentage pojnts down
on the peak LeveI reached in 1975, except, that is, in France and ItaLy, vhere it
has remained stabIe, and in Betgium, where jt has continued to rise.
The Commissionrs forecasts for 1980-8'1 indicate no change in the situation.
In other words, as distinct from what happenecl at the time of the first round of
oit price rises, wage and satary earners rather than the corporate sector wiLL
probabty bear the brunt of t.he second oiI sltock, averting a further squeeze on
profits that ulould work to the detriment of an aIready stuggish investment cimate.
The reLative cost of Labour/energy generaLLy feIL after the 1973-?4
oiL crisis, but it has since increased graduatLy and, in some cases, has exceeddC
its 1973'Levet. The resutt has been.that investors have sometimes been Led to take
irrappropriate decisions (see Tabte 7.6). These "perverse" deveLopments have probabLy t
considerabty biase"l the choice of efficient factor combinations as urett as affecting
productivity growth, thereby checking adjustment to the new energy situation.
b
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The authorities in the Member States have aLso intervened directLy both
to encourage firms to develop or embrace nerol technoLogies and to.induce them to
step up the votume of thejr fixed investment.
Action by the authoritjes to promote resea,rch and deveLopment
(see Tabte 7.7) has consisted eitherin providing support for research carried
out directLy by firms or in promoting the dissemination of new technoLogies.
An ahatysis of the nationaL programm€s for promoting innovation shows that,
desp'ite recent efforts to make such poLicies more effective and a(though it has
been stressecl just how important it is to market the idea of innovation, that
the measures taken are stitI gear:ed extens.ivety to research proper. The
obstacLes to innovation encountered specificaILy by smaLt and mecJium-sized firms
incIude, in addition to financing and vocationaL training probLems, the unwieLdy
administrative procedures that have to be folLowed in order to receive aid and the
difficuIties of penetrating new markets, both of which sti[|. represent major handi-
caps.
The variety of instruments used to promote investment refIects the
diversity of factons jnfLuencing fi rmsr decisions in this fieLd. Thus, aLongside
the trend of demand and management expectations, particuLarIy as regards inftation,
factors such as the cost and avaiLabiLity of financing, the LeveL and structure
of indebtedness and the seLf-financing. capacity created by profits earned have been
taken into account in framing the measures adopted. [r|hiLe these measures have,
generat[y speaking, formed part of economic recovery programmes, they have in some
cases, been adopted with a much more specificaLty structurat objective in mind.
The measures taken in the Memben States incLude the foLLowing : in France, the
package of investment incentives announced in September 1980; in Germany, the
changes made in the tax treatment of investment and in the rutes on depreciation
7.8
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at the end of 1977; in Belgium, the measures contajned in the Law on economic
expansion and empLoyment of February 1977, which cover:s the peniod 1977-80; ancl,
from a more specificaLLy structuraL angLe, the Dutch Investmeqt Account Law of
t\ay 1978. In the case of the United K'ingdom, the changes in c1i rect taxation
wiLL probabLy aLso have the indirect effect of prov'iding firms with the means
to finance additionaL investment.
These different measures taken by the pubLic authorities to promote
investment have been jmpLemented agains the background of radicaL changes in
the energy situation: as a nesuLt of the roLe it nor,l plays in the structune
of firmst production costs, enengy has, since the first oiL shock, become one of
the key determihants of suppLy profitabitity but, at the same ti.me, as a result
of the large amount of direct, or indirect investment in the energy sector, it has
aLso become an'important factor shaping demand.
The energy cofrstraint 
, 
'
After the sudden rise in real energy prices in 1973-74 and an irreguLar
eas'ing between 1975 and 1978, the reaL cost of energy once again increasecl in
1979 and 1980. In 1979 the "energy'and fueLs" component of the whoLesale price
index - expressed in the form of a weighted average for the five countries for ''*
which it is avai LabLe (Germany, France, ItaLy, Betg'iuin, Denmark) - increasecl in
reir[ terms by 21.7 %.
In the various sectors of consumption (industry, transport, househotd/
tertiary), this trend has had the duaI effect of encouraging energy substitution
(a shift from petroLeum pnoducts to. gas and eLectric'ity), and prompting a
neaL conse,rvation effort, which has to some extent weakened the Link between the
growth of industriaL production and the growth of energy demand.
EarLy resuLts for 19?9, however, confirrn that very considerabLe efforts
witL stilI be needed if the growth of energy consumption is to be prevented from
matching economic growth. A sLight acceLenation in the growth of the GDP and a
par"ticuLarty hard winter were enough to boost consumption and to increase the
e[asticity of energy consumption with respect to the GDP to 1.63 for 1978/79
as against 0.84 from 1975 to 1978.
)
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Energy ln lndustry, trensportr househotd/tertiary sector
The industria[ sector cut its consumption by 6 7. fron 1973 to 1928(from 313.3 to ?94.4 miL,tion toe), brinsins its share in totaL energy consumption
down from 38 % 1n 1973 to 35 % in 1978. Industryrs performance can be appreciated
in the Light of the expansion of industriaI production over this period 2 + 5.5 %
between 1973 and 1978.
A detai[ed anatysis shoutd however be made for each country, of the
part that structuraI changes in industry have pLayed in reducing energy consumption
for specific purposes, in order to identify the areas where improvernents in
energy efficipncy have reatty been macle.
. One notable aspect of industriaL energy consumption is the sharp reduc-
tion in oiL consumption between 1973 and 1978, fron'105.6 miLLion toe to 86.9
miILion toe, i.e. a reduction of 17.7 il. t,ith coaL consumption continuing to faLl.
during th'i s period, the main substitutes were gas and eLectr,i c'i ty (the Latter partty
coaL-generated, however) and these have both gained ground.
Energy consumption in the transport sector continued to increase, but
at a slower rate than in the past : + 2.75 % per year from 1973 to 1978, conparer)
wjth + 5.4 i4 per year from 1963 to 1973. The share of transport in total energy
consumption therefore increased from 15 % in 1973 ta 16.9 % jn 1978. The incnease
was due to greater oiI consumption (+ 3 & per year), repLacing other energy
sources.
Transport accounted for 29.3 % of final oil consumption in 1973 ttut 35-411
in 1978, thus becoming the sector with the highest oiI consumption. OiI accountecl
for 95.7 % of the energy used in transport e4.7 it jn 192g.
Data from S0EC energy(cf. TabIe 7.8)
*
t
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baLance-sheets auaiLabLe uo to 1978
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.Energy consumption in the househoLd/tertiary sector increased again
between 19?3 and 1978, but at a far slower rate : 1.2 % per year compared with
4.5 % per year from 1,963 to 1973. 'T"king account, however, of the falt in con-
sumption in the industriaI sectgrr'htere was a,notabLe increase in the househo[cll
tertiary sectorrs share in overaLI consumption - from 39 7, to 4A.aly, - reftected
in'aLL countries except Denmark. The sector has gradual[y become, from 1963
to 19V8' the greatest energy consumer. This is mainty accounted for by heating,
domestic hot water suppLy, cooking and specific uses of eIectricity (Lighting,
domestic apptiances)
Over the period 1973-78 there r,ras a marked faLL in the part of petro-
leum products in totaL energy used by this sector G5.4 r( in 19?31 38.5 % in
1978) and an even sharper fa[L in coa[ consumption U0.7 % in 1973,6.5 % in 1978).
,There was €xtensive substitution - mainty a shift to etectricjty (increasing from
29.8 % to 34.3 Z of the overatL total) end naturat gas (from 13.4 iA to 19.9 Z :
of the totat) - which generaLty eases dependince on oit, provjded that the
etectricity is not produced from oi L.
Dependence on externaL sources of energy and oiL
t,llith regard to suppLy trends for individuaI products, jt is worth not'ing
that in 1979 energy consumption rose substantiaLLy in the Community as a who[e,
whil.e for the first time in many years, coaL consumption increased in reLation
to overalL consumption, from 18.7 % to 19.4 %. The considerabte rise - 9.4 % - in
coaI consumption t,las covered by drawing on stocks and'increasi,ng imports, whiLe pro-
duction remained at virtuaLLy the same Leve[. The increase is expLained by the
upturn in the iron and steeI industry and promotion of the use of coaL in power
stat i gns.
Natural gas aLso ehowed an increase (7.6 %') higher than that of gross
inLand.consumption, and its share of the totaI rose from 11.1 T. to jz.5 %.
'\
The proportionaL increase of coaL ancl naturaI gas has had the effect
reducing the percentage of crude oil, from 54.4 % to 53.3 %, despite an increase
around 14 niLlion toe G 2.7 %) in oiL demand in 1979.
)
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, A number of factors rnade it possibLe during this period to reduce
to a notable extent the Communityrs dependence on imported energy and, mcre
specificaLLy, on imported oi L :
- Lower consumption in industry and substitution, sharpLy reducing the pro-
port'ion of oi I used;
- the repLacement of oiI by natunaL gas and e[ectricity particuLarty'in the
househoLd/tertiary sectori
- 
jncreased Community production of energy, particuLarLy oi L;
- the outback (to vany.ing extents), in the use of oiL in power stations and
its repLacement by coaL, naturaL gas and nucIear energy.
The Community's dependence on imported oiL feLL from 60.7 %'in 1973
to 46.9 % in 1979 (as measured by net imports of oiI and petroLeum products
oS r p€tccntage of gross inIanrl consumption and bankering).
The Communityts depencJence on imported oiL is LikeLy to faLt further
in 1980, since over the first nine months of the year imports have decreased by
44 mifLion tonnes (about 12.5 D compared wjth the corresponding period in 1979.
Energy investmgnts
The Community's growing sel.f-sufficiency in energy and oiL has not been
accompanied by the massive investment effort that might have been expected after the
1973'74 crisis.
0n the contrary, fix'ed investment in the energy sector, which accounted
or an average of 1.4 % of the GDP (6.2 % of GFCF) from 1968 to 1972, stil[ accountecl
for on[y 1.4 % of the GDP (about 7 % of the GFCF) in 1979, whereas in 1976 it had
been estimated that energy investments amounting to 1.8 % of the GDP would be
required over the five years fron 1976 to 1980, (cf. Table 7.9).
Among these investments, there was a notable increase in those directed
to eLectricity generation by nucLear power - from 10.8 "/, of the totaL in 1974 to
17.8 7. ln 1979; but those devoted to prospecting for other conventionaL sources -
gas, oi[ and coal - have increased at the same rate U1.7 % of the 1974 total and
21.3 % ]n 197().
*
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3
The Comrnission departmentst firstrcalcuL;ti"nr, based on the Member
Statest energy programmes up to 1990, show some increase. IncLuding investments
in energy conservation and in the new en6rgy sources, there wouLd be an average
wolume of about 4q 000 mitLion ECU at 1979 prices and rates of exchange, over
the period 1980-90, j.e. slightly under 2 7, of the GDP and about 9 % of total
investment. However, it wouLd hardLy be more than the retative teveI of energy
:
investments made in the 1950s.
Furthenmore, from a List of the Memben States' energy programmes
drawn up at the beg'inning of 198O,'it appears thet the ambitious guidelines
recentLy set out by the CounciL in its ResoLution of 9 June 1980 (cf. section
be[ow on Community energy objectives) cou[d not be put into practice by 1990
without additionaL investment aimed main[y at oiI savings of the order of 60
to 70 miLLion toe. Atthough it wouLd be specutative to suggest totaL figure
for the investment effort needed to achieve such savings, a tentative estimate,
based on an average cost of between 600 and 1 200 ECU pen toe,saved, wor-rld put
the LeveL of additionaL investment needed in the Community during the first
hatf of the period 1980-90 at around 60 000 to 80 000 miLLion ECU, at 1980 prices,
'i.e. about 15 000 miLIion ECU per year.
Totat energy investment (production, d'istribution and conservation) hr
cou[d therefore reach approximateLy 55 000 miLIion ECU per year : amounting T
to12Zof'thegrossfixedcap.iLa[fonction,thiscontributiontothe
Comrnunityts process of capitaI accurirutation woutd be very c[ose to totaL generaL
government investment. The pubtic authorities wouId ptay a majon part in
attaining these objectives.
..
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- The bases of a common European energy poLicy were estabLished by three
CounciL resoLutions adopted at the end of 1974 and earty in 1975 which provided
generaI guidetines and defined the objectives for each sector for 1985.
The objectives set by the Community for 1985 were further defined in
the Light of the conctusions of the European CounciL meetings of JuLy 1978, March
and June 1979.
Since the target date of 1985 is approaching, and since a period of
about ten years is needed for carrying through changes in poLicy direction and
imptementing the investments, it is now necessary to define the objectives for
1990. The Commissionts proposaIs in this respect Ied to the Councit's adopting
two new resoLutions on 9 June 1980, one of which [ays down the foll"owing guidelines
for the Community as a whoLe:
to reduce to 0.7 or tess the average ratio for the whole Community of the
rate of growth in gross energy consumption to the rate of growth of the
gross domest'ic product;
to cover 70
etectric'ity
to reduce oi L
gross primary
to pursue an
obj ect ives.
Annex to the
of act'ion by
to
by
75 % of primary energy requirements for the production of
means of soIid fuels bnd nucLear energy;
consumption in the Commun'ity to a [eveL of about 4O% ot
energy consumpt'ion;
energy pricing poLicy aimed at achieving Community energy
This policy shou[d be basecJ on the principtes set out in the
Councit's other resoLution of 9 June 1980 concerning new Lines
the Community in the fieLd of energy sav'ing.
These new Community objectives shouLd form the consistent pattern
within which the nationaI energy poIicies are deployed.
*
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Very broadLy speaking, nationaI reactions to the 1973-24 crisis Led
to the adoption of measures whose main objectives was much the same for alL
countries : to reduce dependence on imported oiL. However, their practicaL
imptications varied censiderab[y, as a resuLt not onLy of each Mernber Staters
initiat conditions of situation, particul.arty as regands nationat energy resources,
but aIso of the possjbiLit'ies of introducing fairty determined energy conservation
or production poLicies at short notice, ConsequentLy, the efforts made to bring
in the necessary:nergy poticies have varied widety in scaIe. tJhiLe Denmark,
France and Genmany have deveLoped detaiLed strategies, Be[g'ium has no energy con-
sumption in the Community. In the other countries, coherent energy programmes
have gnaduatty been set up, mainLy for energy saving, for which the Commission
has estabLished a basic programme recommended to aLL the Member States
nmark, the Nethertands, Germany, France and the United Kingdom have
aIL adopted measunes,to encourage efficient use of energy, covering atL sectors. :[
l'he l,letherLands and Gefrnanyy. however, ernphasise the househoL:l sector more, whereas
there is a wider distribution of effort in Denmark, France and the United Kingdom.
Over the Iast few yeansr. increasing emphasis has been pIaced on invest-
nrent'incentives in the form of grants, teasing systems or tax cred,'its. In the
househoLd sector, such investment aids are now on a considerabLe scaLe in Denmark,
the Nether[andsr Genmany and France, but are'stiLl. minimaL or even non-existent
in Be[gium, Iretand and Iuxemburg. In the inCr.rstriaI sectorT they are retativeLy
extensive in the former group of countries together with the United Kingdom, but
are stiLL scarce or non-existent in BeLgium, 
-Iretand, Itaty and Luxemburg.
in a[[ cases, however, they are Iess than in the househo[d sector.
fr
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Thene are wide variations in pr'ice formation meChanisms, ranging
from compLete freedom to controLted prices. F,levertheLess, substantiaL progress
has been achieved with the adoption of a generaL principLe of applying "true
prices,', designed to pass on to the finaI usen the futl effect of increases in
the costs of energy'production, especiaLty crude o'iL price nises. There are
stiLL however, marked d'ifferences in the way in which the taxation of energy
is used to absorb or re'inforce pre-tax trends, especiaLLy in connection with
petroLeum products.
In 1979 ettorts were made in most countries (to a Lesser extent
Itaty), except Denmark and. IreLand to repLace petroLeum products ds far as
possibte with gas, which targeLy accounts for the only moderate increase in
demand for petroLeum products in these countries' '
A certain shift from petroLeum products to eLectricity was aIso
-,observed in 1979, particuLarly in Denmark, IreLandr, the United Kingdom. However,I
-whereas additionaI e[ectricity requirements are met by coaL burning power
stations jn Denmark and the United Kingdom, in Iretand they are suppLied by ojL-
fired power stations.
In l9T9 Dower-stations oiL-burn in the Communjty as a whole continued
to increase rapidLy at much the same r.ate as in 1978 (about 14 %), despite
the efforts that have been made over the past tt^ro years to step up the use
of existing coat-fired power stations in preference to oiL-fired pLants'
The various Member States are'now judged to have virtuaLLy no potentiaL for
changeovers of this type in 1980; and the emphasis shouLd be pLaced on
nen, coaL-burning power pLants and on the conversion of existing power pLants
to coa t -fi ring
*
7.17
,
: What finaLLy emerges from this rapid review of nationaI enengy
policbs is that the dey to any further progress is investment in the replacement 
_
or renewaL of instaLLations. Con'sequentLy, it is vitaL that a sound energy
pricing poticy be accompanied by adequate infonmation and technicaL assistance
for the user. Public schemes, at e'ithen nationaL or LocaL LeveL, shouLd aLso
be financed in order to expedite investment in energy conservation., Member
States d'iffer widety with regard to the pubLic financing of energy-saving
programmes. In th'is respect, the constfaints stemming from the pubIic finances
situation in some countnies,are Iiabte to haye an adverse effeet on the
process of adjustment to the energy constnaint.
}
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t TABLE 7.3.AnnuaL grob,th rate
by owner branch
in and breakdown of gross fixed capitaL fonrnation in 1978'
4^
r913/68 1918/73 r975/13 1978/15
1978
brec kdown
%
Germany (1970 prices)
AgricuLture
Ene rgy
ivlanufacturing
Hous i ng
Market servi ces
lJon-market services
Tota L
1.7
ro.4
6.7
5.1
8.9
3.4
6;i
3.7
0.0
-0.4
-3.5
3.2
0.7
o.o
-2.6
4.8
-9.3
-13.9
-6.7
0.9
-6i9
8.1
-3.0
5.1
4.0
9,4
o.5
4'9
3.5
5.8
19.0
23.7
8.5
16.0
100
Fnance (1975 prices)
I'6iJiltture
Ene rgy
Ivlanuf a ctu r'i ng
Hous i ng
lvlarket servi ces
llon-market services
totaL
4.4
o.4
9.3
7.9
IOrl
2.8
6.8
-1.6
1.?
-2.8
-o.6
?t9I.3
o.2
-5.0 0.85.3 'O.7
-5.9 , :O.O1.1 
-1.?r3r4 6154.8 -1.0
-L.2 1.1
4.5
5.1
r5.3
28.8
29t9U.9-
100
ItaLy (1970 prices)
Ag ri cu Lture
Ene rgy
Manufacturing
Hous i ng
Market senvices
llon-market services
totat
2.9 2.8
-2.9 -2.6
-10.8 -2.3
'-4.4 4.5
-4.7 4.9
-2.L -2.8
-5.0 0.5
-2.1
1.9
9.14.)
1.9
o.g
3.2
2.9
-2.7
-5.9
-2.1
1.9
-2.5
-I.?
8lo
5rB
1?t?
2rl,
3ri5
914
re.-4 F
100
t
NeiherLands (1975 prices)
AgricuLture
Ene rgy
142nufacturing
Hous ing
14arket services
Non-manket servi ces
Tota L
10. I
1.5
3.J
4.5
3.4
-3.8
2.4
3.E
-1.I
0.4
-O.3
1.8
;2.0
0.4
-12e6
5.1
-4.8
-10.0
'4.6
3.4
-4.3
L5.7
-4.9
4.1
617
6.4
-5.5
3.7
6.3
7.7lr.9
25.6
26.3
14'g
100
BeIqium (1975 oi'ices)+AgricuLtune
Enengy
Manufa ctur i ng
Hous i ng
lvlarket servi ces
Non-market servi ces
IOIAL
9.o
-4.8
.5.7
2.9
9.4
2.3
4.4
2.8
6.0
-5.4
6.5
2.4
1.O
2.I
-15.b L6.722.L 
-3.51.5 
-9.86.8 6.3
-1.0 4.70.8 l.I
2,.6 1.8
3+o
7+r
13+ 7
2914
2814
L6[2
100
United Kingdom (1975 prices)
AgricuLture
Ene rgy
lvlanu f a ctu r'i ng
Hous i ng
llarket services
Non-market servi ces
loraI
7t6
-8.84.2
4.7 ]
5.P
2!1
-5.9
L2.4
2.1
-0.9
-1.74.2
-O.7
-19.?
29.5
0.8
-O.1
-7'O
-lor4
.-r.8
4.8
2.)
3.0
-1.5
2.O
-9.3
O.O
3fo
t5i2
18i2
19r3
3rr 5
, llr3
100
EUR-6 (1975 pfices &
rat e s)
Agri cultune
Ene rgy
Manufacturing.
Hous i ng
Market servi ces
Itl,on-maiket servi ces
Tota L
ex c hange
O.9
2.8
-1.?
..I.5
1.8
-1.2
-o.1
-r.4
9.44.9
-5.5
'4.7{r3
-3.8
5.4
-I.3
. 1.9
. r.2
6.5
-1.8
?.3
4.5
7.9
L7.4
25'2
29,8
t 3+4
3.0
0.3
7.5
i.s'
2.9
4.9
*
,t including housing,
Source : 1968-78 : ESA National Accopnts
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?]'ABLE 7.4 i
Changes'in gross fixed capitaL formation by br.oduct.
ReIative
76 77
snares
78 79 80
Annuat grourth nate
17h5 78/77 7s/78 en/n
. Ptant & fiachinery
Btdq. & Construction
n
" ^+.,,hi^(1970 prices) or wntcn :
Hous i ng
TotaL G.F'.C,F',
! Pl.ant & machinery
F B[dg. & construction
n+,,hiqh ;(1975 prices) "'*"'
Hou s.i ng
Totat G.F.C.F.
Ptant & {vlach'inery
. 
etdg. & constructionL of which :(1970 onices)' Housing
Total. G.F.C.F.
Ptant & mach'inery
B[dg & constructionarrts ^J ..L:ch .(1?75 prices) v' w"'
Hous i ng
Tota I G. F, C. F.
Pl.ant & machineny
Bldg. & construction
. B of whi:h :(1975 prices)
Hous i ng
TotaI G.F.C.F.
.PLant & nachinery
el.dg & construction
(1?75"'price ) or wh'rcn :
Hous i ng
TotaI G.F.C.F.
&r4 4tr8 444
5gro 71$ 56,8
23r8 ?314 2218
100 lm 1@
37t6 3719 39ro
58,3 57$ ie,l
7gr8 29$ 2816
loo loo loo
39t.4 39r5 39rr
55t6 55J 56,4
2419 25t2 25t5
100 100 100
1€r3 4€rQ 41i4
59$ 57t5 5813
2518 2617 2616
l0o I@ 10o
33r1 31rO 32t4
6311 6318 6214
2818 28rg 2g14
loo too l@
43r3 45f3 4618
5Ot2 47t6 46J
2Qr7 1916 19r3
loo loo loo
25rO ?5r7
LOO IOO
19r4
55,7
25t3
100
4310 43$ .6$ 7t8 8.5
56,3 55,E 2r5 4,9 8.1
2217 2218 4r3 3r3 8.,1
IOO IOO 4t4 613 8.7
4.2,
4.2
+-1
40r3 4l'3
55J 53rB
24t8
'loo
4Bt4 4Ir7
5512 58rl
25,O 26,2
loo 1oo
34rr 35t7
6t12 6012
100 100
49t7 5Or4
44t2 43t7
1?r? I5r5
lm 100
47 ' 3'8
-1r2 , :, -1r3
-116 -116
lr2 IrO
4r7 -1r4
-1rO Or7
;lrl or7
Ir2 4r4
4t1 lrl
4to 4t4
9rl 2r5
4r3 3rl
-4r1 618
3r2 4tZ
8to 3'5
lrl 2rl
2r3 2r1
-3r2 {r3
-2t2 0rl
4r7 lr5
2rJ ?'6
716 13.0
2rl 3.8
Lr7
4t5 8.0
5,2 -3.4
-3.8 2.8
-}rtl 11 5
0.0 -0.0
1.
4,5 4.0
-2,.7 -1.1
-0.5 2.0
4.5 -2.8
-7.6. -6.3
-1112 -1510
- 1.9 -4.t
3'8
[IrR-6
(1975 prices
& exehange
fate,s)
PLant & machinery lErO 39rO
Btdg & construction 96$ 55r3
of which
Hous i ng
TotaL G.F.-C.F.
3r3
ot3
1r2
2rI
4ro
1r5
Irl
219 2.3
SoJrces :1975-78: ESA l\!at-ionat Accounts - 1qz
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TABLE 7.9
Fixed investment
Community - r000
in the energy
mitLion EUA at
sec tor
1979 prices
r9T4 t975 t976 L977 L97B t9T9
Sotid fueIs
0iL and Gas
- production
- refining, transpont
and distribution
Production of electricity
* nuctear energy
- other primary enengy
sou rc es
- secondary energy
sourc es
Transport and distribution
of eLectricity
Tota t ( 1)
Q.4
9.2
2.3
6.9
6.5
2.5
o.8
3.3
5.9
23. I
o.6
Ll.1
3.0
8.1
6.8
3.l-
0.7
3.O
5.8
25.3
o.9 o.9
9,6 10.4
3.2 3.9
6,4 6.5
6.9 6.5
3.3 3.2
0.8 0.8
2.8 2.5
5.1 4,9
2J.5 22.7
I.L l.L
11.1 11.6
4.o 4.4
7.L 7.2
7,2 7.8
3.8 4.6
0.8 0.8
2.6 2.4
.9..1 5.3
24.5 25.8
*
(1).r Z of gross fixed
c'apitaL formation
(r)as % of gross do-
mestic produc
6.7 716 7.0 5.7 7.0 7.0
1.3 1.5 r.4 1.3 r.4 r.4
Source : Commission staff caLcuLations
i
t
+
(t0)
'lLl u' '.
Gr:6ss f ixed capitaL formatiorl in the Community by 
'industry
L970:= LOO
M i ni ng/ Energy
Market services
r
r50
r40
130
L20
1L0
1Oo
9o
80
V-:--'t'e€-----'
Agri cuLture
Housing
PubLic
70 7L 72 73 14 .75 7
Source and notes : cf. TabLe 7.2
b
n
r, :,isii
Construction
i.rfacturing
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f E. EnpLoyment trends' and pot"icies
The employment trend in the Community has been marked - since the first oiL
crisis - by a fatL in agricuttura[ employment, a reduct'ion of emptoyment in
industry and a continued steady rise in emptoymert in the tertiary sectori
this has been rapid enough for total employment in 1977r 1978 and 1979 to
have increased at atmost the same rate as the [abour force. Emp[oyment tti[t
not grow in 19E0 and shoutd faLL in 1981. The increase in the Labour force is
acce[erating for demographic reasons, and there shoutd be a rise in unempLoyment
in 1980 and 1981. This rri'Lt be particularly rapid among young peopLe rho may"
netl account for atmost 502 of the totaL.
Number of jobs crealed smaLLer than the incfg,?se
in the tabour force
After the negative empLoyment trend recorded in the Community during,
the 1974/75 crisis, most of the [tlember States hid, untiI recent[y, returned
to a rate of job creation close to if not greater than that of the earty
sevent i es.
Thus, despite an environment in vhich economic growth had sLowed in
comparison rith the pre-recession expansionary years, and despite the
contraction in the groyth of investnent, the record of the tabour suppty
t trend is not unfavourabte at macroeconomic Levet. PartLy as a result of the
neasurgs:taken by the pubtic authorities to ,support empl,oyrpent, fi.tl 
,
continued recruiting at a high rate unti t 1979 at .teast
ThjsreLativeLyposjtivepictureinfactc.oncea[stwoimportant
structurat factors upsetting the equi Librium of the [abour market in the
medium term:
- a rapid increase in the Labour force both because of the age structure of
the working-age poputation and because of the trend of participation rates
(notabLy femate participation rates) over the period 1975-80; the average
growth rate of the Labour force in the Community wi[L have been 0.85% a
year as against 0.36% for totaL empLoyment;
I
t4t4 E.2
- the continuing tren{s in the distribution of emp[oyment by sectors of
activity, nameLy a decrease in agriculturaL empLoyment at a rate simitar
to that of the sixties (despitethe difficuLties of absorption into
other sectors), an equalLy negative gronth rate for job creation in industry
and the key rote p[ayed by the tertiary sector. The main area for the
creation of ney jobs is the services sector - particuLarly narket services,
since the nationat public sectors are fee[ing the effect of more restrictive
budgetary poIicies.
These structural. factors recur to a greater or lesser extent in each
llernber State, the latest avail,abLe figures (See Tabte 8.1) beginning to show
up sone trend reversals, particul.arLy in industry, onLy for Germany, Dennark
and lreland: it is true that industriaL emptoyment in the forner two countries
vas hard hit by very large numbers of job losses during the 1974- 75 recession.
The situation in the industria[ sector is the 
.result of the need to be
conrpetitive combined vith the,ueakness of investment yhich receives Littte
stirnuLation from an uncertain - if not depressed - market. In France,
the United Kingdon, Belgiun and the NetherLands, the greatest emptoyment
a{Justrnents have been made by industry.
Tertiary emptoyment has so far benefited from a steady increase in
demand, and - through the grouth of temporary york - from a transfer of
activities vhich tere formerly considered industria[: it'has thus been abLe
to defer rationatization in a sector uhich enjoys greater protection from
externaI competition. But the introduction of ney technoLogies, vith the
productivity gains they shoul.d bring, makes continuation of this expansion
Gore uncertain.
F
,b
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The steady rise in.unempLoyment rates
The imbatance betveen employment suppLy and demand and the scaLe of
Labour-shedding in industry are the main causes of the rise in the
unemp[oyment LeveI in alL the Community economies since 1975. The exceptions
are the Nethertands, which ras enjoying a stabLe .rate of close on 4X, and
Germany vhere it has decLined sLightLy. The thrust of unenptoyrnent
wiLL have been particu[arLy strong in France, Betgium and the United Kingdom
(see TabLe 8.2).
llomen are affected by unemployment far more than men since their
reLative share in the totaL number of unemployed is appreciably greater than
their reLative share in the totaL labour force. tloreover, uith the exception
of lre[and, the unfavourabte situation for Homen has distinctty rorsened from
1975 to 1979, vith the Community average retative share of uomen in the number
of unemployed increasing from 362 to a[most 452.
There is no cLear tink betreen the'increase in f,emaLe.unemptoyment
and the movement of gLobal. unemp[oyment rates since this increase is apparent
in Germany and the Netherlands as yeU. as in ItaLy and BeLgium. l{or is there
iany obvious Link betneen the re[ative share of femate emptoyment and the
scale of or increase in femate unempLoyment. By contrast, it is quite possibLe
that the specific ru[es governing the payment of unemployment benefit in force
in the different member countries exert substantiat influence on the relative
scate of femaLe unempLoyment, rithout, horever, affecting the generaI uprard
tendency; at Least this is suggested by the very different rates, for Betgium
on the one hand (6?.52of totaL unemployment in 1g?Er, and for the
United Kingdom (30.7U) and lreland (?2.9I) cin the other.
Young peop[e are the other group hardest hit by unemploynent. The share
of unemployed peopte under 25 years of age ranges from 262 to 4?Zl vhereas
the share of young peopte in the Labour force ranges from 17 to 2?I onty.
1
' September - October 1979 figures:
tirne of the year.
*
figures are traditionaU.y highest at this
l4L
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The percentages of young unemptoyed are particu[arty high (between 40 and
502) in France, Italy, BeneLux and the United Kingdom - Hhere the share has
greatty increased from 1974 to 1978. They are betueen ?5 and 30U in Qermany,
IreLand and Denmark - yhere the proportions have remained stabLe hetween
1974 and 19,79. Among /ounS peopte, Lromen nearty everyuhere and nearty aLuays
account for a ,higher percentage G9I in'1979 in the Community as against
34X f or )loung men),,
But if women and young people are trlo groups uhose unfavourabte
situation i,s retativeLy easier to pinpoint, they do not by themseLves make
up th9 ,'h?r9 corei'of unemployment: this includes people with no vocationaL
training, otder peopte, migrapts, the handicapBed, and - more generaLLy -
the .Lqng-ter.m unemptoyed; Long-terrn unempLoyment - probab[y one of the most
difficuLt aspects of unemployment - has been on the increase since 1975.
Labour market poticies
lJith the overaLL imbalance between emptoyrnent suppLy and demand, the
ste3dy rise in qh9 number of unsatisfied job-seekers is the.resuLt of
differences in the rates at which productive .systems undergoing transformation'[
'r :'
and Labour markets Locked into econgmic, socioLogicaL and cuLturaL rigidities
'.:. 
. a. ,
adapt to each other. The publ.ic authorities have stepped,up the,ir intervention
measures.toreducet|reserigidities.NationaLm€asureshavebeenassociated
yith Community labour market poLicy, based on increased intervention by the
,\. .-
Sociat Fund. But if alL these actions have succeeded in Limiting the most ;
seridus consequences of the existence of six m,iLlion unemployed in the
Community, the objective of fuLt empLoyment is stiLL, in almost aLt the
Jtlember States, pushed back to an unspecified future.
..'
tlilh varying eqphasig, nationaL or Community tabour market adjustment
poLicies have foILowed the sane guideLines!
t
,n
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- action mai'nty on employment suppLy, by granting firms favourabLe terms
for the recruitment of young uorkersl
- action on emptoyment demand by encouraging vocationaI training and retraining,
Labour mobitity, and aLso earty retirement schemesi
- changes in the sociat protection of job-seekers from the viewpoint of
increasing and guaranteeing certain benefits over a period, and re-
empLoyment opportunities, and of adjusting the rules to eIirninate a number
of abuses.
. Instances of pubLic intervention reLating to the labour market are
many and varied. They are recorded in th9 "Report on the DeveLopment of
the SocjaL Situation in the Community" published by the Commission each year.
0f the main ones, the foLlowing can be quoted by uay of iLLustration:
- the nationat empLoyment compacts in France under which employerst sociaL
security contributions can be cut for recruiting young peopte and women,
and which cover apprenticeship subsidies, training courses, and contracts
combining empLoyment and training. In 1979 300 000 positions h,ere fiLLed
under this compact;
- in Germany, the speciaL empLoyment assistance
unempLoyment areas, for nhich Dlr| 1 000 miLLion
the Late -1979 decision to grant recruitment premiums jn BeLgium; as a
resuLt 20 0OO jobs have been created; or the premiums granted in Iretand
for any additionaL iob created under tvo major programmes (EmpLoyment
Incentive Scheme and Uork Experience Programme);
the training and vocationaL l'ntegration measures which have increased
in Germahy with the empLoyment promotion lar (AFG), and in the Netherlands,
IreLand and Denmark.
{l
programme for high
has been earmarked;
t
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Improvements made to the situation of those seeking uork have
reLated to the reform of the Agence NatjonaLe pour LtEmpLoi (ANPE) in France,
tightening up the conditjons for obtaining unemptoyment benefit in ltaLy
and BeLgium, and increasjng the staff of the emp[oyment agency (ANCO) in
I re Land.
The situation in the United Kingdom offers more of a contrast in
that since 1979 a whoLe series of speciaL empLoyment measures - such as the
tenporary enployment subsidy - have been ended, and the staff of the
ltlanpower Services Commission has been cut by some 102.
Lastty, in addition to the contributions by the Communityfs SociaL
Fund, which amounted to 775 mittion EUA in 1979, the Community has worked
for the imptementation of the rules on the free movement of workers by
eliminating banriers to mobiLity, and has continued with its labour market
and tabour force surveys. This is uith a vieh, to improving coordination of
those measures to prevent and remedy unempLoyment which faLL within the
Community framework.
b
h
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Recent trends and prospects
The Labour market situation in the Community has deteriorated
even funther throughout 1980, and forecasts for 1981 indicate that
there wiLL be no jmmediate'improvement. This shows up first and fore-
most in the unemployment rate, which has increased rapidLy over the
fjrst half of the year, passing the 516% mark, the previous record
rate, and reaching 612% by August, despite the fact that economic
activity gt'owth did not itseLf turn cJown ti IL the en,J of the f irst
guarter
Trends in the Iabour market are, apart from the fIuctuations in
empLoyment, determined by an exceptionaLly fast rate of growth in the
working-age popuLation (varying from 0,7% to 1% over the years 1980-85),
due to the arrival of very Large cohorts of 15 year o[ds into the work'ing-
age population in each of the next 5 years. These young peop[e, numbering
some 4 1/? nilLion in each of the next two years alone, even before the
growth rate buiLds'up to its peak rate in 198?-84, are the first genera-
tion echo of the verry high birth rates preva'iLing in the years immediately
after the Second tJorLd War.
lt
Tak'ing into account the "norma[" partic'ipation rates of both the
15 - 19 and the 20 - 24 age groups, i.e. incLuding atL those just f in'ish'ing
further education or training, it is estimated that the totaL number of
young people prepared to enter into the [abour market wiLL be of the
orcJer of 3 mjLLion in each of the years 1980 and 1981.0f course, it is
possibLe that a discouraged worker effect wiLL come into ptay and some
young peopLe may be diverted out of the Labour market into aLternative
act'ivities such as further educat'ion or the armed services, but on the
basis of past evidence this is unLikeLy to be significant. Consequentty,
Labour force growth at around 0,6% per year in 1980 and 1981 wiLL far
exceed the envisaged expansion jn empLoyment.
In view of the slow growth o.f activity in 1980 and 1981, product-
ivity (output per occupied person) is expected to r.'ise by onty about 1% in
each of the tb,o years, or substantia[[y less than during the preceding
four years. Most Member States share the overaLL stowdown of productiv'ity
growth with, however, a particuLarLy sharp decLine taking pLace in the
.J't
sL ^(2
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United Kjngdom in 1980. The weak
of the fact that only a moderate
in the present cycIicaL downturn
smaIL decLine in empLoyment.
trbnd in productivity is a reflection
degree of Iabour sheddjng is expected
- as indicated by the forecast fairLy
In fact, after having expanded, nough[y in the Line wjth the growth
of the tabour force in 1978 and 1979 the total number of emptoyed in
the Community is estimated to.have increasecl by 0r2% in 1980 and may,
according to the forecasts by the Commissionrs staff, decline by 0r3%
in 1981.6iven the ccjntinued rise in the labour forcer.the rate of unern-
ptoyment may rise to 715 nilLion or 6rE% of the civiLian Labour force on
average for 1981 and couLd by the end of the year be even h'igher.
WhiLe the unprecedented scaLe of the rise in undmptoyment wiLL
Leave no sections of the labour market untouched, the tendency - described
above - for some groups of workers to bemore seriously affected by increas-
ing unemployment than others is nevertheLess LikeLy to be accentuated over
the next two years, and- wiIt have serious implications'for the future.,
Among these disadvantaged groupSr the most important is that of
young peop[e under 25 years of age. As expected, atreacJy by autumn 1980,
young peop[e comprise some 42% ot,the unemployed in the Communityt 4
figure which is considerabLy up on the figure for the simi[ar period
last year
Thjs tendency for the number of unempLoyed young peopLe to increase
retative to the totaI number of unempLoyed during recession wiLI resuLt'
from both increasing redundancy and increasing faiLure to get a first
job; Indeed, it fs to be expected that young peopte wilt be among the
first to be made redundant, both for economic reasons - [ower productivity
and Less work experience - ancl for considerations of sociaL equity. In
addition, young peop[e wiLt find it increasingLy difficutt to obtain a
first job. Under conditions of rising unit Labour costs anfl increasing
aduLt unempLoymentr €mFLoyers wiLL be reLuctant to offer empLoyment
with training, particutarLy in those Member States where minimum wage
requ'irements make it reLatively uneconomic, and young peopLe wiLL have
to compete for unskil.Led jobs with other disadvantaged groups who may be
prepEred to accept Lower wages.
L
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As a result, it.is LikeLy that by the end of 1981, out of 8 miL-
Lion unemployed in the community, some 3 1/2 - 4 miLLion of these coutd
weLL be young peopLe under 25 years of age. Given the very fast growth
of the working population untiL at Least 1985' unemployment is LikeLy
to remajn at fairty higf Levets even after activity has picked up again'
In part.icuLar, the faiLure of targe numbers of young peopLe to obtain
occupational trainjng wiLL leave a gap in the agelskiLI structure of
the future. For unskiLted young people, the faiture to obtain or keep
a job now wjLl entaiL somewhat different consequences for the future:
the Lack of work experience, if it continues for any Length of time,
wiLL create its ot"rn barnier to obtaining work'
Female unempLoyment , at 46% of totat unempLoyment in the community
by mid-1980, is the other principaL category of probLem unempLoyment,
but is made up of two distinct parts. To a Large ex'tent, the femaLe un-
empLoyment probtem is part of that of young peopLe generatLy, slnce near[y
ha[f the unremp[oyed peopLe under 25 years are female, and in any case
these have a higher particibation rate $han o[der women. If aLlowance
is made for this, then the'proportion of femaLe adult uneTpLoyment is of
course, much Less, and at the community LeveL wouLd appear to be rather
a structuraL than a cycLicaL phenomenon Linked particuLarLy to the
probtems of certain femaLe-intensive industrie.s such as textites' and
witt therefore not increase disproportionateLy over the next two years'
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9.1
9. The Greek economy and eltry into the Communjty
Greece has been associated uith the European Economic Community s'ince
1962 and wiLL become a member on 1 January 1981. Between these two
dates, considerabIe economic'progress has been achieved which has enabted
great strides to be made in catching up with the average productivity.
and income LeveLs of the Nine. NevertheLess accession to the Community
rlitL mean that, despite the transitionat periods Laid down, Greece wiLL
have to make great efforts to adjust her structures to the far stronger
internationaL competition she wiLL face. The success of these efforts is
itseLf LargeLy dependent on the speed with trhich current corrective
poLicies manage to set the economy free from the constraints of its
present imbaLances.
gver the last two decades, Greecets economic deveLopment has
been very rapid; her gross domestic product grew by weLL over three
times in volume between 1960 and 1979 (TabLe 9.1a).Therate of grqwth
did, however, slow.down distinctLy between the firSt decade, uheh it
aver:aged 7.5 ?( a yea?, and the second, qhen it feLL'back to.4.5 X.
The turning-point between the two periods occurred in 1973 and
1974, after which dearer energy and rawl materja.ts on the one hand, and
keener internationaI competition onthe pther, cnamped the economyrs
growth opportunities more severeLy.
very moderate rise 'in
the norm, partLy as. a
prices. Since thehr doubIe-digit inftatign has become
result of externail causes, but above aLL of domes-
tic factors - the sharp acceLeration in hrage rises and the sweLLing of
the pubLic deficit - rhich, in combinatlion, have magnified the overa[[
effect
?
if?
*
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Growth was accompanied by. important changes in the contribution
made by the various branches of activity to the formation of gross
domestic product (table 9.3). Thus, between 1960 and 1979, the share of
agricutture feLL from 23 7. to 13 Z whiLe the share of manufacturing
industry grew from 1 4 7, to aLmost 22 Z, and the share of industrial
services (water, gas, e[ectricity) from sLightLy over 1 1( to over 3 Z.
The services share, aLready over 50 t in 1960, increased only sLightty
overaLL, but certain branches - transport and communications, the distrib-
utive trades and banking - gained in reLative importance, uhite pubtic
administration, heal.th and education, and housing decLined in varying
deg rees .
The substantiaL industriaL deveLopment during the period was
itsetf accompanied by important'changes within the spread of sectors.
TextiIes, construction materiaIs, the basic metaL industries, and the
chemicaI industry, in part'icuIar, appreciabLy increased in importance,
uhite certain traditionaI industrieg such as the food and clothing
industries, decLined in retative terms.
It is renarkable that the rapid growth of the Last twenty years
uas accompanied by a contraction in the Labour force and in emptoyment
(tabLe g.4>. The tabour force has shrunk by over 10 Z since 1960, as a
resutt of emigration - heavy especiaLLy in the first part of the period
- and of the ftight from farming, the coroltary of which tras a faL[ in
female auxitiary labour. Emptoyment contracted in paraLLeL, but to a
smaIter degree. Consequentty unempIoyment has fatLen steadiLy since
the beginning of the period and nou stands at a very Lou Level (1). The
structure of employnent has aLso been profoundLy modified; the most
spectacutar change has been the decLine from 58 Z to 32 t of the share
of agricultural employment in totaL employment. By contrast, in non-
agricuIturat empIoyment, the proportion of wage and saLary earners grew
(1) The statistics do
young peopte, nor
not' recorded.
not, however, incLude first job seekers - mostLy
the rurat unempLoyed. AIso, short-time rorking is
t
i
I tho
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onLy sIightLy,
a[mbst 30 X ;
in industry and in the
nevertheIess made very
tuenty years.
and the proportion of non-wage and salary earners is sti[L
this shows that the degree of economic concentration
services is stilL Low. Labour productivity has
[arge advances, ihaving gronn by 350 Z in
Growth and the concomitant radicat structuraL changes have
required a very high LeveL of investment. Investment Has in fact remar-
kabty buoyant up to 1974, and resumed its grouth, though at a more
moderate rate, after the falt recorded fn t975 (tabLe 9.1a). Between
?960 and 1979, the capitaL stock increased by a factor of atmost 4, the
coefficients being of the order of 3.3 for buiLdings and 4.7 tor equipment
respectivety (tab[e 9.5). Capitat accumqLation has therefore been
considerabte over the Last twenty years, and this itseLf indicates the
profound change in the economy during ttrie period. NevertheLessT the
accompanying trend l',as ctearl.y for the lrofitabitity of invested cap-
itaL to weaken.
Sharp growth and the capitaL accumuLation which made it pos-
sibLe,rere in their turn targeLy the ."rfrtt of increased foreign }'
trade, another outstanding feature of dbvetopment over the last trlo
.l
decades. Between 1960 and 1979, the share of exports in domestic
product grew from 7 i( to atmost 15 %, an{ tt'e share of imports in the
counterpart of domestic demand grew fromlunder 15 % to aLmost 30 %
(tabte 9.1a).
In the same period, the compositilon of foreign trade
changed profoundty (table 9.6>. Food Oro{ucts and rar materiats, which
originaLLy accounted for almost aLL sxp6pfs of goods, represented no more
than 40 Z at the end of the periodrwith manufactured products making
up the other 60'A. 0n the imports sidp, the share of mineraL fuets
increased sharpLy, in conjunction with the rapid expansion of energy
consumption, whiLe the share of manufactured products llas faLLing
I
I
t6r
+
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as competing nationaL production expanded. ltloreover, exports of
services - transport and tourism - made considerable strides in tjne
with the rapid expansion in trade. ALL in att, the vo[ume of goods
and services exported increased by a fabtor of:6.5 between 1960 and 1979,
and the volume of imports by 5.8 (tabl.e 9'1a) -
Great changes atso occurred in the pattern of trade f[ows,
particularl,y in the Latter part of the period when the growing weight
of imports from the oiI and rar+ materiats producing countries brought,
in return, a significant expansion of exports to those countries. The
Community countries nevertheLess remain by far the main outLet fon
exports, continUing to absorb aLmost 50 Z. Thei r share in imports has,
by contrast, appreciabty decLined from over 50 Z in the first haLf of
the period to under 40 Z in the tast few years (tabLe 9.6il.
Despite the very rapid expansion of exports of services and
emigrantst remittances, the current balance has, throughout the period,
continuaILy recorded a heavy deficit (table 9.7). A significant propor-
tion of this deficit was covered by Long-term movements of cap'itaL,
connected either uith the establi shment of foreign f i rms, or r'li th
property investments made by nationats using funds hetd abroad. Another
item was the short-term borrowing of banks abroad, t,lhich has become
more significant, particuLarLy, in the Latter years of the period.
The considerabLe improvement in productivity fol.Lowing on the
economyrs deveLopment and modernization was refLected in a sharp rise
in Living standards (tabLe 9.2>. ReLated to the number of inhabitants,
consumption grew by 279 y, between 1960 and 1979. It is stiLL weLL
below the average consumption [eve[ of the Nine, but has moved apprec-
iabLy.cLoser to it, having cLimbed from one-third to one-ha[f of the
t
f,
i"
I
i
l
-.ti::'-.,! i 
_,
/bz
teve[ in tuenty years. The pattern ofi consumption has a[so changed,
l
with the weight of expenditure on basiic necessities (food, cLothing,
housing) faLLing sLow[y, in favour of expenditure on heaLth and
personaL care, comfort and entertainmeht (TabLe 9.8).
The tast twenty years have been marked, finaLLy, bY a consi-
derab[e expansion in the use of resources by the pubLic sector (TabLe g.9).
Measured as a percentage of grOss domeStic product, the sum of general
government current expenditure and cap.itaI expenditure by the pubLic
sector, enterprises inctuded, rose fron 23 % to 35 %.between 1960 and
1979. This sharp reLative increase b,aF produced by cgrr:ent expendi-
ture, and in particuLar transfers to househotds, reflecting the redis-
tributive activities of centrat government and the sociaI security
funds, since the increase in pubIic sector irivestment was, in contrast,
Less than proportionate.. A.paratLeL fiature t.las the increase, but to a
smaLLer extent, in the overalL tax burden, especiaLty at the end of the
period when heavy deficits appeared.
The economi c i Li cations of accessi to the Eur
Greece has been associated wittt the Eulopean Economic Community
since 1 January 1962 and witL become a itutt nember of the European
Communities on 1 January.19S1. This ye4r wiIt therefore see the
acceLeration of an adjustment process, ltogether trith the stat"t of a
more active participation in an economiic grouping LargeLy open to the
outside world, and subject to the hazarbs and dangers, as r,leIt-as
the benefits, of competition and the inlternationat division of tabour.
The adjustment ulitL'be facititated by ai tive-year transitionat period
for the generaL system, extended to seven years fon certain agricuL-
tural products and thE fuLL introductiofr of the free movement of
workers
The changes to be expected fromlaccession are atI the greater
since, despite the significant progres'slmade in modernization over
the Last twenty years, the gtruc,tures of tt" economy dispLay the
. 
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features of the agricuLturaL sectorrs stiLt over-dominant posit'ion,
the industriaL and commerciaL Sectors' Low degree of concentration
and spec'iaLizat'ion, heavy externaL protection and a financiaL sys-
tem governed by tight regutations which impede, in particuLar, the
free determination of the exchange rate and of interest rates.
Ibg-!iEgre!i.se!iel-gl-!rede-e!g-!!s-eqigs!se!!-sI-predss!ie!-e!rse!srss
Trade wilL have to be comptete[y LiberaLized after five years,
i.e. by 1 January 1986. This means, for industriaL products, aIign-
ment on the common'externat tariff and the eIimination of customs
duties on products imported from the other member countries (1), and'
for agricuLturaI products, a graduaL narrow'ing of the gap with Commun-
ity prices by means of a speciaL system of compensatory amounts-
LiberaLization wi [[ Probabl-Y
in production structures since theSe
necessari Ly compLementary to, those
requj re a "substantiaI adjustment
are \,ery different f rom, and not
in the rest of the Community.
t The position in the national economy of manufacturing industry,
i'n particuIar, is stiLL modest (2) and,aLthough its share in the export
trade has greatty increased to reach some two-thirds of the totaI
. today (3), the type of product is not very soph'isticated and has up
to now enjoyed a degree of protection high enough,to ensure [arge
. domestjc markets (4); During the'phase of association with the
Community, customs protection vis-i-vis the partner countries was
phased out for roughLy three-quarters of industriaL imports, but
retained for "sensitive" products. The end'ing of this protection,
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
At a rate of 10 % per annum for each of
2Q % fcir each of the folLowing years
See above, TabLe 9.3
See above, Table 9.6
15.8 % on average on raw materiaLs, 24 t
and 32.9 il on manufactured products, lwith
"sensitive" products on which the duties(and even 80 Z in the case of beverages).
the fi rst tt.lo years and
on semi-finished products
the exception of
can be as high as 60 %
i
I t";1
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planned for 1984, uiLf mean that a lood many firms without ejther
a degree of speciatization, or a tephnoLogy, or sufficient financiaL
resources riLL have to make a substpntial effort to adjust to the
competition of both the highty indulit.i"l.ized community countries
and the many deveLopings countries with competitive technotogies and
Low labour costs. The probLems deserve atL the more attention as
accession to the Community couLd we[L push up ],,age costs, yhich
have remained retativeLy [ow so far, without immediateLy improving
skiILs and productivity. It is to.Qe hoped, in any event, that the
industriaL fabric wiLL be rapidty reinforced by investment from the
western economies : this is LikeLy fo be stimuLat'ed by the tiberaL-
ization of current payments (1).
Agrrgs!!gre! ,9o:lggilr-P.ri*:
The productivity of agricuIture, uhich stiLL contributes
14 Y. of the domestic product and Loys 32'% of the tabour
force, is much Lower than in the re$t of the Community.. For mos.t
types of produce, the two agricuLturaL systems are nevertheLess
comp[ementary, in that Greece produ{es a surptus in fruit,and vege-
tabLes, tobacco, cotton and oLeaginifus pLants and has a deficit in
certain cereats, mi tk products and nireat. The Nine at present absorb
some 55 % of Greecers agriculturaL dxports and provides so.ne 25% of its
imports,. .ALL in a[1, the guarantee{ prices mechanism which appties
to beef and pi gmeat, mi Lk products, i .u."" Ls 'and sugar, wi r. L concern
on[y some 4o /. of production, compared with 70 % tor the rest of the
bommunity. Because of the regulatidn of prices, an,increase must
be expected interalia in the priceslof durum wheat, olive oiL and
tobacco, which shoul.d stimuLate production, but a faLL in meat(in particutar pigmeat) and miLk prqduction, owing to the higher
cost of animat feedingstuffs. 
.
I
I
?
(1) See betow
tL{9.8
+
3
Expo'rts of fruit and vegetabLes, tobacco, oLive oi L and wine
to the Nine cou[d weLL incnease rapidLy, whiLe meat and miLk pro-
ducts from the Nine couLd find growing markets in Greece. The
refund mechanism wiLL aLso encourage the expansion of exports'
outside the CommunitY.
A seven-yeaItransitionaL period has been set for customs
duties and prices. The gap between Greek prices and Community
prices wiLl be closed by a system of speciaL compensatory amounts.
There wiIL be a phasing-in of production aid (for oLive o'iL, durum
wheat and certain processed fruit and vegetabIes) and deficiency
payments (cotton, figs and dried grapes). Lastty, certain nationat
a'ids wi LL graduaLty be dismantLed-,
I!s-!tEsIe!ize!iel-sI-1eg!els-el-Pledgs,!ign"-!he-rglele!ien- g j
i$benge-gs!elIsi.!te-s!d-seluibstie!!-!e-!!e-!e!enss-el-pexse$:
At the same time as obstacLes to the movement of industriaL
and agricuLturaL products are eLiminated, integrat'ion into the
Community wi LL bring graduaL. tiberatization of the factors of pro-
duct i on.
The f ree movement of r"rorkers wi L I be achieved onLy gradualLy,
over a seven-year transitionaL period. The free movement of capitat,
by contrast, shouLd be accompIished as earty as 1 January 1981 and
- with only a few exceptions (1) - shouLd cover initial fLows as welt
repatriations and current transfers.
The free movement of workers shouLd not bring any substantiaL
upturn in emigration, since the expected expansion of.the Greek eco-
nomy duling the transitionaI period shoutd continue to work towards
the narrowing of paY differences-
(1) Direct investment in the EEC
investments made before 1975
and transfers of the Y'ieLd from
are excepted for another few years-
I
/,a:b 9.'9
It is more ditficult, however, ho grasp the consequences of
measures to tiberaLize movements of'..pitat. In ,the medium term,
they are,L:ikeLy to encourage the growthiof foreign investment.
But, initiaLLy, they are LiabLe to haver certa'in disruptive effects
onshort-termmoVements,sincetheywiL|.beaccompaniedbythe
abotition of the particuLarLy restrictive controLs in force hitherto
on exchange rates and interest rates. It is therefore impossibLe to
foresee how Operators tdiIL react to suclh nrajor changes. However,
their effect wjLL probab[y be very Iimited on emigrantsr remittances,
which have remained at rough[y the same LeveL for severaI years mainLy
because of the targe-scate unemptoyment:prevaiLing in the host coun-'
Itries. Furthermore, the mobi L'ization of f'oreign exchange reserves
and the management of interest rates shouLd enabte the monetary
authorities - in the framework of-the ciose monetary cooperation which
has been estabLished between Hember States - to Limit the sca[e of the
I
possibLe disruptions on the foreign excliange market and to stabi[ize the
exchange rate at the Levet they deem aOJropriate.
By contrast, greater certainty is possibLe in eva[uating
the favourabLe consequences for the baL{nce of payments of the action
of the current transfers resuLting fr:omiaccession itsetf.- Assuming
no,change in Community poLicies, GreecelwouLd receive from the Commu-
265 m j Ltion EuA, 165 mi tt'ion of which
wouLd be in respect of the EAGGF Guaranliee Section, and thiq amount should
increase sharpLy to reach 775 niLLion EtA in 1985. Taking account
i
of tfe payments which Greece would haveito make in return - obrn resour-
ces and participation in the operating expenses of the institutions -
the credit batance, negtigibLe in the tirst year' should grow rapideLy
to reach 475 mi tl"ion EUA in 1985. 
I
''
The economic situation - the short and dium-term outtook
Si nce
whi ch economic
increasing by
mid-1'979, the
activity has
6.2 "l in 1978,
Greek econoniil has entered a phase in
stowed down land even contracted. After
gross domesltic product .grew by onLy
?
l679.10
q
r
3.9 % in 1979, the drop in agricuLturat production ontf partLy
expLaining th'is faLL-off. Despite the better resuLts expected from
this sector, zero,- or even sLightLy negative - growth couLd be
recorded in 1980.
Indeed, the index of industriaL product'ion, seasonaLLy adjusted,
has decLined continuousLy since the third quarter of 1979 (See below).
' This deveLopment is primariLy due to the definite change of trend
in private consumption whi chr. after jncreasing sharpLy in 1978, stayed at vi rtua[-
[y the same tevet in 1 979, as a result of a slower rise in disposable
income, a sharp acceLeration in the upward movement of prices and the
introduction of a speciaL vehicLe tax. Exports, ,for their part, rose
far Less vigorous[y than in 1978. Jhe trend of fixed investment was, by
contrast, favourabLe, not onLy in housing, but in industry, which
recorded a distinct upturn in equipment expenditure by the manufactur-
ing sector, which has been on a marke.d downward trend since 1974. For 1980,
the persistence of factors serving to depress private consumption, the
weaker buoyancy of exports and the expected drop in investment point,
aLL in aLL, to a faLL-off in overaLL demand.
The appreciable sLouiloun of econom'ic activity has had no
imnediate negative effects on empLoyment. Thanks to the services
sector, non-agricu[turaL empLoyment in 1979 actuaILy recorded parti-
cu[arLy sharp growth. At the beginning of 1980, the number of regis-
tered unemployed was onLy 41 000, or sLightLy over 3 % of the urban
and semi-urban popuLation. The empLoyment situation has, however,
been deteriorating since the end of 1g7g.
t
;/ {?6
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deveIopment of industriaLQuarterI Sroduction and consumer prices
I
Percientage change,
(1 978-80)
at an annuat rate
1978 1979 1 980
II III IV II III IIIV
Industiiat productiqn
4.1 1?.2 -5.9 -1.? -6.64.4
11.2
8.?
19.s
4.5 17.9
19.3
r prl cesConsum
28.7
Since the beginning
worsening in its structuraL
sharpLy at the same time as
uas widening rapidIy.
23.1 11-4 30.2 31.1 31.1
economy has seen a sudden
itrice rises. acceLerated
batance of payments deficit
I
i
lof 1979, the
I
imbatancef..
the currerfrt
The spurt in infLation uas paftLy due to extdrnaL'causes :
higher prices for oiL and raw materiat,s and, in the early months of
IgSOt a falL in the exchange rate. But domestic causes were even more
to bLame: agricuLturaL and food prices trere detiberateLy raised with
the a'im of beginnjng to aLign them wi{n community prices and reducing
the weight of budget subsid'ies; *o." ii,nportantLy, production capa-
cities were subject to increasingLy acute strains as a resuLt of the
contrast between a nominal demand fueriteo by several years of sharp
rises in incomes and the definite s[oilpoun, from 1g74, in productive
'
capitaL f ormation. AL L these f actors lcomb'inbd to produce a very sharp
acceteration in consumer prices, which wiLL have risen by 18 % in
Y.
1979 and 26 % in 1980.
h
;.1i.,:-
/61
ry
9.1?
.
The c.urrent account deficit, after falling in 1978 to 3 %
of gross domestic product, increased again sharpLy 'in 1g7g, reaching
aLmost 5 %. As we[L as the deterioration in the reaL trade baLance,
the terms of trade worsened considerabty. ALthough it had increased
substantiaLLy, the surp[us on invisibLes i n 1979 covered onty 63 7,
of the trade deficit, compared with 71 % in 1978. Thus the proport.ion
of the current deficit which had to be financed by short-term borrow-
ing was again Larger. The situatfon b,orsened further in the first
hatf of 1980, mainty because of the fall in the exchange rate, but
aLso because exports stowed appreciabty. The surptus on invisibtes
and on tong-term capitat movements aLso shrank, mainfy au" to specu-
Lation against the drachma : the effective exchange rate, after
decLining 6 i4'tn 1979, feLL further in the earty months of 1980.
The heavier infLationary pressures and the faster deteriora-
tion of the balance of payments necessitated appreciabLy tougher
budgetary and monetary policies in 1980. The 198Q budget plans to cut
the pubLic sector deficit by one percentage point of gross domestic
product, by drasticaLLy reducing the rate of increase of expenditure
on aLI items which can be squeezed, but especjatl.y of investment, The
decision has also been taken to bring the rate of increase of bank
Lending to the private sector down f rom 19 % to 13 "A, but this Limi.t
witt most certainLy be exceeded, since it was consistent with an
anticipated rate of infLation we(L below the one actuatLy recorded.
*
t
l7D 6.la
The economic outLook for the whole of 1980 can now be
discerned fair[y ctearty. It is given in the tabLe betow rrhich
shows that final domestic demand wiLL probabLy dectine by 1 1/? /., but
that the increase in stocks, and in particuLar the improvement in
the externaI baLance in reaL.terms, shoqLd offset this decLine and
should keep gross domestic product at it,s 1979 LeveL. The current
deficit in cash terms shoutd nevertheLess reach USD 2 500 mittion
compared with USD 1 750 mi (l.ion in 1g7g.
Short-term trend, and economic outLook (1079-1981)+
Fercentage changes in voIume
,1979
Oqtturn
1980 1981
Forecast '(1) Out Look (1)
Private consumptioh ...............,
Pubtic consumption .....,...........
Gross fixed capita[ formation .r....
FinaL domestic demand ......r.......
Stockbui Lding .................
TotaL domestic demand .........
Exports ..... ....r .......
Imports ............... ..rrr.r.
Externat batance .. r.......... r.....
Gross domestic product ......
For reference
Fi',;Fconrrrmption def Lator .,... r.
1
3
3
?
i
i+3
l+5
i+3
t5
r2
l+5
t+6
+lr1
li
+i 4
I
+18
1t2
1/2
1t2
1t?
-2
-33t4
-43t4
- 1 1t?
+ 1t4
- 1t1t4
+3314
- 1 1t4
+ 1 114
0
+26
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
1/?
1t2
1 1t?
4 112
2 1t?
3t4
? 1t4
+2O
(1) Commission staff estimate
The outlook for 1981 \s stitL veryluncertain, The expected
upturn in worLd demand and the depreciation of the drachma wiIL proba-
bty secure a further improvement in the external batance in reaL terms.
Furthermore, if budgetary and monetary pot{.y stay.on their present
9.14
course and if the exchange rate can be maintained, the inflation rate
shouLd sLow down, provid'ing there are no net{ and substantiaL
oi L price increases.
This could bring a moderate upturn in prjvate consumption, |f,
as is probab[e, personaI d'isposabLe incomes 'increase jn Line with
prices and if t'he personaL saving ratio continties to.faLL sLightLy.
LastIy, the future trend of investment is unctear. It wiIt be stimutated
neitherby budgetary or monetary poLicy, norby the immediate prospects
for demand. But it couLd benefit from the improvement in
companiesr financial- situation and from a resumption of capitaL move-
ments from abroad, which might occur as a resuLt of the stabiLization of
the exchange rate and the prospects opened up by entry into the European
Community. Under this set of reLativeLyoptimistic assumptions, domestic
demand wouLd recover by some 2 7. in 1981 and gross domestic product
increase by sIightty more. Consumer price infLation wouLdbe brought down
to 20 %, .on an annuat average, and the current def icit in cash terms
shouLd stabiLize at its 1980 LeveL. The upturn in production wouLd
not, houever, prevent a deterioration in the empLoyment situation.
In'the Longer term, the economyts growth prospects are governed
by the need for a sharp cut in the current deficit and a rapid Lowering
of 'the inf Iation rate. The prospective deveLoPment of worLd demand wo.r td
not seem to pecmit exports to grow by more than 8 % per annum.
ConsequentLy, in order tg keep import growth weLL below this figure,
gross domestic product wiLL not, for severat years, be able to increase
by more than 3 7, and domestic demand by more than 2 to 2 1 t2 %. The
possibiLities for increases 'in private consumption wiLL be even more
limited, since a proportionateLy much Larger share of this margin wi Lt
have to be reserved for investment, mainLy so that the economy can
17(
*
?
t
,'l fr"v
adapt to the new internatjonaL context.
atigned with the average rate prevai Iing in tradingpartner countries as quickl.y
as possib[e if sufficieht stabiLity in tfre exchange rate is to enabte
this outlook ]to become a reaLity. This iisrconditionaL upon a rigorous
monetary pgticy, but the main factor in praduaLty reducing domestic
borrouing so as to sLor.r down the rate ofi money creation must be the
squeezing of the public deficit.
9.1 5
The inftation rate must be
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WhiLe the 1979180 oiL price shock (measu
of magnitude as that of 197.3174r,the totaI
due to the Lower price increases for other
rate devetopments : much smaLLer than the
As a rbsuLt mainty of a Lower degree of ab
growth of ,imports to many deve[op'ing count
external demand is, on the other hand, on[
deterioration of the Communityrs compet'ive
market shares. The decline'in output, whic
1980, shoutd come to an end in earLy 1981
in activity in response to a renewed incre
tory formation. The Community shouLd res
si fying energy poI i cy, investment i ncent i v
the. growth potentiaL without relaxing thepoticy. A certain increase in the budget de
the operation of automati c fi scal .stabi Iize
t i ve measures.
'10;1
tions
in do[Lars) is of the same order
externaL price shock of 1979180 is -
mmodities and offsetting exchange
which hit the Community in 1974.
nbtjon by 0PEC countries and sLow
ies in baLance of payments difficuLties
rising sLowly in 1980/81 and the
osition may be fett in a Loss of
started in:lhe second quarter of
be foLLowed by a gradual upturn
of private consumption and inven-
to the oit price shock by inten-
and other measures aimed at increasing
eraI L restri ctive stance of budgetary
icit in 1981 is unavoidabLe due to
s and shou[d not be offset by restric-
en ces
price rise has been of simi[ar
in fact somewhat Larger in
.3E
The external rice shock and its conse
As shown in Chapter 1, the oiI import
order of magnitude in 1979/8O as in 1973/74
constant pri ce doL Lars. Moreover, because t
probabLy going to be Lower now than after :t
cause of a different evolution of the world
npact of the new oiL shockmacro-economi c ir
stronger of the two. But there are other si
the two episodes
e rate of OPEC absorpt
e first oiL shock, and
terms of trade, the initiaL
s indeed probabLy the
nificant d'ifferences between
ion is
be-
semi-fini shed
terms of tnade
The
demand and
1973/74 oi L pri ce rjse took p[ace
boom'ing conditions, notabLy in r
products, which contributed s
for" the Community in 1973
shock was fotLowed by a rise in the vaLue o
munity entai Led a suppLementary increase in
nationaL currencjes. This time prices of
have risen much Less in dolLar terms and ex
have 6n the whole r"lorked so as to dampen th
in a situation with excess
w rnateriaL markets and many
rongLy to the deterioration of
,1974. In addition, the first oi t
'the doItar which for the Com-
impont prices measuned in
-oi L 'imports to the Cornmunity
hange rate deveLopments in 1980.
import pri ce increase even
h
10,z "' {tF
t? frrther when measured in nationaL currencies. The totaL externaL price
'shock to the Community, as measured by the reaL income Loss resu[ting
from a tenms of trade deteriloration is therefore in 1979/80 less than
haLf as large as in 1973/74
This [ess bad terms of trade deterioration for the Community is
not incons'istent, however, with the.oroposition that thd overalt weaken-
ing in effective externaI demand nay be greater, ]n addition to the
Li'keLihood of a weaker spending of their increased income by oiL-ex-
porters, the weaker increases of non-oiL commodity prices puts many
deveLoping countries in a more difficuLt situation. The oiL price
increases have aLso coincided with the onset of cycLicaL down-turns in
some major economies prompted by other factors (the United States, and,
tdithinthe bmmunityrthe United Kingdom). FinaLty, stnce 1973 the Commu-
nity's competitive position has been espjousLy eroded by a combination
of high domestic cost increases and exchange rate appreciation. The
deftationar:y impact of the oi,I price increase and restrictive poLicies
may therefore, fOr the Community, be aggravated by a [oss of market
shares both in domestic and in export mdrkets, In 1980 there h,ere cLear
signs of Loss of market shares for the Communityrs automobiLe industry
lbut a[so other branches - where statistics on sates are Less read'iLy
'avaiLabLe 
- seemed to be experiencing simiLar conditions.
On the other hand (as discussed in greater detaiL in Chapters 2
and 4) the private sectorts reactions to the changes in macro-economic
conditions in 1980/81 may not be the same as in 1974/75; domestic
demand in the Community naY' in particu[ar, not falL as markedly as in
1g?4/?5. The cash fLows of enterprises have not deteriorated as drasti-
caLLy as in 1974. Moreover, in'Line with potic'ies, the rise in energy
prices has this time been shifted more readiLy into retaiL prices and
the financ'iaL position of the enterprise sector has atso in this way
been protected better than in 1974. Despite an increase since 197pr
partLy cycLicaLLy determined, the borrowing requirement of the
enterpr i se se ctor i s est i mated . **'"- " )
$
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to be smaLLelin 1980 than in 1974/19V5.Indeed, investment intentions
'I
in manufacturing rema'ined reLativeLy puoyant at Least.up to the spring
Iof 1980. Rapidly rising'import penetrbtion and difficuIties in export
i
markets, may, however, in the course pf 1980 have put a strohger-than-
expecte<J pressure on profit margins wfricfr if'continued wguLd not faiL
'I
to weaken the financial position of kby bnanches; This probtem appears
to be particutarLy press'ing in the Unjted Kingdom but is to some extent
aLso feLt in ItaLy.
Ag'ainst th'is background the saving/expenditure behaviour of
the. househoLd sector in, 1980 anC 198:l lappears to bq,o! criticaL ipponr
tance for the everaLl trend.in demand{ In retrospect 'it is seen that
one of the f actors whi ch in 1974 anri 11975 contributed to the sLowdown
I
in activity sras an increase in the sarlings ratio of hoqsehoLds. There
is probably no s'impLe expLanation for itnis incnease in the savings
ratio in 1974/1975 but econometric ev'i1rlence (1) as t"reLL as the ana-
Lysis in Chapter 4 above wouLrl seem aol runnurt that the accet'eration
ot.'rntLat'lon may be one of the main expLanatory factors. Ris'ing unem-
i
p[oyment and uncertainty about economiI Rrosoects may aLso have Led to
Ih'igher precaut'ionany, savihgs
*.
,qEi-,
tri
(1 ) See e.g.
Europe6n
l'The i mBa ct
Economy No
of infLat,ion
5, March 1980.
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Y WorLd trade: trends and Prospects
The growth of wbrLd trade, estimated at 6.6% in reat terms for
1979 over 1978 is LikeLy to have dropped to ?r7'/. in 1980 and is forecast
atsom€ lrg%in 1981. Foreign trade of the major country groupings, how-
ever, foL[ows highIy divergent patterns. Imports to the OPEC countries,
which decLined sharpLy in 1979 as a consequence mainly of the events in
Iran, have expanded strongLy ( probably some 20% \n reat terms) in 1980
and should rise considerabLy (157) atso in 1981. Non-oiI devetoping
countr.ies, on the other hand, which expanded their imports substantiatly
Q.5% in reaL terms) in 1979, are now facing increasing baLance of payments
difficulties due to the sharp rise in their oiL biLL and sLow growth of:
their exports to the industriaLised countries.and may be forced to cut
down on imports. The growth of their voLume'imports js estimated at some
4% in 1980 but may drop to onty 1.57.-in 1981. Imports to the industria-
[jsect countries, on the other hand, as a resutt notabLy of a marked
decIine in irnports to the united states, lanada and Japan, l:, l:::tt
show any votume increase in 1980 and may stagnate aLso in 1981. Atlhough
non-oiL imports are LikeLy to rise somewhat faster than oiL imports,
the indust'rial.ised countrjes,r, 
" 
group wilL thus in 1980 and 1981 pro-
vide onLy weak impulses to activity in the rest of the worLd; and both
the non-oiL LDCta and the centraL[y pLanned economies wiLt suffer from
a sLow growth of exPort markets.
With,in the oECD area trends in the main economies have in 1980 fol-
towed roughLy the same pattern' aLbeit with dif ferent ampL;r'tude ' Gross
I quarter of 1980 in thedomest'ic product in neaL terms feLl in the secon(
United States (as in the tommunity (see beLow) and gnowth may onLy resume
towards the end of the year or in 1981 in both cases.
The surpLus on the current account of the balance of payments of the
gpEC countries .is bxpectec] to reach 119O0OmiLL'ion doLLars in 1980 (after
6g 000 mj LLion in,1 979) and to faLL onLy sLightLy (to 110 000 mi LLion doLLars) in
1gg1.The combineddef jcjt of the OECD couritries may rise from347A0 miLLion
I
:JI
I
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doLLars in 1979 to 8/r 300 million in 1980 Hut is forecast to decline to
some 65 300 miLLion in 1981. The current adcount of the United States i.s
i
expected to show a smatL surpLus in 1980 afd 1981 whereas the Community.
may account for cLose to haLf the totaL 0EpD deficit and the smatLer (non-EC)
OECD countries for some 3A/. ln 1980 and asi mruch as 407t in 1981. Despite
sLow growth of totaI jmports in voLume terifrs the current account deficit
of the non-oiI exporting deveLop'ing count.h"t is forecast to rise from
43 000 mill.ion do[tars in 1979 to 60 000 r,f tiion in 1gg0 anO may rise to
65 000 mi Ltion in 1981. The deficit of the centraLLy pLanned economies i's expected
toremainLittLechangedatl6500milLionaoUltarsinlgS0andlS000miLLionin 1981 .
tLook for the
FoLLowing a reLativeLy buoyant deve'L t 'in f ate 1979 and in the
first quarter of 1980 reaL gross domest,ic
in the second quarter of the year and is e
in the third quarter. For '1980 on average
!o show a rise ol 1,3%. The cycLicaL s[ wn is attributable in the finst
instance to a decLine in prjvate consumpt'i
income of househoLds whi ch started to f al l,
reflecting trends in disposabLe
in Late 1979; in the first
period of acljustment househotds seem to halve reacted by a reduction in
I
the savings ratio, but in the course of 19p0 the LeveL of expenditure
was adaptiid. to the tower income IargeLr refuLting in'a sharP decIine of
consumer demand in real terms 
I
I
I
.l
DeveLopments in 1981 wi L l" be determifred by a range of f actors many
..1of which are subject to important poli.y dFcisions stilI under preparation.
Moreover', certain criti caL assumpt'ions conicerning the pattern of reaction
of househoLds and enterprises to some extelnt depend on conjectures and
I
interpretation of quaLitative information jon attitudes and opinions. The
current Ly avai LabLe data wouLd suggest thajt the expans'ionary forces
may regain a certain strength in the coursle of 1981. Private consumption,
in particuLar, after a probabLe falL 'in tfje second haLf of 1980, ttn. O:.
expected to recover as the. growth of reaL ld'isOosabLe income of househoLdsis t jkeLy to resume in the f irst haLf of r,{ext fear. Moreover, in sharp
contrast to 1975 deveLopments, househotOs lare not expected to step up their
I
acquisition of financiaL assets in the co{ing phase of cycLical deveLop-
ments: the savings ratio of househotrJs'is 
ltorecast 
to rise onIy moderate[y
I
I
I
oduct of the Community feLt
timated to have decLined aLso
is nevertheLess estimated
',..;.
Wq
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in 1981, remaining approximateLy on the LeveL of'1977-?9. F,ixed investment,
after a decLine in the second haLf of 1980 andthe first haLfof 1981 isaLso
expected to provide a modest support to activity as from the second haLf of '198'l,
Investment intentions in industry remained buoyant up to May f980 and the financiaL
sjtuation of the enterpnise sector as a whoIe had kept reLativeLy heaLthy. Thene
is as of yet no reason to expect anything LJke the coLLapse of business
investment which was a major factor behind the 1974-75 recession. As
normaL in a period of cycLicaL sLowcjown the cash fLow deterioration wiLL
be refLected in a decLine in inventory formation: this process shouLd
come to an end in the course of 1981 and stockbuiLding may by the second
half of the year provide a smalL stimuLus to activity.
This outLook for private sector demand would seem LikeLy to be
reaLised without any major change in economic poL'icy and/or shift in public
sector spending programmes. PubLi c consumption is forecast to rise onLy
moderateLy (13% in reaL terms) anrJ pubLic investment may actuaH.y faLL
in voLume terms. Given, however, the temporary sLowrJown in the growth
of income and expenditure in the private sector, the rise in tax rece'ipts
(net of transfer payments) wiLL in 1981 faLL somewhat behind the rise in
pubLic expenditure resul-ting in a certain rise in the budget deficii in
proportion. to GDP f rom 3r5% in 1980 to 3r?'A in 1981 . Even with unchanged
generaL orientation of budgetary poL'icy, the automatic budget reactions
wiLL thus contribute to sustain'ing the growth of activity in 1981.
As,indicated above, worLd trade, aften stagnation in most of 1980,
is expecte'd to ."rrme growth in the first hatf of'1981, with notabLy
a rise in imports to North America and Japan, folLow'ing the marked decLine
in 1980. Exports to the non-oil LDCrs may rise on[y s[ow[y white exports
to the 0PEC countries shouLd be a factor of buoyancy for the Community. A
key issue is, however, whether the Communityrs industry is in a position
to maintain i!s'shares in domestic and foreign markets or whether the
marked toss in price competitiveness since earty 1979 witI exert a negative
infLuence on the sates performance notabLy in comparison with Japan wh'ich,
debpite the recent strength of the yen, has gained a sharp competitive
edge over the Community. Against this background exports from the Com-
orunity to the rest of the wortd may not rise as fast as the increase in
markets (excLuding imports of oiL) although some acceLeration is LikeLy
to take pLace in the course of next year.0n'average for the'yeair 1981
tr
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exports of goods (includ'ing intra-trade) {re expected to rise by .119%
iin voLum,e terms after a.rise of 3.5%'in 1{SO. Imports, on the other hand,
ri
aften a decline in volume terms in the sedond half of 1980 refLectinq
- I '- "-
mainLy the faLL in inventory format'ion, shouLd resume growth in the
courSeof1981.Al.thoughtheriseinirnpor,itpricesisexpectedto'dece-
Lerate the current acqount of the batance lof payments, which is expected
l
to 'improve between the f irst and'the seconid haLf of 1980, nay therefore
see onLy timited further improvement in 19b1. For the year as a whoLe'the
deficit may amount to some 25 500 miLLion Fcu (36 200 mitLion dollan,s), ,
corresponding to approximateLy 1.2% of the Communityts GDp.
IThe rise in consumer prices is Liket[ to stow down more rapidLy
than in 1974/75 as domestic cost increasesl r,ru" been kept in check more
successf uI Ly since the second oi L pni ce sfrpct<. Part of the reqent pri ce
dece Lerat ion nay, however, 
,be att ributabte, to a narrow'ing of prof it margins
due to st'iffer competjtion from abroad. Thp degree of divergence of price
performance is LikeLy to 
.f aL L somewhat f rorfn the necord-h'ieh f igure of 1980;
the difference between the h'ighest and the Lowest rate of increase in the
deftator of pr''ivate consumpt'ion is expect"f to faIL from about 15 percen-
tage points in 1980 toabout 11'points in ltaf. NevertheLess, even in 1981
the rate of inflation in the community wirf, at 9.7% be more than twice
ashi9hasintheperiod1960/73with,in{ar,ticuLar,amuchh.igherdif-
ference in performance between Member Stat$s, The GDP deflator and unit
tabour costs, which are more reLiab[e indj{ators of the under[ying rate
of inflation, and which showed a smaLter aciceLeration in 1980, may onty
stow down moderate[y in 1981.
,l
I
,h|ithonLys|.owgrowthinact.ivityinitpaoand1981.emp|oymentmay
show onty LittLe increa,se.in the former yearl and a faLL in the Iatter. The
Labour force of the. Commgnity'is, on the otiher hand, IikeLy to expand
reLat'iveLy fast - ma'inly f o.r demographi c ,"l"ron.. in 1981 it wi L L therefore
be particularLy djfficuLt to pnovide jobs tjor those who join the [abour
I
market for the fjrst time or after a certa'iln pause.0n average for the
I
year the rate of unemployment is forecast tp reach 6.8% of the Labour
Iforce and couLd by the end of the year be elen higher:.
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.f PoLicy 'i-ssugs for the Community
In view of the unsatisfactory'prospects for output and unempLoyment
and the forecast of a deceleration in the inftation rate is there any
room for a Loosening of either monetary or budgetary poticies? There is
tittte doubt that the rather t'i9ht monetany condi'tions of the recent
past have, in conjunction with domestic cost deveLopments, had an
jnitiaLLy depressing effect on activity in the Community, both thnough
h.igher interest rates and through exchange-rate movements (for the Com-
mun'ity as a whoLe and, more acuteLy, for certain Member States). However,
given the imneratj's ef re"tuc;ng the'atc of inflation in orcJer to restore
a pLatf orm f or stabi lity and medium-term grot^rth, the argument for main-
taining the present stance of monetary policies is a strong one. To
abandon this wouLd threaten not onLy to prevent a reduction of the average
inflation rate in the Community but aLso to funther wiclen d'ivergences arid
to enclanger the stabitity of the EMS. Further, the greater wiLlingness of
the private sector/ as compared with 1974/75, to.reduce (dr a Least not to
increase) their rate of accumuLation of financiaL assets may be Linked to
a reduc.ed degree of uncertainty anrl an increased r:legree of confidence
about meclium-tenm stabi Lity; this deveLopment itseLf is very LikeLy to
l.ave been infLuenced by the evident determination of the authorities in|l
Member States.to avoid feerling an infLationary spiraLr
In addition, there are severaL constra'ints upon the use of budgetary
reLaxation aimed at eLiminat'ing or Limiting the recess'ion uncler the present
circumstances. First, to.the extent that the recession in the Community
is c1ue to the impact on activitv anrt'world trar^te of the restrictive
monetary and fiscaL poLicies in non-EC countries' discretionary budgetary
measures a'imed at offsetting such an jmpact cannot'be taken in the Com-
munity without Leading to an additionaL increase in the current baLance of
payment def ic'it. Second, a pa'rt of the recession is attributabLe not to a shortfaLL
t
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Iin demand but to a Loss of markets to [on-EC exporters. In this case
stimuLatory measures would tend to Leai< heavj Ly jnto 'imports. Moreover,
Idue to the high marginaI import propenlsity the impact on activity wouLd
i
be smalt and the toss of fiscal revenub too large to.be acceptabie.
In both cases, even if the authoritiesi were prepared to accept the
h'igher budget def i cits an.l the deteriorration of the batance of payments,
I
the chances are that the arlditionaL boirrowing requirements woul.d be covereri
onIy at increased rat.es of interest. 
I
I
, Thus, the'conditions for discretiionary budget action (which in some
countries, of course, rntouLd mean a slolwing of the rate of reduction of
Ipersistent and unacceptabLy Iarge pubtlic sectol' deficits) in nesponse
to the initial oiL-shock are not favoulrabLe. T[er"e might, however, stjtl
I
be a roLe for budgetary poLicy'in offsiett'ing the worsening of the reces-
sion wh.ich might resuLt f rom private slector attempts to buifd upr the'ir
explained above, the present forecastsl of the Commission do not envisage
such a reaction on the part of the prilvate sector within the Community
as a whole, for reasons set out in Chqlpter,l and 4. The possibiLity
of a centa'in stepping up of private selctor financiaL asset accumuLation,
however; cannot be ruLed out and it maly be appropriate tO cons'i{er the
policy options of the Community under^ lthis assumptjon
There 'is onLy Littte informationl avai LabLe on short-term deveLop-
ments in househoLd incomes and expendilture in the Community and..jt 'is
therefore impossibLe at present to prolvide more than quaLified guesses
with respect to the current situation fin this fieLd. Accordinsto the survey of consumet opinion madej in tlar 1980 (1) the faLL in con-
sumer confidence between May 1 979 and llunru.r 1980 had been brought to
I
a hatt: consumers in May 1980 on the t^lhoLe did not Expect their finan-
ciaL situation to deteriorate as much |as in January anrj were somewhat
I
Iess pessimistic with respect to the OleneraL economic situation. RLL
in the consumer opinions in May 1980, lhowever, appeared no more opt'i-
mistic than on average for 1974 exceptl as far as savings were concerned: ,
Ibothwjthrespecttopresentsavingsa|ndtosav.ingsoverthe'nexttueLv'e
months opinions in l4ay 1980 wer.e mone lfavourabLe than on'average for 1974.i,
I
i
FEuropean Economy" SuppLement seriles cr "Econom'ic Prospects - consumer^
Survey Results", No ?, Jul'f t9S0. | -bl1
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Any concLusion drawn on the basis of this survey with re'spect to
prospects for ac!uaL saving of househotds over the remaincler of '1980
and 1981.must necessari Ly be tentative and provisional. 0n baIance
there might', however, appear to be some reason to expect the 1974/75
pattern to be repeated but with a considerably smaILer ampIitude. This
wouLd impLy that the faLL'in the savings ratio wh-rch is tikel-y to
have occurred in the first months of 1980 couLrl, unJer certain condit'ions,
be expecterJ to be foL[owed by a return to LeveLs cLose to those experjenced
in 1975/76.
The centraL economic forecast by the Commissionrs staff as outLined
above assumes that the savings ratio of househoLds decLines somewhat (0.6
points) between 1979 and 1980 and rises by 0.3 points in 1981. Ift insteacl,
the savings ratio of househoLds after the temporary dectine in Late 1979
and early 1980, as suggested above, rose far above the teveL of 1979,
private consumpt'ion couLd hardLy be expected to necover as earty as
suggested in the central. forecasts and the recession couLd become both
deeper and Longer than expected in September. For instance, if as a result
, of higher-than-assumed savings, consumer spending ulere 1% Lower than int
- the centraL forecast frorn the second haLf of 1980 onwards, GDP in the
Community couLd by the middle of,1981 be about 1Z Lower than in the centraL
,forecast and output woutd be lower in the second haLf of 1981 than in the
first haLf of 1980. The h'igher househoId savings ratio wouLd have as a
counterpart partLy a Lower current externaI deficit and partLy a higher
generat goverqment budget deficit, resutting from a short-faLl of tax
receipts and additional expenditure in the form of unempLoyment aLLowances.
Despite the higher budget deficit, short and Long term,interest rates wouLd,
however, be lower than in centraL scenario. Thus the higher government
borrowing requirement resuLting from the operation of the automatic sta-
bitizers wou[d not make it harder or more expens'ive for private borrowers
to find finance and wouLd therefore not reduce private expenditure. However,
the governments in some t'lember States haye undertaken generat commitments
, to keep the budget deficit beLow certain Limits 0s o proportion of GDP, and
even wjthout a specific committment governments are aiming at a gradual
reduction of the rate of increase sf nom'inaL pubLic debt. The possibi Lity that
budgetary policy wouLcJ be tightenecl in response to the rise in househo[d
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is difficuLt to brir,\S about an activation
a sufficientty earty stage in a cycLicaL dounsuing
I
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'impact of an increaser in househoLd savinOis anO budgetary measures to keep
the government borro,wing requirement fromi rising wouLd Leacl to a very con-
siderab[e short-falL of GDP and to mrcirl nigher unemployment than in the
'centraL f orecast. 0n the who,[e it :can be prgued that in order to avoid a -'
major Loss of output, governments woutd bF more or Less obliged'to accept,
at [east in the short term, the incnease in the budget deficit resulting
from the change in savings/expenditure behaviour of househoLds.
i
It would be more difficuLt to advis4, however, that budgetary,policy
shoulcl not only a.ccept the induced 'increa{e in the budget def i cit but go
further and try to fuLLy offset the defLatiionary impact of the rjse inhouseho[d
savings through discret'ionary measures such as a tax reduction or an ad-
clitional increase 'in pubL'ic expenditure. fihe timing of such mea=ures'wouLd be
I
a key issue. t,Jhi[e a certa:in activation otl budgetary poLicy, if taken at
a vtery earty date in the cycIicaI piocess, Eriqht be beneficiaL for activity :
'
and ernployment and, tead to onty 6 marginal\ increase in the budget deficit
thenegat.iveaspectsofsuchmeasureSwoutpbeLarger.iftakepwhenthe
economy is aLready approaching a cycLica[ {rp-turn.
,I
In practice
of budgetbrly poticy
it
at
tto bring tlle dectine o a hatt one or turo iguarters earlier than youtd
othernise be the case. First, despite continuous improvement of the iu
and avaitabiLity of statisticat data, 
".t"lp. picture of the conji.rnctusituation can be obtained onLy with a detayr of several months or in so
nprov quatity
a cteiar .ju t rat
'I
t Layl me
cases severaI quarters. Second , even r,lhen data on cycLicat deveLopments
I
are avai[abte the preparation and impLementftion of poticy measures take
tine and, furthermore, such measures as migttt Ue introduced wjLL often take
effect bnty graduat[y over several months o{ rith an even tonger delay.
Given that perfect foresight is impossibLeridiscretionary budgetary measures
mightthereforehavetheirmainimpacton"dtivityatatime.h,henthe.
econony is atready putling out of the recession and thus on the nhoLe
accentuate rather than dampen the cycL.e. 
i
-.r':;;1":1.';
10.1?
This might weLL be the case if generaI stimuLatory measures, for
instance a tax reduct'ion, were taken in Member'St'ates in ear Ly 1981
in response to the slowdown which has been under way since the second
quarter of 1980. By the time such measures wouLd have effect, the bottom
,of the cycle might have been reac.hed and there wouLd be a risk that the
measures wouLd stimuLate price increases and imports rather than domestic
activity.
trlhether or not private sector income/expendi'ture behaviour does {sysl6p
as in the.centraL-forecast, it is cLear that the reaction of interest
rates and investment expenrJiture is a key factor which may determine the
speed and profiLe of the move out of recession. The anaLys'is of sectoraL
financiaL baLances and the Loss in weaLth due to infLation (Chapter 4
above) suggests that a cLose reLationship exists between infLation and
'househoLd savings and that, 'in parti cular, interest payments on pubLic ciebt
in some Member States are to some extent considered by the private sector
as a compensation for the Loss in weaLth due to inflation rather than a
uniLateraL transfer from the pubtic sector. ALthough it wouLd be premature
to argue that a reduction of the rate of infLat'ion in the Commun'ity
would exert an expansionary impact upon demancl, there are strong
!{reasons to argue that a Lowering of the rate of infLation is a neces-
sary condition for a reduction of the househoLd savings ratio which in
the tonger run would favour a return to a [ower government budget cjeficit.
')ti
These findings therefore sherJ
traclictory economic performance of
have important'impL'icat'ions for the
Community as a whole as well as for
of convergence within this ent'ity.
new light on the apparentLy con-
the various Member States and aLso
choice of poLicy guideLines for the
poLi cies aimed at increas'ing the degree
First, Memben States which manage to permanentLy and convinc'ingLy reduce
the rate of infIation can expect a certain cycIicaL "payback" from the stimuLus
to activ'ity resuLt'ing f rom a higher propensity to consume out of 'current incorne.
weakened by a positive correLation between infLation and savihgs. This cor-
reIation indeed expLains why in a high-inflation Member State L'ike ItaLy
unenpLoyment remains high and demand pressure (apart from temporary bouts of
strength) so Low, even with very h'igh and increasing budget deficits.
i
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Third, adjustment poticies invotving ex
crrder to offset domestic cost increases may s
clemand to the extent that they [ead to a furt
Poticies aimed at breaking the inflationary
monetary and budgetary poLicy measures may
t han norma L Ly t hought . The pos i t i ve demand
titiveness' through moderation of domestic
I
weaker currency'may indeed be part of .the
performance of the German economy'in past
In sum, the benefits which a single cou
nomous" orientation of macno-economic poIicy
and are Likely to be very short-[ivecl. Member
tlirited Kingdorn, where Large exchange rate de
time to time have in tire perfotl immedjateLy a
a sharp dnop in'the Labour income ratio, folLowe.l
and a subsequent new decLine in the profit shath.
through achiev'ing reaListic wage a4d price de
a,cpropriate domestic monetary and budgetary m
hand Li keLy to present considerable advantage
in point are the Benelux countries ancJ notabL
improvement of the cost and price performance
a tight monetary poLicy and exchange rate sta
the speed of the more or Less unrestrained a
K'ingdom ex change nate has ca I ted f or a part'i c
domestic cost conditions. The European Monetar
turtionaL framework within which coordinated st
inrpLemented and therefore constitutes a key eL
rate poLicies in the narrew sense but indeed i
poLicy structure of the Commun'ity.
The pre cedi ng ana Lys'i s of t he macro-e c
whoLe Suggests that it is preferabLe to set a
budgetar:y anC monetary potjcies. Although it c
getary po['icy has a roLe to pLay in medium-ter
strong case against abrupt changes in poLicy o
ef
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exp
dec
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hange. rate depreciatjon in
stantiaLty deprbss domestic'
r acceLeration of infLation.
iraL through appropriate
refore be Less defLationary
ects of mainta'ining compe-
s rather than through a
anation of the strong growth
des .
t r:y may reap f rom ah "auto-
ay be very limited indeed
St,ates, notably Itaty' and t he
eciations have occurneii from
ter the depreciation experienced
owever by compensatory wage jncneases
I i cies bimed.at convergence
ermination combined with
asures are on the other
in the Long run. Cases
BeLgium where a graduaL
'is under h,ay supported by
i Lity. At the same time
eci at i on of the Un'ited
an[y rap'id'improvement in
System pr"ovi de s t he i nst i :
i Li sat ion poti cies may be
ment not only in exchange
the whoLe macro-economic
ic po['icy options. on the
di um-term course .f or
t be excLuded that bud-
economi c po I i cy' there i-s a
ientation, particuIarLy when the
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automat'ic f iscaL stabi L'izers are reLativeLy strong as in most European
countries. The operation of the automat'ic stabiLizers wiLt - if not offset
by restrictive poLicy measures - provide a certain support to activity but
cannot prevent a sLowdown in a situation when strong externaL and internaL
forces exert a defLationary impact upon activity as in 1980-
The restricted fr^eedom of manoeuvne avaiLable to Member States in the
demand-management fieLd to Limit the appearance of recessionary conditions
in no way lmpLies an inevitabLe poL'icy negativism. Indeed, it may heLp to
concentrate the minds of poLicy-makers on measures to'improve the working
of the various markets in the economy which tend to be ignored at times
when <jemand-management measures seem to be a rnore obv'i ous option for poLicy
activism. It is important, however, that any m icro-economic (or "suppLy
side") measures taken shouLd be such as would be positive and worthwhiLe at
any stage of the demand-cycLe; whiLe aimed at having an impact
in combatting the unfavourabLe empIoyrnent and the structuraL effects of
recessioru they shouLd not be considered as specificaLLy short-term anti:
recession measures forced on poLicy-makers by the frustration of more
convent i ona L demand-management poL i cy
-rt For exariple, act'ions in the fieLd of energy demand and supply must
haVe as their starting-point the need to Loosen the energy constraint on
the Community's medium-term growth prospects. Thus, recalLing the energy
pot.icy objectives adopted by the CounciL in May 1980, at a time when an
underLying growth assumption of 3 1t2% per annum was used, 'it is even
more impor:tant no11, when it seems LikeLy that such a growth assumpt'ion
may be rather h.igh, to'ensure that the targets for reducing ener"gy-consump-
tion are met. Simi[arLy, investment in new sources of energy suppLy and in
- reducing energy consumption in industry, construction and househoLds is a
priority .independent of cycLicaL considerations. The importance of enengy
investment may in fact neceissitate a change in the pattern of overaLI
spending and taxation (so as to favour such investment) intheMember Statesl
budgets at the expense of such tradit'ionaL anti-recession spending areas
as subsidies to "crisis" industries and sociaL transfers. Further, the
existence of recess'ionary conditions shouLd not defLect governments from
seeing that increases in energy costs are passed on to users or from movlng
towards convergence rates taxation of energy at the LeveL of the highest-
rate lvlember States. In this respect it is particr.rLarLy jmportant that any
,'softenins in oiL prices as a resuLt of recession shouLd not be aLLowed byi-
.- governments to weaken the efforts of domestic sectgrs to econontze on energy.
i /,1:{
icy shouLd be to faci[itate
income invested by the
er States since the 1970ts.
tax harmonization is
o consider the effects
e,ts in a wider context. The
nstruments (usuaLLy public
ing (to finance househoId
earty not consistent with
through the fina.nciaL, .
I
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A second major target of micro-econom
the reversal of that dectine jn the proport
private sector which has taken pLace in mos
The Long:term Commission strategy for corpo
.heLpfuI in this direction. It is aLso impor
of tax sy,stens on the openation of financia
favoui'ed tax treatment g'iven to certain sav
debt instruments) and to certain forms of
sector purchase of dwetLings, fon instance)
ent pattern of resource-allo
markets.
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In the fieLd of pubL'ic investmentri governments shouLd
I
consideretabLishingcontingencyq|ansforinvpstmentschemeswhichcouLd
I
be put into openation at short notice shouLd tlhe economic and budgetary
I
c'ircumgtances become such as to caLL for increlased pubLic investment;
At times in the past the capacity of certain wlember States to absorb
i
avaiLabLe investment funds has been Limited byl the absence of adequate
forward pl.ann'ing. 
'
i
I
t,lhere product markets are concenned, it lis in recessionary conditions(uhen pressures mount to extend barriers to cofnOetition, both internaL and
"rit".n.l) especiaLLy important to foster the ifnprovement of competition andtg faciLitate the deveLopment of the CommunitXl market for new products. This
couLO be done, for instancer:through i more 
".[iu" use of Community compe-.:
tence'to counter the emergence of technical orl reguLatory obstacLes to free'
I
c'ircutation of goods and through more active Olreventive use of the harmo-
nization approach in the fietd of technicaL stpndarcls.
I
I
The 1980/81 downturn coincides with a relLativeLf Large - demogra-
phicaL[y determined - growth in the potentiaL lLabour force. The formqtation
I
ol'a policy response to this widening of the dfisequiLibrium between suppLy
i"
l n
and demand f or manpower i s theref ore a key pollt.y i ssue f or 1981'. As in
other areas of micro-economic poLicy, measures faken shouLd
Tb
de'sirabte in themselves and retain their worthl whatever the
nonetheLess be
state of thei
stressed in the
.
i.
);. ,
cy'cte. Thus in the anea of Labour'suppLy, for fnstancer as
/C?
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CounciL resolution of 18 December 1979 on th€ adaptation of workjng time,the
formuLation of a Community approach making for overa[[ coherence and fostering
consensus at Community Levet shoul.d be aimed bt through consuLtations and
contacts with representatives'of empIoyers and workers. DetaiLed guideL{nes
for voLuntary part-tjme work, for Community action in the fieLd of temporary
work and for fLexibLe ret'irement havei:on this basis recent[y been put forward
in communications from the Comtnission. The communication on fLexib[e retire-
ment, in particuLar, recaU.s that measures in this fiel.d could have a
t{amper'ring impact Upbn the grouth of Labouf suppLy in'a'period with pers'istent
unempLoyment. Such measures wouLd not, however, necessari Ly tend to create
bottLenecks during an upturn
Adaptation of those aspects of employment and sociaI security
LegisLation r,rhi ch prevent empLoyers f rom taking as much: advantage of
the demand by potentiaL workers for part-time jobs as they might otherwise
domight be considered. An extension of part-time and shift work wouId improve
the uti lization of the existing capital stock and thereby 'increase the structuraL pgs-
sibiLities for empfoyment. A stepping up of part;time work and earLy re-
tirement wouLd, however, hardIy be sufficient to prevent an increase in un-
emptoyment in a situation when almost 3 miILion young people join the Labour
force annuatIy in the Community. Possibi Lities of extended schooLing,
speciaL training schemes and other measures to'improve the professionat
quaL'ifications of the young eLements of the labour force couLd bring a
f avourabLe soc'iaL return over a mecJium-term jn wh'ich the Community wi I L
be looking to estabL ish or maintain an internationaL competitive advantage
in ski L I and technoIogy-'intensive industries '
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